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PREVIOUS WRITINGS OF
PAUL S. REINSCH

The Common Law in the Early American

Colonies, 1899.
World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth

Century ak Influenced by the Oriental

Situation, 1900.
Colonial Government, 1902.
Colonial Administration, 1905.
American Legislatures and Legislative

Methods, 1907.

Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911.

International Unions, 1911.

An American Diplomat in China, 1918-1918,
1932.

SECRET DIPLOMACY

HOW FAR CAN IT BE ELIMINATED?

BY

PAUL S. REINSCH

NEW YORK
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANy

COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY
HAKCOURT, BRACE A13D GOMPAKY, INC.

PRINTED IN THE U B. A. BY

THE QUINN * BODEN COMPANY

RAHWAY, N J.

The principal conclusions based on the material
contained in this book were presen1;ed by the Au-
thor at a joint meeting of the American Historical
Association and the American Political Science
Association, in his address as President of the
latter, on December 28th, 1920,

CONTENTS

FAGB

Intboduction 3

CBAFIEB

I. Eighteenth Centtjey Diplomacy . 22

II. Old Diplomatic Coeeespondbnoe , 36

III. Aptee the Congeess of Vienna . . 45

rV. Napoleon III, Diseaeli, Bismaeck . 58

V. Teiple Alliance Diplomacy and Mo-

eocco 70

"VT. Entente Diplomacy 84

Vn. The Ceisis of 1914 102

Vin. The Seceet Teeaties of the War . 116
IX. Hopes foe Improvement Defebeed . 129
X. The Desteuction of Public Confi-
dence 136

XI. Pabliament and Foeeign Affairs . 149

XII. The Public and Diplomacy . . . 166

XIII. A Survival op Absolutism . . . 181

XTV. Recent Ambbican Expeeience . . 194

Conclusion 211

Index 225

SECRET DIPLOMACY

INTRODUCTION

Is secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern
politics? Is it the force that keeps nations in a
state of potential hostility and does not allow a
feeling of confidence and of wholehearted co-
operation to grow up? Or is it only a trade de-
vice, a clever method of surrounding with an aura
of importance the doings of the diplomats, a race
of men of average wisdom and intelligence who
traditionally have valued the prestige of dealing
with "secret affairs of state"? Or is it some-
thing less romantic than either of these — ^merely
the survival from a more barbarous age of in-
stincts of seoretiveness and chicane acquired at
a time when self-defense was the necessity of
every hour?

It is quite patent that the practice of secret
diplomacy is incompatible with the democratic
theory of state. Even in the Liberal theory of
state it finds little favor, although that is dis-
posed to grant a great deal of discretion to the
representatives who are given the trusteeship of
public affairs. Yet the essential idea of Liberal-
ism, government by discussion, includes foreign

4 SECRET DIPLOMACY

affairs within its scope fully as much as those of
purely domestic concern. In applying to public
affairs the experience of private business it is
often argued that as the directorate of a corpora-
tion could not be expected to transact its busi-
ness in public, even so diplomatic conversations
are not to be heralded from the house tops. How
far this particular analogy between private busi-
ness and public affairs will hold, is a point we
shall have to examine later. At first sight the
plaiming of private enterprises and the considera-
tion of benefits and losses, can hardly furnish
completely satisfactory rules for the conduct of
public affairs, particularly those involving the
life and death of the persons concerned. Stock-
holders would be reluctant to allow such matters
to be determined by a board of trustees in secret
conclave.

Divesting ourselves of all prejudices, even of
righteous indignation against plainly unconscion-
able practices, we shall try to examine and analyze
the action of great diplomats and to see to what
extent really important results achieved by them
have depended upon the use of secret methods.
In the 18th Century, diplomacy was still looked
upon as a sharp game in which wits were matched,
with a complete license as to the means pursued;

INTRODUCTION 6

provided, however, that embarrassing discovery
must be avoided, in other words, that the exact
method of deception must be so closely guarded
that only the results will show. The great diplo-
mats of the beginning of the 19th century — Met-
ternich, Talleyrand, Pozzo di Borgo — ^while they
talked much about humanitarian principles, con-
tinued to play a barren game of intrigue. Napo-
leon III, that master of devious statecraft, will
always be cited by excoriators of secret diplomacy
as an abhorrent example — a man undone by the
results of his own plotting. Bismarck indeed
prided himself on looking down upon petty se-
cret manoeuvering and cast a certain amount of
contempt on the whole diplomatic business; he
often disconcerted his opponents by an unaccus-
tomed frankness. Yet the orientation of his
statesmanship was based upon the idea of helping
history to find a short-cut to her aims through
masterful plotting. He took the reins out of the
hands of Providence.

But let us return to our first question: "Is
secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern poli-
tics ? " It is indeed worth inquiring how far our
secretive methods in foreign affairs are to blame
for the pitiful condition in which the world finds
itself to-day. No doubt there is a general belief

6 SECRET DIPLOMACY

that secret diplomacy and ever-increasing arma-
ments led Europe into the terrible destruction of
the Great War and that the continuance of such
methods is chiefly to blame for the deplorable
condition since the Armistice. There may be
deeper causes, but these evidences are so obtru-
sive that they naturally attract most attention and
are given most blame for the evils we endure. It
is plain that secret diplomacy is a potent cause
for continued distrust, fear and hate. There are
few statesmen that would not shrink from deliber-
ately planning and staging a war. Yet they
nearly all participate in methods of handling pub-
lic business from which it is hardly possible that
anything but suspicion, fear and hatred should
arise. Distrust is planted everywhere. There is
no assurance of what is the truth; true reports
are questioned; false reports, believed. All mo-
tives are under suspicion. The public conscience
and will are beclouded; nothing stands out as re-
liable but stark military force.

It would seem that we have learned very little
from the war. The same dangerous and un-
healthy methods continue to be used with in-
veterate zeal. The result is that suspicion has
now grown up among those who fought side by
side and who shed their blood together. Realiz-

INTRODUCTION 7

ing the fundamental importance of basing inter-
national life on sound opinion and fair dealing,
the framers of the League of Nations tried to se-
cure the publicity of all international agreements.
Yet this moderate provision of the covenant has
not been obeyed by some of the strongest contract-
ing powers. Some outsiders, indeed, such as Rus-
sia, have quite willingly published their treaties
and furnished them to the bureau of the league.
That the first act of peace-making was to shut
the door of the council chamber in the face of the
multitudes who had offered their lives and shed
their blood for the rights of humanity was a tragic
mistake. In the defense of secret procedure, pub-
lished on January 17, 1919, it was said "To dis-
cuss differences in the press would inflame public
opinion and render impossible a compromise."
So all connection between the great public that
was paying the price of the game and the benevo-
lent elder statesmen who thought they would
shoulder the burden of responsibility alone, was
cut off. The men in the council chamber were not
strengthened in this great crisis by a feeling of
intimate touch with a strong and enlightened pub-
lic opinion. The public itself was disillusioned;
suspicion and contempt were the natural result.
The bald statements given to the press concern-

8 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ing the negotiations did not satisfy any one.
Most of what was going on became known to out-
siders. But its authenticity was so uncertain and
it was so commingled with mere rumor that the
public soon gave up in despair. It will be impor-
tant to inquire as to what is the proper perspec-
tive between confidential deliberation and public-
ity of results, in conferences, which are becoming
the usual agency for discussing and settling inter-
national affairs.

"When secrecy is confined merely to the methods
of carrying on negotiations, its importance for
good and evil is certainly not so great as when
the secrecy of methods includes concealment of
aims and of the agreements arrived at. We
could imagine that even a statesman who seeks
the closest relationship with public opinion, even
a Lincoln, could not at all times eliminate all
use of confidential communications. But the
temper of the whole system of foreign affairs is
a different matter; and any broad effort to con-
ceal the tendency of action or its results is cer-
tainly productive of evil, no matter how salutary
or beneficial it may seem to the men employing it
at the time.

But, it is said, we must trust to experts. In-
ternational relations are so intricate and have so

INTRODUCTION 9

many delicate shadings that they elude the grasp
of the ordinary man, and can be held together and
seen in their proper relations only by the com-
prehensive and experienced mind of the seasoned
statesman. There is, however, a distinction
which ought to be noted. The public relies in
most cases unreservedly upon expertship in mat-
ters of engineering, science, accounting, business
management, and even in medicine, though in the
latter with a feeling of less complete security. In
all these cases we know that the processes applied
and the methods pursued are demonstrable, and
mathematically certain to produce the results an-
ticipated. But in the affairs of international poli-
tics into which the human equation and other in-
exactly calculable factors enter, there is no such
mathematical certainty which can be tested and
ascertained by any group of experts. It is all a
matter of wisdom in choosing alternatives, and
we may well doubt whether any man or small
group of men, under modern conditions of life
and public state action, can be wiser in such mat-
ters by themselves than they would be if they con-
stantly kept in direct touch with public opinion.
Society, when properly organized, will have at its
disposal on every question of importance, groups
of men who have expert knowledge. Expertship

10 SECRET DIPLOMACY

in foreign affairs is not confined to the foreign.
ofiSces or the chanceries; many thoughtful men
observing and thinking intensely, traveling widely,
seeing foreign affairs from an independent angle,
have opinions and judgments to contribute that
the officials cannot safely ignore. In an inquiry
of this kind we shall have to consider the broader
setting of diplomacy as a part of public life within
the nation and throughout the world. The ele-
ment of secrecy is appropriate only when we con-
sider diplomacy as a clever game played by a
small inner privileged circle; it appears out of
place in a society organized on a broader basis.
As a matter of fact the defense of secrecy, from
the point of view of the inner politics of the state,
resolves itself almost entirely into an opinion that
the ignorance and inexperience of the people does
not fit them to judge of foreign relations. That,
it must be confessed, does not seem to be a very
sound or convincing basis for the choice of meth-
ods of public action in a modern state.

But the real strength of the argument for se-
crecy comes when the external aspects of state
action are considered. Then there is, on the sur-
face at least, an apparent justification for se-
cretiveness, in the interest of a closely knit society
engaged in competitive struggle with similar so-

INTRODUCTION 11

cieties and obliged to defend itself and to safe-
guard its interest by all available means.

Regarded in its broader aspects there are two
conceptions of diplomacy which are quite antag-
onistic and which have divided thinkers since the
time of Machiavelli and Grotius. These two
great minds may indeed be considered as typify-
ing the two tendencies and expressing them in
themselves and through the sentiments which
their thought and writings have engendered in
their successors.

We have the conception of diplomacy as work-
ing out a complex system of state action, balanc-
ing and counterbalancing forces and material re-
sources and giving direction to the innermost
purposes of the state. It is probable that all
professional diplomats are more or less enchanted
by this ideal. Up to the great war, Bismarck was
generally considered the ablest master of diplo-
macy, and his action seemed to supply short-cuts
for historical forces to work out their natural
aims. Nationalism was the word of the day and
the creation of the German national state, fore-
ordained as it seemed by the laws of history, was
accelerated by the masterful action of the great
diplomat. But we are now able to see wherein
lay the limitations of this method as applied by

12 SECRET DIPLOMACY

Bismarck. Notwithstanding his grasp of historio
principles of development, he did not, after all,
work in unison with broad natural forces, but re-
lied on his power to dominate other men through
forceful mastery, with dynastic associations. He
was a superman rather than a great representa-
tive of a people's aspirations. So while he pro-
claimed the truthfulness of his diplomacy, it was
nevertheless kept essentially as his own and his
master's affair and business, rather than the peo-
ple's. The base of his policy was narrow. He
understood nationalism from a Prussian point of
view. He severed Austria from Germany, and
then antagonized France by taking Lorraine ; far
more important still, he failed to strengthen Ger-
man relations with Central Europe and thus made
it later seem necessary for Germany to go on to
the sea and thus to arouse the apprehensions and
enmity of England. Thus while he himself would
probably have in the end avoided confronting the
entire world as enemies, the foundations he had
laid did not provide a safe footing for the more
ordinary men who followed him. His diplomacy,
once considered so great, had contained no ade-
quate and sound foundation for permanent na-
tional life. Such have been the results of the
most distinguished and successful work of manip-

INTRODUCTION 13

ulative diplomacy during the Nineteenth Century.
What then shall we say of the justification of
wars brought about as a part of such a system;
under which statesmen consider it quite natural
to contemplate "preventive war" and to assume
responsibility for wholesale slaughter because
their plan of action seems to reveal a necessity
for it. The idea of conscious planning, or striv-
ing to subject national and economic facts and
aU historic development to the conscious political
will, — that conception of diplomacy is synony-
mous with the essence of politics and will stand
and fall with the continuance of the purely polit-
ical state. Manipulative, and hence secret, di-
plomacy is in fact the most complete expression
of the purely political factor in human affairs.
To many, it will seem only a survival of a hyper-
political era, as human society now tends to out-
grow and transcend politics for more comprehen-
sive, pervasive and essential principles of action.
We need not here rehearse the fundamental char-
acter of politics as a struggle for recognized au-
thority to determine the action of individuals,
with the use of external compulsion. Politics is
a part of the idea of the national state seen from
the point of view of a struggle for existence
among different political organizations, in which

14 SECRET DIPLOMACY

one class originally superimposed its authority
upon a subject population and in -which, after au-
thority is firmly established within, political power
is then used to gain advantages from, or over,
outside societies. It is Machiavelli as opposed
to Grotius who gives us the philosophy of this
struggle. The narrowness of this basis for hu-
man action and the direful effect of conscious and
forceful interference with social and economic
laws, is now beginning to be recognized.

But there is also a broader conception of diplo-
macy which is influencing the minds of men al-
though it is not yet fully embodied in our daily
practice. This conception looks upon humanity,
not as a mosaic of little mutually exclusive areas,
but as a complex body of interlocking interests
and cultural groups. As this conception gains in
strength, the center of effort in diplomacy will
not be to conceal separatist aims and special plots,
but to bring out into the clear light of day the
common interests of men. The common work for
them to do in making the world habitable, in dig-
nifying the life of men and protecting them
against mutual terror and massacre, — that ideal
of cooperation and forbearance, is as yet only
partially embodied in our international practices,
although it arouses the fervid hopes of men

INTRODUCTION 15

throughout the world. Whether a system of local
autonomy combined with full cooperation and free
interchange of influences can be brought about
without the exercise of an overpowering influence
on the part of a group of allied nations, is still
doubtful. But if it should be achieved, then
plainly the old special functions of diplomacy will
fall away and administrative conferences will take
the place of diplomatic conversations. When
Portugal became a republic, the proposal was
made to abolish all diplomatic posts and have the
international busine^ of Portugal administered
by consuls. That would eliminate politics from
foreign relations.

Diplomacy in the spirit of Grotius has always
had its votaries even in periods of the darkest
intrigue, but there has only recently come into
general use a method of transacting international
business which favors open and full discussion of
diplomatic affairs. Such business will be dealt
with less and less in separate negotiation between
two powers ; there will generally be more nations
involved, and conferences and standing commit-
tees or commissions will be at work, rather than
isolated diplomats. Indeed, international con-
ferences are still largely influenced by the old
spirit of secretive diplomacy. Yet the practice

16 SECRET DIPLOMACY

of meeting together in larger groups is itself
inimical to the strict maintenance of the older
methods and we may expect a natural growth of
more simple and direct dealings. It will be in-
teresting to watch the use of the older methods
of diplomacy under these new conditions and to
see how far and how fast they will have to be
modified in order to bear out the underlying prin-
ciple in human development to which action by
conference responds.

The Washington Conference of 1921 afforded
the first notable occasion for bringing into use
open methods in diplomatic discussion. Secre-
tary Hughes in his introductory speech struck a
keynote hitherto not heard in negotiations on in-
ternational matters. A new era seemed to have
dawned in which great issues and all-important
interests could be discussed openly and decided
on their merits. A great wave of enthusiasm
passed over the public. But it cannot be said that
the temper of this auspicious opening was sus-
tained throughout. As the conference descended
from general declarations to important questions
of detail there was an unmistakable reversion to
old methods, which obstructed the straightforward
aims of Secretary Hughes. Even the generous
Initial proposal of the American government was

INTRODUCTION 17

made by one of the powers a trading subject. The
result was that some of the attendant evils of se-
cret diplomacy invaded even this conference, and
that the public soon became somewhat confused as
to its object and purposes, through an abundance
of guesses which put a premium on the sensational
imagination. It must be said that the temper of
the press, encouraged by the manner in which the
Conference had been inaugurated, was one of re-
straint and responsibility. Viewing the questions
which were before this Conference, there can be
no doubt that the very problems about which
there was hesitation and exaggerated secretive-
ness, were exactly those which could have been
best judged of by the well-informed public opin-
ion. One could not avoid the conclusion that the
fear of publicity is in all cases inspired by mo-
tives which cannot stand the test of a world-wide
public opinion.

At the present day, as yet, the fatal circle has
not been broken: secret diplomacy, suspicion,
armaments, war. We had thought that we should
escape from it quite easily, after the terrible sac-
rifices laid on mankind and the light which had
been flashed on us in that darkness. But the pas-
sions which had been stirred up and the fear and
terror which had been aroused in that dire ex-

18 SECRET DIPLOMACY

perience may for some time yet serve to
strengthen the reactionary forces in human af-
fairs, and retard those which tend to liberate hu-
manity from terror and suffering. But it is lack
of leadership toward better things, that is most
to blame.

To America, to the government and the people,
the elimination of secret dealings in international
affairs is nothing short of a primary interest.
The entire character of our foreign policy is in-
spired with, and based upon, the belief in open
dealings and fair play. We have a broad conti-
nental position which makes secret plotting and
devious transactions unnatural, inappropriate
and unnecessary. Our national experience of one
hundred and fifty years has expressed itself quite
spontaneously in proposals for the peaceful set-
tlement of international disputes by discussion,
for the improvement of international relations
through conferences, and in the great policies of
the Open Door, which means commercial fair play,
and the Monroe Doctrine, which means political
fair play to the American sister republics. A
policy such as this has nothing to seek with secret
methods and concealed aims.

To tolerate secrecy in international affairs
would mean to acquiesce in a great national dan-

INTRODUCTION 19

ger. For good or ill we can no longer conceive
ourselves as isolated. Our every-day happiness
and permanent welfare are directly affected by
what other nations do and plan. Continued se-
crecy would mean that we should feel ourselves
surrounded by unknown dangers. "We should have
to live in an atmosphere of dread and suspicion.
We could find peace of mind only in the security
of vast armaments. In international affairs we
would be walking by the edge of precipices and
over volcanoes ; our best intentioned proposals for
the betterment of human affairs would be secretly
burked, as in the case of Secretary Knox' plan
of railway neutralization in Manchuria. Our
rights would be secretly invaded and our security
threatened, as at the time when England and
France agreed with Japan that she should have
the North Pacific islands, behind our backs,
though our vital interests were involved. In all
such matters secrecy will work to the disadvan-
tage of that power which has the most straight-
forward aims and policies. America cannot will-
ingly submit to such a condition. It is unthink-
able that with our traditions of public life and
with our Constitutional arrangements, we should
ourselves play the old game of secret intrigue;
it is for us to see, and to the best of our power

20 SECRET DIPLOMACY

and ability to assure, that it will not be played in
the future by others.

Nations will respond to the call for absolutely
open dealings in international affairs, with a
varying degree of readiness and enthusiasm. We
are perhaps justified in saying that wherever the
people can make their desires felt they will be
unanimously for a policy of openness. The Eng-
lish tradition of public life would also be favor-
able to such a principle of action, were it not that
such special imperial interests as the British raj
in India frequently inspires British diplomacy
with narrower motives and with a readiness to
depart from open dealings from a conviction that
imperial interests so require. The Eussian So-
viet government in giving to the public a full
knowledge of international affairs, was at first
inspired primarily by a desire to discredit the
old regime. But it is also undoubtedly true that
the hold which this government has on the party
which supports it, is in a measure due to the fact
that all foreign policies and relationships are
freely reported to, and discussed in, the party
meetings and the Soviets. No matter what the
aims of this government may be, it cannot be de-
nied that it has strengthened itself by the open-
ness of its foreign policy. The Chinese people

INTRODUCTION 21

have manifested a deep faith, in public opinion and
ijheir chief desire in international affairs is that
there shall be open, straightforward dealings so
that all the world may know and judge. Through
all their difficulties of the last decade they have
been sustained by this faith in the strength of a
good cause in the forum of world-wide public
opinion.

The peoples of the Continent of Europe lan-
doubtedly would welcome a reign of openness
and truth, for they have suffered most from se-
cret dealings in diplomacy. But those who gov-
ern them find it difficult to extricate themselvesi
from the tangle of intrigue. As President Wil-
son expressed it :

"European diplomacy works always in the dense
thicket of ancient feuds, rooted, entangled and en-
twined. It is difficult to see the path; it is not always
possible to see the light of day. I did not realize it all
until the peace conference; I did not realize how deep
the roots are."

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY

During the eighteenth century, diplomatic ac-
tion was dominated entirely by the tactics and
stratagems of war. Diplomacy was a continuous
struggle for political advantage and power, seek-
ing to accomplish the purposes of war through
keen intriguing; it was war pursued in the coun-
cil chamber. The temper of diplomacy was not
that of a commercial transaction, or of coopera-
tion in the works of peace and betterment ; but it
was intent upon selfish advantage — ^power, pres-
tige, preferment, and all the outward evidences
of political success. It did not have the con-
science of peaceful enterprise and cooperation,
but on the contrary emulated the keen, restless,
alert, and all-suspecting spirit of the military
commander in action. All the ruses, deceptions,
subterfuges, briberies and strategies which the
struggle for existence in war appears to render
justifiable, diplomacy made use of. It was es-
sentially a political secret service informed with
the spirit of life-aad-death competition. As,

22

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 23

among individuals in that society, all action was
dominated by the constantly overhanging haz-
ard of private duel, bringing into life something
of the keenness and cruelty of the tempered
blade; so among nations warlike rivalry inspired
all political action. War was either going on or
impending and being prepared for ; humanity was
living true to the old adage: "Man a wolf to
man."

Diplomacy was personal in that the ambassa-
dor was held to be an alter ego of the monarch.
It was surrounded with the glamor of high state
and important enterprise, and inspired with a
great pride of office. The fact that he repre-
sented absolute power in its contact with the ab-
solute power of others, gave the diplomat a sense
of high importance. The monarchs, themselves,
were generally governed by personal motives and
considerations. They looked upon politics as a
keen game for personal or family power in which
populations of subjects, territory, and war in-
demnities were the stakes, and human lives the
pawns; the highest happiness and good fortune
of the subject was supposed to be the right to
die for his king. The diplomatic representatives
quite naturally fell into the same way of regard-
ing affairs of state from the viewpoint of political

24 SECRET DIPLOMACY

power to be gained, maintained and constantly in-
creased. It was a rather narrow game as seen
by the rank and fQ© of the diplomatic world;
only a few far-seeing and statesmanlike minds
could at that time appreciate the abroad under-
lying human foundation of all political action.

Such broader insight would often have been a
real obstacle to the success of the keen and clever
player of the game. The mastery of underlying
principles which made Grotius famous for all ages
did not contribute to his success as a diplomat.
The wheel of fortune turned fast, and fleeting ad-
vantage had to be caught by quick, clever though
often superficial, machinations. Even as late as
1830, John Quincy Adams observed that deep in-
sight and unusual ability was something of a
hindrance to a diplomat. Yet the keen edge of
the successful diplomats of the powdered wig pe-
riod is in itself one of the noteworthy qualities
of that sociable though unsocial age.

Throughout this period Machiavelli's Prince
may be taken as the fitting commentary on po-
litical action. The men of this age had not yet
grown up to the realization which Machiavelli al-
ready had of the nature and importance of the
national principle; but Machiavelli's thought con-
cerning the means by which, in a period of unrest

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DH^LOMACY 25

and sharp rivalry, political power may be estab-
lished, built up and preserved, with total disre-
gard of every feeling and ideal and the single-
minded pursuit of political success, — that thor-
oughly explains the spring of action of this period.

In reading the memoirs and letters of this time,
one will encounter a great many protestations of
conventional morality, as well as an understand-
ing of human nature and a comprehensive grasp
of the details of international rivalry. But far-
seeing ideals of wisdom, moderation, and justice,
and of human cooperation will not frequently be
met with ; there is no searching vision of realities.
Nor will one gain from these memoirs very spe-
cific information about the actual methods of
doing diplomatic business. These methods, even
the particularly unscrupulous ones, were prob-
ably considered almost as natural processes, to
be passed by without mention. But incidentally,
one may receive hints, even in the correspondence
of the most correct and guarded diplomat, suf-
ficient to reconstitute their current manner of
thought and action.

We encounter there all the artifices of a secret
service versed in the stratagems and tricks
through which information can be obtained, — ^the
stealing of documents, bribery of public officials,

26 SECRET DIPLOMACY

general misrepresentation and deceit. Matters
are often so inextricably complicated that it must
have required the greatest effort to remember
what each participant in that particular intrigue
knew or was supposed not to know, what he could
be told and what must be kept from him. These
are still the more venial methods; but when the
welfare of the state required, it might even be
necessary, as in the case of war, to dispose of in-
convenient and obstructive individuals by wreck-
ing their reputation or even by putting them out
of the way altogether.

Even the learned and dignified authorities on
international law could not entirely ignore the
methods employed in actual diplomatic inter-
course. Grotius held that "amphibologies" — a
term apparently coined by him to designate state-
ments which could be understood in several ways
— ^were admissible, except in certain cases where
there existed a duty to unmask, as in matters
involving the "honor of God," or charity towards
a neighbor, or the making of contracts, or others
of like nature. His successor, Vattel, draws a
distinction between a downright lie, "words of
him who speaks contrary to his thoughts on an
occasion when he is under obligation to speak the
truth"; and a "falsiloquy," which he considers

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 27

venial, and which is "an untrue discourse to per-
sons who have no right to insist on knowing the
truth in a particular case." This distinction
gives a rather ample latitude to the discretion
of a diplomat in the matter of truthfulness. Ac-
cording to the good and learned Vattel, the duty
of any one to tell the truth was binding only
towards another who had the right to demand
that the truth be spoken. In his day, very few
people indeed could claim the right of demanding
an insight into diplomatic affairs, so that his rule
did not put the diplomat under a very severe
moral constraint. Even to the present day there
have been known individual envoys whose utter-
ances plainly are made in the spirit of Vattel's
distinction.

Callieres, who wrote on the Practice of Diplo-
macy, in the year 1716, is full of admiration of
all that a shrewd, clever diplomat may accomplish
in stirring up trouble and confounding things gen-
erally in the state to which he is accredited. To
the question, "What can be achieved by a negotia-
tor?" Callieres answers, "We see daily around
us its definite effects — sudden revolutions favor-
able to a great design of state, use of sedition and
fermenting hatreds, causing jealous rivals to arm,
80 that the third party may rejoice (ut tertius

28 SECRET DIPLOMACY

gaudeat), dissolution by crafty means of the cIost
est unions. A single word or act may do more
than the invafsion of whole armies, because the
crafty negotiator will know how to set in motion
various forces native to the country in which he
is negotiating and thus may spare his master the
vast expense of a campaign. ... It frequently
happens that well chosen spies contribute more
than any other agency to the success of great
plans. They are not to be neglected. An am-
bassador is an honorable spy because it is his
function to discover great secrets. He should
have a liberal hand." That admiration of suc-
cessful deceit and mental cleverness in obtaining
results that could only be gained by force through
great sacrifice of life, inspired also the Italian
admiration for clever deceit, such as shown by
Maehiavelli in his eulogy of Pope Alexander VI
for his unrivaled eminence in prevarication.

It is remarkable that the famous witticism of
Sir Henry Wotton that "an ambassador is a per-
son sent abroad to lie for the good of his coun-
try," did not occur to some one much earlier; but
though the hon mot had not been coined, the idea
itself was quite familiar. Louis XI quite bluntly
instructed his embassies, "If they lie to you, lie
still more to them." But through all this period

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 29

the virtue of sincerity and of truthfulness also
had their admirers : Callieres, speaking of the suc-
cessful diplomat, says, "Deceit is but the measure
of smallness of mind and intelligence. A diplo-
mat should have a reputation for plain and fair
dealing and should observe the promises he has
made." It may, however, be suspected that the
good writer here contemplates the dangers of un-
successful deceit and of too transparent ruses,
rather than the positive value of truth itself.

James Harris, Lord Malmesbury, who was cer-
tainly conversant with all the ins and outs of
eighteenth century diplomacy, wrote in a letter
of advice (April 11, 1813) addressed to Lord Cam-
den: "It is scarce necessary to say that no oc-
casion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an
unjust accusation, no idea, however tempting, of
promoting the object you have in view, can n6ed,
much less justify, a falsehood. Success obtained
by one is a precarious and baseless success. De-
tection would ruin, not only your own reputation
for ever, but deeply wound the honor of your
Court." In this sage advice, too, the dominant
idea seems to be that detection is ruinous. The
homage which is thus paid to the ideal of truth
and sincerity is compatible with the use of quite
opposite methods provided they are successful

30 SECRET DIPLOMACY

and so cleverly guarded that they are not dis-
covered.

However, at aU times there must have existed,
among the people at large and even among those
playing the game of politics, men who had a nat-
ural inborn desire for truth and a simplicity of
nature which brought them closer to the true un-
derlying forces than were the common run of
courtiers and politicians. The ever recurring ad-
miration expressed for the diplomacy of Cardinal
d'Orsat, the «nvoy of Henry IV to the Pope, in-
dicates a real appreciation, even among the pro-
fession, of high standards of straightforwardness
in diplomatic negotiations. Cardinal d'Orsat
seems to have disdained all shallow devices of
deceptive cleverness. He relied upon simple rea-
sonableness and honesty in proposing an arrange-
ment mutually beneficial, to win after others had
exhausted all possible tricks and stratagems. In
discussing diplomacy, Mably says that such meth-
ods alone are calculated to secure positive and
permanent results while the devices of clever de-
ceit can only serve to delay and confuse.

Several statesmen have discovered that the
telling of the actual truth often exerts a some-
what befuddling effect on diplomats, so that they
may easily be misled by telling them real facts

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 31

which they will interpret in a contrary sense.
This method has usually been associated with the
name of Bismarck who on one occasion said, "It
makes me smile to see how puzzled all these diplo-
mats are when I tell them the truth pure and sim-
ple. They always seem to suspect me of telling
them fibs." The discovery had, however, been
made by many statesmen before Bismarck. As
early as 1700, de Torcy had arrived at the con-
clusion that the best way of deceiving foreign
courts is to speak the truth. Lord Stanhope said
quite complacently that he could always impose
upon the foreign diplomats by telling them the
naked truth, and that he knew that in such cases
they had often reported to their courts the oppo-
site to what he had truthfully told them to be
the facts. At a later date, Palmerston also
prided himself on being able to mislead by the
open and apparently unguarded manner in which
he told the truth. It would, however, manifestly
be difficult to use this method successfully more
than in spots; it would have to be interspersed
from time to time with a judicious amount of pre^
varication, in order to throw the other party off
the scent.

To appear simple and true has always been
greatly desired of diplomats. Count Du Luc,

32 SECRET DIPLOMACY

French. Ambassador to Vienna, said in a letter,
"My great desire, if I may be permitted to speak
about myself, is to appear simple and true. I
flatter myself that I possess the latter qnalifioa-
tion; but you know my method of manceuvering."
The appearance of frankness has indeed been
most valuable to diplomats in all ages ; though one
naturally suspects the man who in and out of
season explicitly declares and protests that vir-
tue. Diplomatic frankness is a part of that elab-
orate and complicated system of self-control and
coolness together with a mastery of all the out-
ward expressions of different affections and pas-
sions, which notable diplomats have sought to
achieve. It would not take an expert to advise
against pomposity. Callieres counsels, "Be
genial. Avoid the sober, cold air. An air of mys-
tery is not useful."

In that century in which keenness and clever-
ness were so intensively cultivated with the high
pitch of the personal duel transferred to affairs
of state, the complete self-control of diplomats,
their quickness and their gift of taking advantage
of any favorable turn in the situation, are cer-
tainly worthy of admiration, as we reanimate in
our minds the life portrayed in these old memoirs
and letters. Occasionally a mishap occurs like

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 33

that of the British Minister, Mr. Drake, who
boasted to Mehee de la Touche of the very care-
ful precautions he had taken to guard his secret
correspondence; which vainglory resulted quite
disastrously to his collection of secrets. In-
stances of delightful cleverness and cool-headed-
ness are frequent. Cardinal Mazarin, who in his
methods and principles was quite the opposite to
Cardinal d'Orsat and who was particularly free
from any scruples whatsoever concerning the
truth, won his first striking diplomatic success
through a ruse. "What a quick mind and daring
spirit his, when on his first mission to the court
of the Duke of Feria, as a very young man, he
attained his object so completely. How other-
wise could he have ascertained the true opinion
of His Highness on the matter of great impor-
tance to the Court of France which Mazarin was
especially sent to ascertain, as there were great
doubts about it and the duke entirely unwilling
to express himself? A keen observer, Mazarin
had soon learned that the duke was irascible and
unguarded when in anger; but few would have
followed him in suddenly, out of the clear sky,
deliberately, so stirring the duke to anger that he,
entirely off his guard, blurted out things which
unmistakably gave a clue to his real opinions on

34 SECRET DIPLOMACY

the important matter of state in question. What
a vivid satisfaction the young man must have had,
■which, however, he needs must carefully conceal
to feign grief and despair because he had been
hapless enough to arouse the ill will of His High-
ness. Mazarin was throughout his life noted for
a perfect command of the expressions of all the
moods, sentiments and passions, used by him at
will so that it was impossible for any one to pene-
trate his mask. The same achievement was at-
tained in a notable manner by the great diplomats
of the old school, Talleyrand and Metternich, who
held the stage at the beginning of the nineteenth
century ; and .it has been emulated in greater or
less perfection by successive generations of Min-
isters, Counselors, and Secretaries.

When Cromwell had allowed himself to be
tangled up in double-faced negotiations with the
Spanish and the French courts of which the lat-
ter had obtained complete knowledge, the French
envoy, DeBass, very cleverly rebuked him for the
inconstancy and disingenuousness of his action.
The envoy related to Cromwell in complete detail,
but as an "unauthenticated report," all the facts
of the dubious negotiation, and then asked the
Protector kindly to extricate him from this laby-
rinth. Cromwell was entirely taken aback and

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 36

took his departure abruptly on urgent business,
leaving his secretary to make excuses. The star
performance of Mettemich was when Napoleon,
returning from a hunt in a fit of heated excite-
ment, in the presence of the other foreign repre-
sentatives, rushed up to him shouting, "What the
deuce does your Emperor expect of me?" Met-
ternich replied with the greatest composure, "He
expects his ambassador to be treated with re-
spect."

II

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

The correspondence of diplomats of the eight-
eenth century is full of interest because of the
particular intimacy which characterized social life
at that time. But we receive from it also direct
and invaluable information on the spirit and
methods of diplomacy. The correspondence from
St. Petersburg at the time of Catherine the Great
gives a complete picture of the less noble features
of diplomatic life and action. At that Court, pre-
sided over by a woman of great ambition whose
every movement and mood the diplomats felt nec-
essary to take into account and carefully to cal-
culate, at a time when England and France as
well as other nations were involved in almost con-
stant hostilities, the sharpest characteristics of
eighteenth century diplomacy came to the surface.
Politics is seen as a game of forfeits and favors
in which wars were made for personal and dynas-
tic reasons and territories traded off in the spirit
of the gamester without regard to natural or
ethnic facts, or the welfare of the population.

36

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 37

A letter written near the beginning of Cather-
ine's reign, addressed by Sir George Macartney
to the Earl of Sandwich, most strikingly illus-
trates the character of the period. The British
Minister first reports that M. Panin, the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had signed a treaty
of alliance with Denmark, contemplating war with
Turkey. By a most secret article, Denmark
promises "to disengage herself from all French
connections, demanding only a limited time to en-
deavor to obtain the arrears due to her by the
Court of France. At all events, she is immedi-
ately to enter into all the views of Eussia in
Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly,
with her in that kingdom." The writer then re-
ports that it is the ardent wish of the Empress
"to make a common cause with England and
Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French
interest there (in Sweden). This certainly can-
not be done without a considerable expense; but
Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable
enough to expect that we should pay thfe whole."
The amount necessary absolutely to prevent the
French from ever getting at Stockholm again is
suggested. As the Swedes are highly sensitive
because of their dependent situation in recent
years, the Russian Court desires "that we and

38 SECRET DIPLOMACY

they should act upon separate bottoms, still pre-
serving between our respective Ministers a con-
fidence without reserve. That our first care
should be, not to establish a faction under the
name of a Russian or of an English faction ; but,
as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a
mere name, to endeavor to have our friends dis-
tinguished as the friends of liberty and inde-
pendence." The Minister then reports that an
alliance with Russia is not to be thought of un-
less by some secret article England would agree
to pay a subsidy to Russia in case of a Turkish
war (Turkey happened at the time to be in al-
liance with England). The Minister relates that
a similar proposal which was put up to the King
of Prussia by a Russian official who was his mor-
tal enemy and who hoped greatly to embarrass
him thereby, was unexpectedly and quite blandly
accepted by Frederick II. The letter closes with
the earnest entreaty on no account to mention to
M. Gross, the Russian Minister in London, the
secret article of the treaty which his own Gov-
ernment had just concluded with Denmark.

The correspondence of James Harris, Lord
Mahnesbury, is a particularly full and continuous
account of court and diplomatic life in the eight-
eenth century. In describing his diplomatic

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 39

struggles in a Court in which everything turned
round the whims and ambitions of an unscrupu-
lous woman who had come to the throne through
putting out of the way it^ rightful occupant, the
vicious practices of the day are presented in all
their corruption and deceitfulness. Before going
to Eussia, Sir James Harris was Minister at Ber-
lin. He paints the character of Frederick the
Great in the following words: "Thus never los-
ing sight of his object, he lays aside all feelings
the moment that is concerned; and, although as
an individual he often appears, and really is, hu-
mane, benevolent, and friendly, yet the instant he
acts in his Eoyal capacity, these attributes for-
sake him, and he carries with him desolation, mis-
ery, and persecution, wherever he goes." A Ger-
man scholar of the period, an admirer of the
great monarch, used the following language:
"The art, till then unknown in Europe, of con-
cluding alliances without committing one's self,
of remaining unfettered while apparently bound,
of seceding when the proper moment is arrived,
can be learnt from him and only from him."
These descriptions of the political character of
Frederick II set forth the essential political fac-
tor as it was understood at the time and as it has
been understood by a continuous line of states-

40 SECRET DIPLOMACY

men from Machiavelli to the present. As in
physical science, every factor has to be disre-
garded except those essential to the experiment
which is being conducted, so in the intensive poli-
tics of the modern state, in the mind of such men,
abstraction is made from all sentiment, virtue and
quality, to the sole pursuit of a closely calculated
political effect. The same German scholar cred-
its Frederick the Great with a superior straight-
forwardness. That quality, however, is mani-
fested by such a man mostly on occasions where
he is so sure of himself and of his plans that he
can challenge the worst attempts of his enemies
to upset them and can confound them utterly by
flinging his plans in their faces, as did Bismarck
at a later time. A startling and fearless frank-
ness is one of the characteristics of political
genius.

But to return to the correspondence of Lord
Malmesbury. All the devices and foibles of the
profession at that period are there mirrored.
When he (still as Sir James Harris) reports the
coming of a new French Minister to St. Peters-
burg, he expresses the hope that the new envoy
will not be so difficult to deal with as the present
charge d 'affairs, "who, though he has a very
moderate capacity, got access to all the valets de

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 41

chambre and inferior agents in the Russian
houses,, who very often conjured up evil spirits
where I least of all expected them. ' ' A little later
he reports to the British Foreign Minister, Lord
Stormont, as follows: "If, on further inquiry,
I should find, as I almost suspect, that my friend's
(Prince Potemkin) fidelity has been shaken, or
his political faith corrupted, in the late confer-
ences, by any direct offers or indirect promises
of reward, I shall think myself, in such a case,
not only authorized but obliged to lure him with
a similar bait." He reminds His Lordship of
the fact that Prince Potemkin is immensely rich
and that, therefore, perhaps as much may be re-
quired as de Torcy offered to the Duke of Marl-
borough (two million francs).

In a letter of June 25, 1781, Sir James Harris,
writing to the same Minister, speaks of having
obtained information of the conclusion of a secret
treaty between Russia and Austria from the con-
fidential secretary of a Russian minister. He
adds: "I trust I shall keep him to myself, since
I have lost almost all my other informers by
being outbid for them by the French and Prus-
sians." He adds that it is painful to him that
the secret service expenses come so very high but
he explains that the avid corruptioi^ of the court

42 SECRET DIPLOMACY

is ever increasing and that his enemies are fa-
vored by the fact that they can join in the ex-
pense against him, their courts moreover supply-
ing them most lavishly. He adds: "They are
also much more adroit at this dirty business than
I am, who cannot help despising the person I cor-
rupt."

The Foreign Minister of Russia at this time,
and for many years before and after, was Count
Panin, It was then suspected and is now known
that he was firmly bought by Frederick II. Bat
there has been some doubt as to whether he en-
tered upon this corrupt relation behind the back
of Empress Catherine or at her bidding. It is
known that she often encouraged her ministers
at foreign courts to accept bribes and apparently
to sell themselves to foreign governments, be-
cause through the relationship of confidence thus
established they might gather information use-
ful to their own government. This is one of the
many ways in which the game of corruption
tended to defeat itself.

As far as the letters of this period deal with
diplomatic policies they are no more reassuring
than when they relate the details of diplomatic
practice. On August 16, 1782, Sir James Harris
made a long confidential report to Lord Grantham.

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 43

He observes that Count Panin is powerfully as-
sisting the King of Prussia, the French Minister
is artful and intriguing, working through Prince
Potemkin and the whole tribe of satellites which
surrounded the Empress, whom he calls "barber
apprentices of Paris." He then unfolds his own
policy of wimiing the favor of the Empress for
England by giving her the island of Minorca as
a present. His idea had been adopted by the
British Foreign Office and he writes, "Nothing
could be more perfectly calculated to the meridian
of this Court than the judicious instructions I re-
ceived on this occasion." He decided, — hand in
hand with the proposed cession of Minorca, — to
designate the Empress as a friendly mediatrix be-
tween England and Holland; he says: "I knew,
indeed, she was unequal to the task but I knew
too how greatly her vanity would be flattered by
this distinction." Farther on he reports how,
gradually, after several British Ministers had in-
curred the ill humor of Catherine, Fox and the
present Minister of Foreign Affairs have finally
found favor and smoothed the road for Sir James.
He hopes that all these great efforts and sacri-
fices may result in "lighting the strong glow of
friendship in Her Imperial Majesty in favor of
England." At this distance a slim result of so

44 SECRET DIPLOMACY

much effort. The characterization of Catherine
with which he closes, few historians would now ac-
cept.*

American diplomats had their first taste of Eu-
ropean diplomatic methods in 1797, when Pinck-
ney, Gerry and Marshall were sent to France on
their special mission. Every attempt at delay
and mystification was practised on them. After
various secret agents had tried the patience of the
Americans and had finally come out with the plain
demand of Talleyrand for a million francs as the
price for peace and good relations, they resolutely
turned their back on Paris. Meanwhile Pitt was
seriously considering buying peace on similar
terms.

* "With very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon
Bagacity, she wants judgment, precision of ideas, reflection, and
I'esprit de combinaison."

ni

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

The convulsions of the French revolution and
the Napoleonic conquests did not seem materially
to affect the principles and practices of diplo-
macy. When the Congress of Vienna met to re-
arrange the state of Europe, it was guided by
men who stiU looked upon diplomacy entirely in
the manner of the 18th century, when, in the
words of Horace Walpole, "it was the mode of
the times to pay by one favor for receiving an-
other." The idea of restoring the balance of
Europe or patching up the rents and cracks in the
old system which had been so severely shaken was
the purpose which animated these men. They
viewed everything from the dynastic interests of
their respective rulers and traded off lesser king-
doms and slices of territory with the same spirit
of the gamester that has always characterized
the absolutist diplomacy.

Of the three master minds of the Congress of
yienna, Talleyrand, Metternich and Pozzo di

45

46 SECRET DIPLOMACY

Borgo, it may indeed be said that they illustrated
both the Equalities and the vices of the old diplo-
macy in a superlative degree. The last named
has characterized Talleyrand as "a man who is
unlike any other. He wheedles, he arranges, he
intrigues, he governs in a hundred different man-
ners every day. His interest in others is pro-
portioned to the need which he has of them at
the moment. Even his civilities are luxurious
loans which it is necessary to repay before the
end of the day." Talleyrand, himself, has said:
"Two things I forbid — too much zeal and too
absolute devotion — they compromise both persons
and affairs." He did not, indeed, betray his
great master Napoleon, he only quitted him in
time.

Metternich, who resembled Talleyrand in the
complete self-control of a passionless diplomat,
had a long and brilliant, but essentially sterile,
career. His correspondence shows a keen and
luminous spirit with a great mastery of detail,
and capacity for manipulating the human pawns ;
but there is no deep insight, no real constructive
policy. Indeed, he supported Alexander I in his
efforts for a Holy Alliance or sacred league
among nations, but it was conceived in such a
form that it would not have interfered with the

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 47

traditional game of diplomacy. Metternicli in-
deed often pays his complimeiits to the ideal, as
when he praises the league as resting on the same
basis as the great Christian society of man,
namely, the precept of the Book of Books, "Do
tmto others as you would that they should do
unto you." But the details of his policy were
governed entirely by the barren principles of
balance of power and legitimacy, and showed an
utter disregard for the natural and ethnic facts
underlying government. Metternich indeed him-
self at times realized the vanity of political in-
trigue, as when he wrote to his daughter from
Paris in 1815, "This specific weight of the masses
will always be the same, while we, poor creatures,
who think ourselves so important, live only to
make a little show by our perpetual motion, by
our dabbling in the mud or in the shifting sand."
When Alexander himself left the realm of vague
ideals and descended to details, his impulses often
took a form somewhat like the proposal made to
Castlereagh at Vienna, "We are going to do a
beautiful and grand thing. We are going to raise
up Poland by giving her as king one of my broth-
ers or the husband of my sister." The British
statesman does not seem to have been immedi-
ately carried away with this generous design.

48 SECRET DIPLOMACY

It was consistent with the character and tem-
per of the Congress of Vienna that there flowed
in it innumerable currents and counter-currents
of intrigue. In January, 1815, the representa-
tives of England, France and Austria agreed upon
a secret treaty of alliance, directed against Rus-
sia and Prussia. When Napoleon returned from
Elba he found this document and showed it to
the Russian Minister before tearing it up.

The first half of the nineteenth century was
dominated by the principles that had prevailed at
Vienna. In the details of diplomatic intercourse,
indirection, bribery and deceit continue to prevail
although in a less flamboyant fashion than in the
eighteenth century. As the principle of nation-
alism comes more clearly to emerge, the secrecy
of diplomatic methods is distinguished from the
secrecy of diplomatic policy with increasing con-
demnation of the latter; a greater sense of re-
sponsibility to the nation as a whole begins to
show itself, and the traditional resources of di-
plomacy are no longer quite adequate.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic literature of the
age still looks upon diplomacy as essentially a
tactical pursuit, conditioned by the continuous
enmity of states. The French writer. Garden, in
his Traits de diplomatie, gives the following

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 49

elucidation: "Put on this plane, diplomacy be-
comes like a transcendent manoeuvering of which
the entire globe is the theater, where states are
atmy corps, where the lines of combat change un-
ceasingly, and where one never knows who is a
friend, and who is an enemy. It is a political
labyrinth in the midst of which ability alone is
capable of moving with ease and without being
smothered by detail."

The memoirs and anecdotal literature of the
period afford numerous instances of the persist-
ence of that desire for cleverness in dealing with
secrets, which often brings about amusing inci-
dents.

At the time when Frankfort was the capital of
the North German Confederation, the Austrian
government provided its representative there
(Count Rechberg) with duplicate instructions;
one to the effect that he must exhaust every en-
ergy to maintain the most friendly and mutually
helpful relations with Prussia; the other of quite
the opposite tenor. The former was to be shown
to the Prussians. Unfortunately, at the critical
moment the Austrian Minister showed the wrong
letter to Bismarck, who guessed the situation;
suppressing his amusement as best he could, Bis-
marck tried to console the embarrassed Austrian

50 SECRET DIPLOMACY

by promising not to take any advantage of the
slip.

A Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Manteuffel) had hired a police agent to sneak
into the French Embassy in order to secure some
documents there. When he delightedly showed
one of the letters secured to General Von Gerlach,
the latter said: "I could have written you ten
such letters for what this cost you."

Disraeli, in a letter to his sister, spoke of the
Danish Minister at London as his secret agent in
the diplomatic corps.

There were also more innocent means of gain-
ing advantages such as are practised in many
other branches of human enterprise. For in-
stance, Labouchere relates his discovery, when
attache at Washington, that Secretary Marcy was
put in a terrible ill-humor whenever he lost at
whist. Upon a hint from Labouchere, the British
Minister managed thereafter regularly to lose in
his games with Marcy who was immensely pleased
at "beating the British at their own game." La-
bouchere adds : "Every morning when the terms
of the treaty were being discussed we had our
revenge and scored a few points for Canada."

There was all this time an increasing tendency
to discount the importance of the traditional arts

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 51

of diplomacy and to believe that a great deal of
this carefully nurtured secrecy was merely a trick
of the trade. Bismarck expressed himself in the
following language on diplomatic literature:
"For the most part it is nothing but paper and
ink. If you wanted to utilize it for historical
purposes, you could not get anything worth hav-
ing out of it. I believe it is the rule to allow his-
torians to consult the Foreign OflSce archives at
the expiration of thirty years (after the date of
despatches). They might be permitted to exam-
ine them much sooner, for the despatches and let-
ters, when they contain any information at all, are
quite unintelligible to those unacquainted with the
persons and relations treated of in them." In
reporting this statement, Labouchere observes:
"If all foreign office telegrams were published
they would be curious reading."* He also re-

* He -writes that when "I was an attache at Stockholm, the
present Queen, the Duchess of Ostrogotha, had a baby, and a
telegram came from the Foreign Office desiring that Her Majes-
ty's congratulations should be offered, and that she should be
informed how the mother and child were. The Minister was
away, so off I went to the Palace to convey the message and to
inquire about the health of the pair. A solemn gentleman re-
ceived me. I informed him of my orders, and requested him to
say what I was to reply. "Her Royal Highness,' he replied, 'is
as well as can be expected, but His Eoyal Highness is suffering
a little internally, and it is believed that this is due to the fact
of the milk of his nurse having been slightly sour last eve-
ning.' I telegraphed this to the Foreign Office."

52 SECRET DIPLOMACY

lates how his youthful efforts at secret diplomacy
were received by the Foreign Oflfice. He had suc-
ceeded at St. Petersburg in being able quite regu-
larly, through the assistance of a laundress, to
get from the government printing office loose
sheets of confidential minutes of State Council
meetings. "When Lord John Russell discovered
the method in which this interesting information
was obtained, he put a stop to the simple intrigue ;
Labouchere concludes his account of this experi-
ence thus : "For what reason, I wonder, did Rus-
sell imagine diplomacy was invented?"

The term "secret diplomacy" is during this
period used in a special sense, referring to a se-
cret intrigue on the part of a monarch or minis-
ter without the knowledge of those who have the
public responsibility in the matter. Earlier mon-
archs often played their own game without in-
forming their ministers and attempted to keep the
threads of foreign intrigue in their own hands.
Louis XV did great injury to his country by pur-
suing this method.

Napoleon III was a great offender in this re-
spect. Not only was his international policy
prone to unscrupulous attempts and proposalsj
but he acted in these matters frequently without
informing those who were responsible before the

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 53

country. Most of his secret advances to Bis-
marck were made entirely on his own responsi-
bility; he did not inform the Foreign Minister,
OUivier, of the fateful instructions to Benedetti
to the effect that he should demand of Prussia
assurances that no German prince should ever
again be suggested for the Spanish throne ; his
Mexican policy, too, was worked out by himself,
in conjunction with the Due de Morny and Jecker,
the banker, rather than with his ministers. The
disastrous consequences of the secret diplomacy
of Napoleon III will be reverted to later on.

It has also repeatedly happened that envoys
have incurred a strong suspicion of playing a
political game of their own without the author-
ization or even the knowledge of their Foreign
Minister. While a diplomatic representative in
taking such action risks disavowal and dismissal,
yet the temptation felt by a strong-willed man
who is conMent that he knows the local situation
and the needs of his country there better than
any one else, has often been too powerful to be
resisted. "When the unauthorized action has been
successful in gaining some advantage, it has gen-
erally been condoned.* But though the home gov-

• Frequently, indeed, ministers have been encouraged to make
certain demarches "on their own account"; if successful, they

64* SECRET DIPJ.OMACY

eminent is at all times able theoretically to dis-
avow unauthorized actions of its foreign repre-
sentatives, yet the latter through their self-willed
acts may have set in motion forces which can no
longer be controlled. Very often also doubt and
confusion is cast on the real causes of important
events and a general feeling of suspicion is thus
generated.

One of the most self-willed of British Ministers
was Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Eed-
cliffe). It is generally accepted that his personal
diplomacy at Constantinople, where he began his.
diplomatic career in 1808 and where he ended it
in 1858 after various intervening missions, was
one of the causes which brought on the Crimean
war. After reciting that Lord Stratford con-
stantly held private interviews with the Sultan
and did his utmost to alarm him, urging him to

could be sanctioned after the event. Such is the procedure whicli
Palmerston criticized in a letter to Lord Clarendon (May 22,
1853):

"The Kuasian Government has always had two strings- to its
bow — moderate language and disinterested professions at Peters-
burg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the
scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the
Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which
it did not intend, but cannot, in honor, recede from. If the
local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the lan-
guage previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents
have overstepped their instructions."

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 55

reject accommodation with Russia, and prbmising
him the armed assistance of England, John
Bright stated that all this was done without in-
structions from the home government. Lord Clar-
endon wrote : "He is bent on war and on playing
the first part in settling the great Eastern ques-
tion." When the war came on, Lord Granville
wrote: "We have generals whom we do not
trust, and whom we do not know how to replace.
We have an Ambassador at Constantinople, an
able man, a cat whom no one cares to bell, whom
some think a principal cause of the war, others
the cause of some of the calamities which have at-
tended the conduct of the war; and whom we
know to have thwarted or neglected many of the
objects of his Government."

Labouchere, who served under Lord Stratford
in 1862, wrote afterwards that the despatches of
Stratford during the Crimean war could not be
recognized as the originals from which Mr. King-
lake drew his material for a narrative of the am-
bassador's career.* He thought that Stratford's
great power at Constantinople was due to his long

* Labouchere wrote : "Lord Stratford was one of the moat
detestable of the hvunan race. He was arrogant, resentful and
spiteful. He hated the Emperor Nicholas because he had de-
clined to accept him as Ambassador to Russia, and the Crimean
war was his revenge. In every way he endeavored to envenom
the quarrel and to make war certain."

56 SECRET DIPLOMACY

stay there which made it necessary for the Turks
to remain on good terms with him. Labouchere
also claims that Lord Stratford misled his own
government by getting the Sultan to publish cer-
tain reform decrees which he would send home as
evidence of good government, never explaining
that such decrees were entirely dead letters.

The danger and disadvantage of having a diplo-
mat or ruler inject his personal ambitions and dis-
likes into his diplomacy have, unfortunately, been
frequently exemplified. With respect to the
causes of the Crimean war, it will be remembered
that Napoleon III had a personal grudge against
Emperor Nicholas who had addressed him "Sire
and Good Friend" instead of "Brother" as is
customary among monarchs. Though Napoleon
answered him, acknowledging the compliment im-
plied from the fact that one may choose one's
friends but not one's brothers, yet he never for-
got the slight.

Lord Palmerston as Foreign Minister quite
openly regarded himself as a power independent
not only of Parliament but of the Cabinet itself,
and not bound to consult his colleagues provided
he could justify himself later before the House of
Commons. But when in December, 1851, he had
entirely on his own responsibility approved the

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 67

coup d'etat by which Napoleon III made himself
emperoj, Lord John Eussell instantly dismissed
him and thus vindicated the rule that the Foreign
Minister must always pay regard to the joiat re-
sponsibility of the Cabinet.

In 1861 a select committee of Parliament on
the diplomatic service was appointed. It took
evidence, among other things, on the existence of
"secret diplomacy" in the British service. By
this term was understood private correspondence
or private action affecting the conduct of pub-
lic affairs, which did not become part of the rec-
ord in the ministry. Lord Stratford de Eed-
cliffe, the Earl of Clarendon, Lord Cowley, and
Lord John Eussell, all gave evidence with re-
spect to the conduct of business by private cor-
respondence. They all seemed to agree that pri-
vate correspondence between the Foreign Minis-
ter and the individual representatives abroad was
useful and even necessary for supplementing the
formal instructions and reports. But they stated
their belief that whenever any such private cor-
respondence should begin to affect the actual con-
duct of public affairs it would certainly get into
the record; if, however, it should come to noth-
ing, then it might not be referred to in public
despatches.

IV

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK

Wb have so far been dealing primarily with th©
methods of diplomacy. During the old regime
both the methods and the general policy of diplo-
matic action were controlled by the secret coun-
cils of the monarch and of a few ministers. With
the growth of representative government public
opinion began to concern itself more directly with
foreign affairs. There grew up gradually, al-
though with many relapses and with many breaks
of continuity, a consensus that while the methods
of diplomatic action might be secret, the general
trend of policy should regularly be laid before
the representatives of the people who should also
be informed of any individual action involving the'
responsibilities of the nation. When, therefore,
in contemplating the history of the last one hun-
dred years, secret diplomacy is spoken of in con-
demnatory terms, the attempted secrecy of na-
tional foreign policy, rather than of methods, is
usually thought of. When important engage-
ments are undertaken which involve the nation in

58

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 59

responsibility to others, particularly for the use
of armed forces ; when by a series of specific acts
a tendency is given to foreign policy which is not
avowed to the representatives of the people ; then
there exists secret diplomacy in a reprehensible
sense. A further method of concealment works
through a false statement of motives. Often nar-
rowly selfish action has been camouflaged with the
avowal of noble aims and high ideals ; or there has
been fencing for position in order that at the be-
ginning of a war the opprobrium of being the
assailant could be thrown on the other party.
Undoubtedly sometimes statesmen may persuade
themselves of the presence of high motives in
matters in which their specific action or that of
their successors, working with the same materials,
takes on a contrary direction.

At the conclusion of the Crimean war, Lord
Palmer ston wrote to Lord Clarendon (March 1,
.1867) as follows:

"... the alliance of England and France has de-
rivQ,d its strength not merely from the military and
naval power of the two states, hut from the force of
the moral principle upon which that union has been
founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance
to unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against
the strong, and the maintenance of the existing balance
of power. How, then, could we combine to become un-

60 SECRET DIPLOMACY

provoked aggressors, to imitate in Africa the partition
of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of
Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt
for England? And, more especially, how could Eng-
land and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of
the Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from
the Sultan? A coalition for such a purpose would re-
volt the moral feelings of mankind, and would certainly
be fatal to any English Government that was a party
to it. Then, as to the balance of power to be main-
tained by giving us Egypt, but we do not want the bur-
den of governing Egypt, and its possession would not,
as a political, military, and naval question, be con-
sidered, in this country, as a set-off against the posses-
sion of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all
these countries by the general influence of our com-
merce, but let us all abstain from a crusade of conquest
..which would call upon us the condemnation of all other
civilized nations."

This program of liberal principles applied to for-
eign affairs, of high-toned and high-minded di-
plomacy, one reads with mixed feelings in view
of the things which have come thereafter.

In the period between the Crimean and the
F,ranco-Prussian war, Napoleon pursued a policy,
or a series of policies, which fitly illustrate the
worst features of secret diplomacy. In 1858
Napoleon III obtained from Cavour a promise
that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France.
These arrangements, made without the knowledge

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 61

or the desire of the French people, involved Napo-
leon in the war of 1859 and led to a fatal weak-
ening of his position. In 1864 Napoleon se-
cretly suggested to Prussia that she might take
Schleswig-Holstein, thus greatly encouraging her
to undertake the war of 1864. Prance at this
time was under treaty obligations to Denmark
w^iich made such action doubly dishonest. "When
the war between Austria and Prussia broke out
in 1866, Napoleon concluded a secret treaty with
Austria which contained a bargain that he would
assist Austria to recover Silesia in return for a
cession of Venetia to Italy, to compensate the lat-
ter for Savoy and thus to eradicate the evil ef-
fects of the arrangement of 1858. As this treaty
became known, it absolutely alienated Prussia
from France. At the same time Napoleon had se-
cretly demanded from Prussia the cession of the
Ehenish Palatinate which belonged to Bavaria;
this would mean of course that Prussia and
France together would first have to take it from
Bavaria. Bismarck secretly informed Bavaria of
this demand and thus turned her decisively
against Napoleon ; so that he was enabled to make
secret treaties of alliance not only with Bavaria
but with Wurtemberg and Baden for their mili-
tary support in case of war. Napoleon had thus

62 SECRET DIPLOMACY

managed unwittingly to bring about the coalition
of German states wbicb proved disastrous to him
in 1870. Had the French government known of
these three German treaties, it would probably
have avoided war ; as it was, France did not know
that she would have all Germany against her. In
1866 Napoleon, through Benedetti, submitted to
Bismarck a draft treaty according to which, in
case the French Emperor should decide to send
his troops to enter Belgium, the King of Prussia
would grant armed aid to France and support her
with all his forces, military and naval, in the face
of and against every other power which might in
this eventuality declare war. Though this draft
treaty, which became known in Great Britain and
caused high excitement there, was not adopted in
this form, a secret compact was made between
France and Prussia in 1867, one article of which
stated that Prussia would not object to the an-
nexation of Belgium by France. The fact that
both of these powers had signed the treaty of
1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, ag-
gravates the noxiousness of this conspiracy-
Early in 1870 Napoleon was secretly negotiating
with Austria with a view to a joint war against
North Germany. The negotiations were in prog-
ress when the war of 1870 broke out. Probably

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 63

Bismarck was informed of what was going on
and was therefore the more anxious to face at
once what he considered an inevitable war. As
already stated, Napoleon did not communicate to
his responsible minister his decision to require of
the King of Prussia the absolute assurance that
no Grerman prince should ever again b© nominated
for the throne of Spain. In doing so he put him-
self in a position where Bismarck could manceuver
him into a dilemma from which there seemed no
exit except war.

This was done by the famous editing of the
Ems dispatch through which, taking advantage
of King William's permission to modify and
eliminate, Bismarck gave to the report sent by
the king the appearance that nothing further
could be said between the king and the French
envoy and that therefore the only alternative to
the French was retreat or war. This act illus-
trates one of the most terrible dangers of secret
diplomacy in that just at the time when inflam-
mable material is at hand in abundance, one word
or phrase may give a decisive turn to develop-
ments and force an issue, in a certain direction,
without allowing a chance for calm consideration
of all that is involved.

Bismarck considered that the unification of Ger-

64 SECRET DIPLOMACY

many required a war because only thus could the
feeling of unity among the German people, until
then divided into numerous small states, be
molded into political oneness. But in bringing
on the Franco-Prussian war, no matter how in-
evitable he might consider such a struggle, he
was too confident of his ability to play the part
of a Providence and to cut short the slow proc-
esses of historic development. Therefore, though
he attempted to work in the interest of outstand-
ing national factors, his policy was not of a na-
ture to develop that public confidence in the aims
of his nation on which alone a statesman can per-
manently build. His was the diplomacy of au-
thority, often announcing its aims with great
frankness, indeed, but always retaining the old
method so that the public mind remained often
in the dark. His politics directed German devel-
opment into a dangerous course. He abhorred
German disunion, but tried to cure it with means
too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought
about further problems. The taking of Alsace-
Lorraine was the cause of future war. In 1871,
Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland se-
cretly, but the gift was declined. In the years
after 1871, Bismarck always threatened Parlia-

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 65

ment -with, the danger of war whenever he wanted
to put anything through.

The Eusso-Turkish war of 1878, being in its na-
ture a conflict about the merits of which only-
vague ideas could' be current among the Western
nations, produced a whole nest of secret treaties.
The treaty of San Stefano itself was kept secret
by Eussia and Turkey, The British Foreign Sec-
retary in a diplomatic note which was much ad-
mired at the time, demanded that the treaty must
be submitted to the European powers.

Meanwhile a second secret treaty had been made
between Eussia and Austria wherein, as is cus-
tomary in such transactions, "compensations"
were distributed out of property belonging to
neither of the contracting parties, at the cost of
somebody else ; it was agreed that Austria should
have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile the
British Foreign Office, though it had just de-
claimed in indignant tones against the secret
terms of San Stefano, made an agreement, equally
secret, with Eussia (May 30, 1878), concerning the
points on which Great Britain would insist in the
final adjustment. Through the wrongful action
of an employee of the Foreign Office this agree-
ment leaked out and a summary of it was pub-

66 SECRET DIPLOMACY

lished on May 31st. When questioned in the
House of Lords, the Marquis of Salisbury, who
at all times had a well-deserved reputation for
sincerity, nevertheless qualified the statement in
the Globe as "wholly unauthenticated and not de-
serving of any confidence on the part of the House
of Lords." The full text of the agreement was
published by the Globe on June 14th, and when
challenged by Lord Rosebery concerning his
dementi, Lord Salisbury calmly stated: "I de-
scribed it as unauthentic simply because it was so,
and because no other adjective actiially described
it, and I shall be able to state why I so described
it." The explanation which followed was, how-
ever, quite lame, and consisted mainly in stating
that the document as published did not give a com-
plete view of the situation. The impression pro-
duced by these tactics was far from favorable.
Lord Granville, with a great deal of justice,
wanted to know "where the House of Lords would
have been had it not been for the immoral action
of the man who gave the secret treaty to the news-
paper. They would have had blue books and cop-
ies of instructions, protocols and other docu-
ments, but they would have been perfectly duped
as to the way in which the government had actu-
ally proceeded."

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 67

But there followed another, a fourth secret
treaty, growing out of the Turkish situation, an
agreement between Great Britain and Turkey con-
cluded on June 4th, at Constantinople. As a Je-
suit of erroneous information having been tele-
graphed from Constantinople by Mr. Layard, the
British envoy, to the effect that in spite of the
armistice the Russians were moving on Constan-
tinople, a large war credit was voted in the Brit-
ish House, although against the opposition of the
Liberals under Gladstone and Bright. Orders
were also given to the Indian Government to send
troops to Cyprus. A secret treaty was then con-
cluded in which Great Britaia received a protec-
torate over Cyprus in return for the engagement
on her part to protect the Asiatic domains of
Turkey. Never was the blood of a nation with-
out its own knowledge and consent risked in a
more doubtful adventure than in this famous
transaction of Lord Beaconsfield. Gladstone, on
July 20th, analyzed the treaty as providing for
three things: the occupation and annexation of
Cyprus, the defense of Turkey in Asia against
any attempt Russia may make ("to go two thou-
sand miles from your own country, alone and sin-
gle handed, in order to prevent Russia making
war at any time upon Turkey in Asia"), and re-

68 SECRET DIPLOMACY

sponsibility for the government of Turkish terri-
tory in Asia ; and all that was undertaken without
the consent and knowledge of the British people,
to be done at their expense by the blood of their
children. Mr. Gladstone concluded: "There is
but one epithet which I think fully describes a
covenant of this kind. I think it is an insane cove-
nant."

Disraeli had formerly said of Palmerston:
"With no domestic policy, he is obliged to divert
the attention of the people from the consideration
of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign
politics. His scheme of conduct is so devoid of
all political principle that when forced to appeal
to the people, his only claim to their confidence
is his name." The same language could with
equal justice have been applied to Beaconsfield
himself. His speeches in defense of his foreign
policy are usually a superficial appeal to imperial-
ist passion, and deal in such phrases as "What
is our duty at this critical moment?" "To main-
tain the empire of England." (Loud cheers.)
"Empire" is taken for granted as covering every-
thing desirable, but the actual relationship of
these adventurous foreign policies to the welfare
and true development of the English people is
never reasoned out.

NAPOLEON in, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 69

While Beaconsfield had opposed the first
Afghan war, he readily changed his views when
he came into power and began the second war in
1878 on the avowed ground that the Ameer had
refused to receive a British mission. But with a
sudden change of tactics, at a dinner at the Man-
sion House on November 9, Lord Beaconsfield sol-
emnly announced that the war had been made be-
cause the frontier of India was ' ' a haphazard and
not a scientific one." Yet a little before, when
conderoning the first Afghan war, he had de-
scribed the frontiers of India as "a perfect bar-
rier." He did not give to any organization of
public opinion a chance to influence him in this
matter, or even to be heard. On December 9,
Lord Derby said in the House of Lords: "We
are discussing, and we know we are discussing, an
issue upon which we have no real or practical in-
fluence."

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND
MOROCCO

TowABD the end of the nineteenth century the
Sominating development in the diplomacy of Eu-
rope was the actual formation of the two great
alliances — the Triple Alliance created by Bis-
marck, and the Eusso-French Alliance which had
come into being in 1896 as a counterpoise to the
former. The treaties upon which these alliances
rested were made secretly; they were part of an
authoritative policy based on the theory of bal-
ance of power. The texts of the Triple Alliance
Treaty were not published until after the begin-
ning of the Great "War. The so-called Counter-
Insurance Treaty with Russia by which Bismarck
attempted to stabilize the situation and isolate
Trance through a mutual neutrality agreement
between Russia, Austria and Germany, was one
of the most characteristic examples of compli-
i cated methods followed by the old diplomacy; it
yas, of course, also, kept secret. When after Bis-

70

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 71

marck's retirement the German Government did
not renew this secret treaty, it made possible a
fundamental change in the grouping of powers
with the result that Russia, after a very short in-
terval, identified herself with France in the Dual
Alliance.

While Bismarck had been in control of German
diplomacy, the main lines of German foreign pol-
icy were kept quite clear and their general direc-
tion was definite, no matter how complicated and
indirect were the means frequently applied to
carry it out. Emperor William II sought to free
himself from the tutelage of the powerful Chan-
cellor, but from then on the orientation of Ger-
man diplomacy was far from definite. No one
could be clear where its main objective lay; it
seemed to seek expansion of influence in Asia
Minor, the Far East, Morocco, South Africa, and
almost everywhere, even with the inclusion of
South America. Germany appeared to have
many irons in the fire, although meanwhile she
did not make much progress in any specific direc-
tion. This uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in
an increasing manner aroused the apprehension
of her neighbors ; none of them felt any assurance
about what Germany actually wanted. That her
actual wants may not have been unreasonable,

ni SECRET DIPLOMACY

that she herself apparently did not know exactly
which of her interests should predominate, did
not help matters ; all those who had more posses-
sions than she felt themselves endangered, and a
gdheral' suspicion and lack of confidence resulted.

In the years after the Chino-Japanese war the
German Government showed a great desire to
play a prominent part in Far Eastern affairs.
Thus, it took the lead in bringing about the joint
intervention of Russia, France and Germany,
which obliged Japan to surrender Port Arthur,
a part of the spoils of war just taken from China.
The three powers who had thus come to the res-
cue, however, forthwith proceeded to exact from
China an enormous commission for their good of-
fices, and forced her to make to them grants of
lease-holds and other concessions, in which was in-
cluded the very territory that they had rescued
from Japan. In this keen onset, which amounted
to an attempt to divide up the Chinese Empire,
Great Britain in her turn also participated. The
Far Eastern situation was rendered decidedly un-
stable, and the frantic and unorganized resistance
of the Boxer levies was the result.

After the settlement of these troubles, in 1901,
the German Government, as we now know, tenta-
tively suggested the formation of an alliance in-

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 73

eluding Great BTitain and Japan. This proposal
shows how far German diplomacy at the time had
departed from the fundamentals of policy under
Bismarck. Japan proceeded most assiduously to
work on this suggestion, but Germany was left dhit
when the highly important Anglo-Japanese Al-
liance was secured by the Japanese Minister in
London. Negotiations between Great Britain and
Japan were carried on with the greatest secrecy.
Lord Lansdowne himself seems at one time to
have been very anxious fdr prompt action; he
said to (iount Hayashi, as reported by the latter,
that "there was great danger in delay, as the
news of the proposed treaty might leak out and
objections might then be raised."

It is significant that whilfe Lord Lansdowne
and Count Hayashi were in the depth of their
negotiations, Marquis Ito, on his return journey
from the United States, proceeded to Russia and,
entirely in opposition to the express judghient
of Count Hayashi, "plunged into conversations
on the most delicate of matters" at St. Peters-
burg. In fact, the Japanese Governme!til?t allowed
almost identical secret negoMations to be carried
on in London and St. Petersburg at the same time.
Count Hayashi considered this procedure as im-
plying "a lack of faith and a breach of honor.'*

74 SECRET DIPLOMACY

"When the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been ac-
tually signed it was, through the indiscretion of
some official, published in Japan three days too
soon. The Japanese Foreign Office promptly de-
nied its existence, and Baron Rosen, the Russian
Minister at Tokyo, who no doubt knew of the Ito
negotiations at St. Petersburg, very emphatically
denied the very possibility of such a treaty. The
effect on Russia of the truth when it became
known there, can be readily imagined. In the
Anglo-Japanese treaty, England, which had re-
cently joined in the solemn guarantee of the in-
tegrity of China and of the independence of
Korea, made engagements scarcely consistent
with either.

Lord Rosebery, in a public address, October,
1905, expressed his sense of the great importance
of this treaty. "The treaty," he said, "is an en-
gine of tremendous power and tremendous lia-
bility. Whatever else is certain, this at least is
sure, that it will lead to countless animosities,
many counter intrigues, and possibly hostile com-
binations. But I want to point out to you the
enormous importance of the engagements in
which this treaty involves you, the reactions
which it will cause elsewhere, and to bid you to
be vigilant and prepared, and not negligent, as

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 75

sometimes you are, of the vast bearings of your
foreign policy."

The German Emperor, having failed to obtain
a treaty with England, now turned to his Rus-
sian cousin with the design of inducing him to
make an alliance. The Willy-Nicky correspond-
ence which was published by the Russian Revo-
lutionary Government in 1917, as well as the
memoirs of Isvolsky, give us a complete insight
into the action of William II in this matter. The
correspondence shows that Emperor William neg-
lected no means of arousing resentment and sus-
picion of England in the mind of Nicholas, par-
ticularly in attempting to show a complicity of
England with Japan in the war against Russia.
In November, 1904, William proposed the imme-
diate signature by Russia, without the knowledge
of France, of a defensive treaty of alliance, evi-
dently directed against Great Britain. France
was to be invited to join after the signature by
Germany and Russia. The Czar, however, in-
sisted that he could not entertain this proposal
without first submitting it to his ally. William,
in a long telegram, argued insistently upon the
danger of informing France before the signature.
He said: "Only the absolute, undeniable knowl-
edge that we are both bound by the treaty to give

76 SECRET DIPLOMACY

mutual aid to each other, can induce France to
exercise pressure upon England to remain tran-
quil and in peace, for fear of placing France in
a dangerous situation. Should France know that
a German-Eussian agreement is simply in prep-
aration and not yet signed, she would immediately
inform England. England and Japan would then
forthwith attack Germany." Therefore, William
concluded that if the Czar should persist in re-
fusing to sign the treaty without the previous
consent of France, it would be better not to at-
tempt making an agreement at all. He stated
that he had spoken only to Prince Buelow about
it, and that as undoubtedly the Czar had spoken
only to Count Lamsdorff, the foreign minister, it
would be easy to keep it an absolute secret. He
then congratulated the Czar on having concluded
a secret agreement of neutrality with Austria.
As a matter of fact. Count Lamsdorff had not
been informed by the Czar of the Emperor's pro-
posal.

In the summer of 1905, Emperor William re-
turned to the charge, taking advantage of the dis-
couragement of the Czar due to many external
and internal troubles resulting from the Japanese
war. He visited the C?ar at the Island Bjorkoe
in July, and used every resource of his personal

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 77

influence to prevail on Nicholas. This time he
succeeded, and the two sovereigns signed a secret
treaty of alliance, which contained four articles
to the following effect :

(1) If any European state shall attack either
of the empires the allied party engages itself to
aid with all its forces on land and sea.

(2) The contracting parties will not conclude a
separate peace.

(3) The present agreement comes in force at
the moment of conclusion of peace between Rus-
sia and Japan, and may be denounced with one
year's notice.

(4) When the treaty has come into force Rus-
sia will take the necessary steps to inform France
and to propose to her to adhere to it as an ally.

On this occasion the Emperor was accompanied
by Von Tschirsky, who soon after became German
Foreign Minister and who countersigned the
agreement. The Russian Foreign Minister was
not present but Admiral Birileff, the Minister of
the Navy, was called in to countersign the Czar's
signature. After his return to St. Petersburg,
the Czar allowed fifteen days to pass before in-
forming Count Lamsdorff. When informed, the
Czar's advisers took a very strong position
against the agreement, with the result that not-

78 SECRET DIPLOMACY

withstanding the iasistent arguments of Emperor
William, who in his telegram signed himself
"Your friend and ally," the treaty was never
given full force. William strongly appealed to
the gratefulness of the Czar for having stood by
him during the Japanese war, at a time when,
"as afterwards the indiscretions of Delcasse have
shown, although allied to Eussia, France had
nevertheless made an agreement with England to
attack Germany without warning, in time of
peace." The latter phrase gives the effect upon
William's mind of all he knew or believed to know
about the arrangements concluded between France
and Great Britain concerning Morocco.

The Moroccan intrigues and secret negotiations,
during the first decade of the twentieth century,
contributed in no small measure to rendering in-
ternational relations strained and generating a
general sense of insecurity and suspicion. In
July, 1901, a protocol was signed between the Sul-
tan of Morocco and the French Government in
which the latter declared its respect for the in-
tegrity of Morocco. At the same time M. Del-
casse began secret negotiations with Spain for
a delimitation of spheres of influence in that coun-
try. In September, 1902, the first Franco-Span-
ish secret treaty concerning Morocco was given its

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 79

final form. It was, however, not ratified because
of British opposition at the time. In 1904, the
formation of the Anglo-French Entente agree-
ment, in which the French Government declared
that it had no intention "of altering the political
status of Morocco," was accompanied by the con-
elusion of a secret understanding concerning
Morocco which was not revealed until 1911. Ac-
cording to the terms of that agreement the Brit-
ish Government was to be informed of any under-
standing on Morocco which might be concluded
between France and Spain. These two coun-
tries, in fact, on October 3, 1904, consummated a
convention for the partition of Morocco into
spheres of influence. A copy of this secret agree-
ment was given to Lord Lansdowne, the British
Foreign Minister, who wrote, in acknowledging it :
"I need not say that the confidential character of
the Convention entered into by the President of
the French Republic and the King of Spain in
regard to French and Spanish interests in Mo-
rocco is fully recognized by us, and will be duly
respected."

The German Government, which had been ig-
nored, now suggested the holding of an interna-
tional conference. After considerable opposition
the conference met at Algeciras, in February,

80 SECRET DIPLOMACY

1906. The Powers represented there again sol-
emnly recognized the independence and integrity
of Morocco. Meanwhile, various incidents were
brought on by the actions of French and Spanish
commissaries in Morocco. The French parlia-
ment repeatedly reiterated its intention to ob-
serve the act of Algeciras, particularly in the dec-
laration of February, 1909, regarding Morocco,
in which declaration Germany joined. In 1911,
events happened which induced a serious Euro-
pean crisis. The French Government undertook
military operations against Fez, the capital of
Morocco, on the ground that the foreign colony
there was in danger. In reply to questions in
the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey con-
firmed that such measures were being undertaken
by the French Government "for the succor of
Europeans in Fez." He added: "The action
taken by France is not intended to alter the po-
litical status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Gov-
ernment cannot see why any objection should be
taken to it."

The facts of the Fez affair have been thus de-
scribed by the French publicist, Francis de Pres-
sense :

"At this point the Comite du Maroc and its organs
surpassed themselves. They organized a campaign of

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 81

systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press,
they swamped the public with false news. Fez was
represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole
European French Colony was suddenly discovered there,
living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and
children was described in the most moving terms. . . .
At all costs the Europeans — ^the Sultan, Fez itself must
be saved. ... As ever from the beginning of this en-
terprise, the Government knew nothing, willed nothing
of itself."

While these events were happening, the Foreign
OflSces both in Paris and London failed to give
any information concerning the aims which un-
derlay the action taken. On May 23d, Mr.,
Dillon in the House of Commons asked to what
extent England was committed to this "ill-omened
and cruel expedition." The Foreign Secretary
replied, "We are not committed at all." The
French Foreign Minister declared at the same
time that he had never heard of any treaty with
Spain concerning Morocco.

When the international crisis came to a head
suddenly in July, 1911, through the disconcerting
action of the German Government in sending a
war vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken
by surprise and was absolutely in the dark as to
the issues and interests involved as well as to the
commitments which had been made by the British

82 SECRET IHPLOMA.CY

and French foreign offices. The text of the se-
cret treaty between France and Spain had, how-
ever, now been secured by the Paris papers Le
Temps and Le Matin. This revelation led to
party attacks on secret diplomacy in the British
House of Commons and in the French Parlia-
ment. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in
February, 1912, said:

. . . "Why was the French Parliament told only half
the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our
arrangement with England? Why was it allowed to
suspect that this arrangement had as its complement
and corrective some secret clauses and other secret
treaties ? It is this, it is this double game towards Par-
liament and towards the world which becomes morally
an abuse of trust. . . . Now the whole effort of the ar-
rangement of 1904 appears to-day in its truth and in
its vanity. It was a treaty of friendship with England
recognizing the freedom of our political action in Mo-
rocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integ-
rity of that country; that was what the public knew
and approved. But the public was ignorant that at
the same time, by other Treaties and by contradictory
clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between
Spain and France was prepared, of that Morocco of
which we guaranteed the integrity."

In the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon
charged that "the Foreign Office policy has be-

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 83

come during the last ten years progressively more
secret every year. For ten years the foreign pol-
icy of this country has been conducted behind an
elaborate screen of secrecy."

VI

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY

As the commitments of the British. Government
gradually becam.e more and more known the ques-
tion arose as to how deeply and extensively Great
Britain had been involved in continental affairs.
Lord Eosebery, who was uninformed, with the
rest of Parliament and the public, as to the actual
details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January,
1912:

"This we do know about our foreign policy, that,
for good or for evil, we are now embraced in the midst
of the Continental system. That I regard as perhaps
the gravest fact in the later portion of my life. We
are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental sys-
tem, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, be-
cause I do not know enough about it, but which, at any
rate, may at any time bring us into conflict with armies
numbering millions, and our own forces would hardly
be counted in such a war as they stand at present."

Lord Eosebery realized perhaps more fully than
most of the leaders of English public life the com-
plications adherent to what had already become
public knowledge at the time.

84

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 85

Meanwhile the governinent, in Parliament, con-
fined itself to plain denials whenever the matter
of international undertakings and obligations of
a general nature was brought up. The denials
could be justified from the point of view that the
situation as stated by the uninformed questioner
in Parliament, in each case did not exactly cor-
respond to the facts. But the impression created
by such denials that no serious obligations had
been incurred was, as the result showed, entirely
misleading.

On March 8, 1911, Mr. Jowett asked in the
House of Commons whether any undertaking,
promise or understanding had been given to
France that in certain eventualities British troops
would be sent to cooperate with the French army.
The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
replied: "The answer is in the negative." On
December 6, 1911, the Prime Minister said:

"As has been stated, there were no secret engagements
with France other than those that have now been pub-
lished, and there are no secret engagements with any
foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation
to render military or naval assistance to any other
Power."

Upon another occasion Mr. Yerburgh, M.P., in-
quired :

86 SECRET DIPLOMACY

"May I ask whether or not we are to understand that
the Government arrived at no decision upon this par-
ticular question? Is the right honorable gentleman not
aware that this new definition of the two-Power stand-
ard is a question of supreme importance, and that in
arriving at our standard of naval strength previous
Governments had regard to the power of the fleets of
other countries?"

The Prime Minister replied only :

"I think this question shows the inconvenience of
dealing with these matters by way of question and an-
swer."

In December, 1912, Lord Hugh Cecil made the fol-
lowing inquiry :

"There is a very general belief that this country is
under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an
obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Min-
istry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send
a very large armed force out of this country to operate
in Europe. That is the general belief. It would be
very presumptuous of any one who has not access to
all the facts in possession of the Government — "

The Prime Minister interrupted him with: "I
ought to say that it is not true." Lord Cecil
thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having
elicited this explanation, "because," he stated,
"it was certainly widely believed that the Gov-

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 87

emment has engaged in a military policy of an
adventurous kind and that if such a policy had
actually been contemplated by the Government it
would involve a very serious consideration of the
military resources of the country." As a matter
of fact, the latter was a just conclusion from the
actual situation as it really existed, notwithstand-
ing the denial by the Prime Minister.

In March, 1913, when during the discussion of
the Navy estimates, the Mediterranean situation
came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr,
Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be
trusting to France the duty of guarding the
Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the
course of these discussions: "In conjunction
with the Navy of France, our Mediterranean
Fleet would make a combined force superior to
aU possible combinations. ' ' Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke
referred to this as a remarkable statement, and
one "somewhat difficult to reconcile with the re-
cent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to
our understanding with France in the matter of
armaments." He added: "In one case we have
the Prime Minister repudiating an obligation on
our side of any kind, and in the other we have
the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the
safety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our

88 SECRET DIPLOMACY

food supply, upon the assistance which he pre-
sumes will be ready at any moment to be given
to us by France."

On March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minis-
ter, made a comprehensive answer to a question
of Sir W. Byles in the following terms:

"As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not
under any- obligation, not public and known to Parlia-
ment, which compels it to take part in a war. In other
words, if war arises between European Powers, there
are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or
hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament
to decide whether or not Great Britain should partici-
pate in a war."

In August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a state-
ment to the effect that the very friendly relation-
ships with France rendered the situation in the
Mediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11,
1914, this same general matter was up again for
discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a
question, referred back to the statement made by
Mr. Asquith on March 24, 1913, and added: "It
remains as true to-day as it was a year ago."

The nation was meanwhile left entirely in the
dark with respect to the actual matter of the re-
lationships which had developed between Great
Britain and France, and it was only after the

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 89

Great War had broken out that Sir Edward Grey,
in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to Parlia-
ment some account of what had actually hap-
pened.

The first important step in the new interna-
tional policy of Great Britain was taken immedi-
ately after the Liberal Government had been
formed on December 12, 1905. It appears that
Sir Edward Grey consulted in this matter par-
ticularly Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane, inform-
ing the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, but not his other Cabinet colleagues.
The above three men were the leaders of the Lib-
eral Lnperialist faction, and it is not at all cer-
tain that in an aggressive foreign policy thfey
would have been at that moment readily followed
by their whole party.

When in consequence of the attempted division
of Morocco, relations between France and Ger-
many became somewhat strained. Sir Edward
Grey, Foreign Minister, made communications to
the French Ambassador to the effect that, while
no promises could be given to any Foreign Power,
yet in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, if war was then
forced upon France on the question of Morocco,
public opinion in England would rally to the ma-
terial support of France. Sir Edward Grey, as

90 SECRET DIPLOMACY

related in his own words, said : "I made no prom-
ises and I used no threats, but I expressed that
opinion." The accuracy of that opinion has been
questioned, in view of the temper of the House
of Commons elected at a time when resentment at
the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful.
On the basis of the statement made by Sir Ed-
ward Grey, the French Government said to the
British Foreign Minister, as reported by him:

"If you think it possible that the public opinion of
Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, jus-
tify you in giving to France the armed support which
you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to
give that support, even if you wish it when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken
place between naval and military experts."

Sir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and
agreed to it. He authorized that conversations
should take place, but with the distinct under-
standing that nothing which would bind either
Government should occur. However, the holding
of conversations between two Powers concerning
military cooperation is in itself a sufficiently seri-
ous matter out of which expectations and rela-
tionships are apt to arise that cannot be over-
looked in future action. The Cabinet was not
informed of the authorization given by Sir Ed-

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 91

ward Grey until later. He did not state how
much later.

We know from oflScial sources that Colonel Bar-
nardiston proceeded to Belgium and had inter-
views with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff
concerning combined operations in the event ©f a
German attack directed against Antwerp. Colo-
nel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief of
Staff that his Government intended to move the
British base of supplies from the French coast
to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been
cleared of all German warships. When the Bel-
gian documents were published in Germany, it
was attempted by the press to represent these con-
versations as an actual convention. These con-
sultations occurred during the first quarter of
1906.

From an official source comes the statement that
in July, 1911, the British Government informed
the German, that on certain contingencies. Great
Britain would support France (if Germany should
demand the whole of French-Congo and Agadir
as a naval base) . What actually happened at this
time has never been fully revealed.

In April, 1912, the British military attache at
Brussels informed the Belgian General Jungbluth
that Great Britain had 160,000 men available for

92 SECRET DIPLOMACY

despatch to the continent, and added that the Brit-
ish Government in certain contingencies during
recent events would have immediately landed
troops on Belgian territory.

About this time the Cabinet had a discussion
of the whole situation and of the special relation-
ship with France ; and it was decided that there
should be some definite expression in writing, of
the latter. Accordingly, in November, 1912, an
exchange of notes took place between Sir Edward
Grey and the French Ambassador. The British
Foreign Minister wrote the following letter:

.,,, . Nov. 22iid (1912).

My dear Ambassadoe: '

"From time to time in recent years the French and
British Naval and Military experts have consulted to-
gether. It has always been understood that such con-
sultation does not restrict the freedom of either Gov-
ernment to decide at any future time whether or not
to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that
consultation between experts is not and ought not to
be regarded as an engagement that commits either Gov-
ernment to action in a contingency that has not yet
arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in-
stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at
the present moment is not based upon an engagement
to cooperate in war. You have, however, pointed out
that if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become
essential to know whether it could in that event depend

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 93

upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that
if either Government had grave^ reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that
threatenfed the general peace, it should immediately dis-
cuss with the other whether both Giovernments should
act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace,
and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to
take in common. If these measures involved action, the
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into
consideration and the Governments would then decide
what effect should be given to them."

A reply from the French Ambassador accepted
this understanding.

Side by side with the Anglo-French military
and naval collaboration, there went the making of
joint plans by France and Kussia which culmi-
nated in the Franco-Russian military convention
of August, 1912. At the same time Eussia had
jiressed upon France the need of increasing her
army by raising the term of service to three
years. Concerning the new disposal of the
French fleet, according to the desires of Russia,
President Poincare stated to Ambassador Isvol-
sky in November, 1912 :

"This decision has been made in agreement with Eng-
land, and forms the further development and completion
of arrangements already made previously between the
French and English staffs."

94 SECRET DIPLOMACY

Thus the chain of cooperation was completed, and
England was effectively tied np with the situation
in the Balkans, in which only Russia had a pri-
mary interest.

Meanwhile, the repeated denials previously set
forth kept the British Parliament and public from
all knowledge of the exceedingly important rela-
tionships which were growing up between the
Naval and Military establishments of Great Brit-
ain and France.

How these relationships, though only partially
known and suspected, were looked upon by out-
siders is shown from expressions in the reports
of Belgian diplomats. Count de Lalaing wrote
from London in 1907: "England is quietly pur-
suing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at
her isolation." Baron Greindl wrote from Ber-
lin in 1908: "Call it alliance or what you will,
the grouping constitutes, none the less, a diminu-
tion of Germany's security." Baron Guillaume
wrote, in 1911, from Paris: "I have less faith in
the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would
not be sorry to see the others eat one another up."
These expressions are not, of course, evidences
of British policy, but simply of the impression
which whatever leaked out concerning that pol-
icy, made upon outside diplomats.

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 95

In his clear and convincing analysis of the situ-
ation created by the gradual formation in secret,
of these relationships, Lord Loreburn brings out
the following points: Through the communica-
tions with the French Ambassador and military
and naval conversations concerning plans for
joint action, France was encouraged more and
more to expect that Great Britain would stand
by her in arms if she were attacked by Germany.
Such a policy of a defensive understanding with
France, no matter how right in itself, was obvi-
ously a new departure of tremendous importance.
Its execution and effectiveness could be assured
only if understood by Parliament as a national
policy, with all the risks involved, so that proper
preparations could be made. Parliament was,
however, never warned of the danger England
stood of being thrown suddenly into a European
war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914, that
Great Britain would support France and Russia,
the war would undoubtedly have been prevented ;
but while the ministers had in fact incurred moral
obligations over against France, they had not as-
sured themselves of the necessary Parliamentary
support and could therefore not make a statement
involving such risk as the above declaration to
Germany would have created.

96 SECRET DIPLOMACY

Of Sir Edward Grey's speech of the 3rd of
August, 1914, Lord Loreburn says:

"This remarkable speech began, with an elaborate ef-
fort to prove that the House of Commons was perfectly
free to determine either for peace or war. It ended with
a passionate declaration that this country would be dis-
graced if we did not declare war, and the reasoning of
the speech proved that Sir Edward Grey had committed
himself irretrievably. It left the House of Commons
convinced that it had in honor no choice but to join
Prance in arms. It is an epitome of the reasoning by
which Sir Edward Grey had been brought to believe that
he could say and do what he said and did yithout limit-
ing his freedom of action. But if this is legitimate we
ought not to keep up the pretense that we are a self-
governing nation in foreign affairs."

Thus a minister, to whom national intrigue and
duplicity were essentially foreign, who was
trusted by his country and who wanted peace, was
brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into
a position where he had actually incurred the
moral obligation to assist another country with-
out having the power for peace which the ability
to avow that relationship openly, to take the re-
sponsibility, and to confront G-ermany therewith,
would have given him.

As early as November, 1911, Lord Lansdowne,
one of the founders of the Entente, in speaking
of the secret agreement of 1904 concerning Mo-

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 97

roccQ, which had then just become known to the
public, had admitted that in such a ease the prom-
ise of purely diplomatic support might easily
bring on the obligation to assist in other ways;
that an entente cordiale creates close relation-
ships between two countries; and that, should
one of them get into difficulties without its guilt,
it would expect to receive support.

The moral responsibilities in which the For-
eign Minister had involved the British Govern-
ment were not simple, nor did they exist against
France alone. Because of the Franco-Russian
alliance the relationship established between
Great Britain and France virtually involved shar-
ing in the defense of France against the conse-
quences of her alliance with Russia, as the subse-
quent events showed; any serious situation aris-
ing in the Balkans and affecting Russian interests
would thereafter involve France, and through her,
Great Britain. Accordingly, the effect of this
policy was to make the peace of Great Britain
depend upon, and to involve it with, the complex
struggle for influence in the Balkans.

After Sir Edward Grey's speech of August
3rd, Mr. T. Edmund Harvey, M.P., said: "I am
convinced that this war for the great masses of
the countries of Europe is no peoples' war. It

98 SECRET DIPLOMACY

is a war that has been made by men in high places,
by diplomatists working in secret, by bureaucrats
out of touch with the peopde, by men who are a
remnant of an older evil civilization."

Lord Loreburn sums up his indictment of se-
cret diiilomacy in the following language : ' ' Se-
cret diplomacy has undergone its 'acid test' in
this country. It had every chance. The voice of
party was silent. The Foreign Minister was an
English gentleman whom the country trusted and
admired, who was wholly free from personal en-
mities of every kind, and who wanted peace.
And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It pre-
vented us from finding some alternative for war,
and it prevented us from being prepared for war,
because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof
from Parliament." The issue is here quite
clearly stated. Those who see in the methods and
spirit of the old diplomacy the chief cause of war,
do not hold, on the one hand, that secret diplo-
macy involves at all times and in all cases un-
scrupulous plotting. But they believe that the
method of dealing with foreign affairs as a mys-
terious matter, fit to be handled only by the se-
lect, and the reliance on a policy of bargains and
compensations, with the aim thus artificially to
maintain a balance of power, may be blamed for

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 99

this great catastrophe ; for they stood in the way
of dealing with great public affairs in a sounder
manner, that is, with more regard of the actual
public interest and of the underlying racial and
popular factors.

Those British critics who have attacked this
method as practised in their own country before
and during the war, do not th,ereby mean to im-
pute to British statesmen a major share in the
responsibility for the war. The high-mindedness
and public spirit of the responsible statesmen is
recognized by all fair critics, and most of them
imply that Great Britain has far less to fear from
this system than have nations with less responsi-
ble governments and a less sound tradition of
statesmanship. They attack the system as a
whole as it exists throughout European diplo-
macy, and as it has been used by the British Gov-
ernment,

From the point of view of historic evidence,
and of strict reasoning from cause to effect, a
great deal of doubt still remains as to how far
secret diplomacy in itself, — ^that is, the failure to
publish to parliament and the people, details of
the situation as it developed, — could properly be
considered the specific cause of the war; no mat-
ter how definite may be our judgment and belief

100 SECRET DIPLOMACY

that the secrecy and tortuousness of foreign pol-
icy are bound to generate an air of uncertainty
and suspicion which will so greatly favor mili-
tarist intrigues and influence as to render the
making of wars far more easy than they would
otherwise he, were time and opportunity given
to the public to consider the details of a critical
situation. Yet it might be difficult to prove by
historic evidence, the specific proposition that the
war of 1914 was directly due to the fact that the
development of international affairs was quite
generally kept from the knowledge of the public.
Nevertheless, unquestionably the atmosphere of
secret diplomacy is a medium exactly suited to
the most baneful influences.

Viscount Haldane has made a strong defense of
the policy of Sir Edward Grey. He asserts that
"the failure of those who had to make the effort
to keep the peace, does not show that they would
have done better had they discussed delicate de-
tails in public. ' ' He continues : ' ' There are top-
ics and conjunctures in the almost daily changing
relations between Governments as to which si-
lence is golden. For however proper it may be
in point of broad principle that the people should
be fully informed of what concerns them vitally,
the most important thing is that those to whom

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 101

they have confided their concerns should be given
the best chance of success in averting danger to
their interests. To have said more in Parliament
and on the platform in the years in question, or
to have said it otherwise, would have been to run
grave risks of more than one sort." This de-
fense, however, also makes certain assumptions,
particularly the underlying one that the war was
not to be avoided by any method. It is based oh
the traditional concept of foreign affairs which
considers that it is best to leave them at the dis-
cretion of a few initiated and responsible offi-
cials. There can be no question that from the
highest plane conceivable under the older ideas
and norms of diplomacy, the conduct of foreign
relations by Sir Edward Grey must be consid-
ered as a model of sagacity and caution. But
when Lord Cromer describes the secret arrange-
ments concerning Morocco as "a wise measure
of preventive diplomacy," it is not easy to fol-
low him.

vn

THE CRISIS OF 1914

If secret diplomacy exhibits its drawbacks even
in a country where parliamentary government is
so highly developed as in England and where po-
litical intelligence and independence of judgment
exist, we shall not be surprised at the continuous
prevalence of devious methods in diplomacy in
countries where the conduct of foreign affairs is
considered quite frankly a matter only for the
initiated, and where little pretense is made of an
appeal to public opinion except in the sense of
holding it in subjection by vague general ideas
of national danger, necessity, and honor. The
main faults of German diplomacy were due to
its bureaucratic point of view and its lack of con-
tact with public opinion, both at home and abroad.
It was distinctly an expression of the authorita-
tive will of the state, guided by a supposed inner
knowledge of its dangers and needs, but without
any real effort to strengthen itself through con-
tact with the public mind. The Eeichstag was
indeed occasionally informed of foreign develop-

102

THE CRISIS OF 1914 103

ments, perhaps as frequently as in England, but
there was no real mutual influence between the
nation and the officials conducting foreign affairs.
As has already been pointed out, German diplo-
macy failed to reassure either the neighbors or
the people of Germany ; its lack of clear objectives
was puzzling and disquieting. It was also hurt
by its constant, evident dependence on what
should have been only the very last resort — ^mili-
tary force. A further disquieting characteristic
of German politics was that there seemed to be
a cynical approval of certain courses of action
which might indeed resemble what some other na-
tions were doing, but which were treated by the
latter rather as regrettable necessities. Thus
there is, for instance, the conception of RecUpoli-
tik, of which Frederick the Great's statement is
an extreme instance: "Before declaring my in-
tentions I consider on the one side the adverse
incidents which I must risk ; on the other, the good
fortune which I might hope; and after thorough
consideration of pro and con, I decide for war,"
Coming now to the fateful crisis of 1914, it
would appear that at this time a great danger
was allowed to grow up without the men in con-
trol of the government giving themselves a full
account as to the fatal probabilities involved.

104 SECRET DIPLOMACY

whereas the parliament and the public remained
entirely uninformed. Germany had always more
or less backed her Austrian ally in the Balkan
policy of the latter. Bismarck had indeed been
very cautious in this respect, and had been fully
aware of the danger inherent in such a policy, of
committing Germany through giving Austria too
much head. When the Servian question became
acute, the heads of the German Government were
indeed so reckless in encouraging strong Austrian
action as to justify the impression that they de-
sired to push Austria-Hungary into a conflict. It
would, however, appear, from a full study of all
the data which is now possible, that the Kaiser
and Bethmann-HoUweg were quite optimistic in
believing that the conflict could be localized and
that the solution could be left to Austria and Ser-
via. When it was beginning to become quite clear
that Russia would in this instance not stand aside
and that therefore France, too, would be thrown
into the conflict, the German Chancellor began to
make belated efforts to induce Austria to accept
the mediation of the Powers on the basis that Bel-
grade should be occupied to assure compliance
with the Servian promises. The Austrian pre-
mier. Count Berchtold, however, was not in-
clined to reverse his engines. He took advantage

THE CRISIS OF 1914 105

of the encouragement given to Austria in the first
place, to persist in an irreconcilable attitude
toward Servia. The documentary material which
has so far been published, shows that Berchtold
insinuated to the Eussian and British embas-
sies that he was favorable to mediation; mean-
while, he did not answer the proposals to that
effect made from Berlin, but in fact stubbornly-
pursued his stern policy against Servia. In turn-
ing a deaf ear to all proposals of mediation at
this time, Berchtold gave the militarists at Berlin
and Petrograd the control of the situation.

Berchtold had inherited the Balkan policy of
Aehrenthal, who had in 190^ carried out the am-
bition of laying the two Slavic Provinces, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, "at the feet of Emperor Fran-
cis Joseph at his Sixtieth Jubilee." Count
Berchtold himself was not considered a man of
strong initiative; he vacillated and was unde-
cided upon questions of great moment; he, how-
ever, displayed great stubbornness on the fatal
point that the "honor" of Austria-Hungary did
not permit of any mediation with Servia. Count
Forgach, who was his chief adviser, hated Eus-
sia and Servia intensely, and it is believed that
he was very influential in spurring Count Berch-
told to aggressive action. Countess Leutrum

106 SECRET DIPLOMACY

holds him responsible for the war, "next to
Aehrenthal." The German Ambassador at Vi-
enna, Von Tschirsky, also harbored a great deal
of personal resentment against Russia. There
would appear to be great reason to doubt whether
such efforts as Bethmann-HoUweg made to urge
moderation upon Berchtold were strongly empha-
sized by the personal influence of the German am-
bassador. Count Czernin states that all of Herr
von Tschirsky 's private speeches at this time were
attuned to "Now or Never," and he asserts that
the German ambassador declared his opinion to
be "that at the present moment Germany was pre-
pared to support our point of view with all her
moral and military power, but whether this would
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the
Serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful." Count
Czernin believes that Tschirsky in particular was
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Ger-
many would have to go through a war against
France and Russia, and that he considered the
year 1914 would be more favorable than a later
date. Count Czernin adds: "For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fight-
ing capacity of either Russia or France, and sec-
ondly, because — and this is a very important point
— ^he was convinced that he could bring the Mon-

THE CRISIS OF 1914 107

arehy into this war, while it appeared doubtful to
him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor Fran-
cis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on
any other occasion where the action would center
less round him, he wished to make use of the Ser-
vian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary
in the decisive, struggle. That was his policy^
and not Bethmann's. ... I am persuaded, how-
ever, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he did, widely
overstretched his prescribed sphere of activity.
Isvolsky was not the only one of his kind."

It is not the purpose of this essay to enter into
the difficult question of the specific guilt for bring-
ing on the war of 1914, However, in examining
the quality and methods of contemporary diplo-
macy it is not possible to avoid considering some
of the phases of this difficult question. The docu-
ments and other evidence which have recently
been published, make it appear that Bethmann-
HoUweg, when the terrible crisis was actually at
hand, honestly attempted to bring about a mod-
eration of the course pursued by Austria. The
original belief of the German statesman itself
could, however, be accounted for, only on one of
two alternative reasons, either because of an un-
believable lack of foresight, or the conviction that
a threatening attitude would again, as in 1909, be

108 SECRET DIPLOMACY

successful, and that Russia would not dare to fol-
low up her constantly declared interest in tlie
Servian situation. And if worst should come to
worst, "well then," the German leaders seemed
to think, "now will be better than later." No
matter what reasonable occasion German states-
men had during the years leading up to the war to
fear a hostile policy on the part of neighboring
governments, yet their attitude and action at a
critical time shows uppermost in the minds of
these statesmen and diplomats, a narrowly tac-
tical, primarily bureaucratic, view of the factors
involved. There was always present in the back-
ground the notion of the necessity of a preventive
war. Those who make the actual decision to be-
gin a war without any immediate provocation
^making it plainly defensive, who begin it because
of contingent dangers in the future, no matter
bow great, take a very serious responsibility. As
has been said, the indicative "Germany made
war," is far more apt to leave a powerful impres-
sion in the record of history than the subjunc-
tive, "If Germany had not made war then the
others would have done so later on."

The fact that military action against Servia
would probably involve Russia and thus set in
motion the complete chain of international forces

THE CRISIS OF 1914 109

involving Europe in a world war, that is, the fu-
tility of the attempt to localize the struggle in
Servia, is practically admitted ia the statement
of the German White Book, issued August 3,
1914, to the following effect: "We were aware
of the fact that warlike undertaking against Ser-
via would bring Eussia into the war and that
therefore our duty as an ally might entangle us
likewise. We could, however, not advise our
Ally to yield in a manner incompatible with its
dignity, nor could we deny our assistance at this
diffieuljt moment."

Austria-Hungary had judged that it would be
incompatible with its dignity and honor to submit
the Servian matter to arbitration. This illus-
trates a very characteristic feature of contempo-
rary diplomacy, still adhering to the traditions
and prejudices of the past. The term " honor '^
is one that is not translatable into terms which
can be reasoned about. It is in fact a direct
descendant of the conception of "honor" during
the eighteenth century, in the code of the duelist.
Men constantly translate the concepts of their
private life into public affairs, and to these men
who at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin, had the
destiny of the world in their hands, honor was
an indefinable term which could be felt but not

110 SECRET DIPLOMACY

discussed. In practice, when applied to human
affairs of the utmost importance, it cannot be dis-
tinguished from the character of the personal
duel, in which the conception of justice was. en-
tirely subordinate. When it was said that Aus-
tria-Hungary found arbitration "beneath its dig-
nity," there was speaking the mentality of the
Feudal junker who considers himself too noble
to appeal to a court against a peasant neighbor,
but prefers to send his servants to give him a
thrashing. The honor of Austria-Hungary is of
such a special kind in the mind of these men that
it does not suffer arbitration, but sees in war the
only possible satisfaction. In this as in many
other points, secret diplomacy is a superstition
of the past. As late as May, 1916, the Pester
Lloyd, a semi-official paper, declared: "Even if
the Eussian Government had stopt its mobiliza-
tion, which it had secretly begun notwithstanding
all its hypocritical assurances, nevertheless Aus-
tria-Hungary would not have gone to any con-
ference but would have insisted without interfer-
ence from third parties to settle its affairs with
Servia in consonance with the future security of
Austria-Hungary." It would appear plain that
the Austrian leaders wanted war, but with Servia
alone ; trusting that the formidable power of their

THE CRISIS OF 1914 111

great ally -would again block outside intervention.
Thus when we look at the men in whose hands
at this time such a fateful power of decision was
placed, we find them, as the great crisis ap-
proaches, themselves stunned by the enormity of
the forces about to be unchained, seeking still and
hoping for some fortunate escape; yet guided in
their specific action, not by a general masterly
grasp of the entire situation, such as is ordinarily
expected of the diplomatic superman, but just by
details happening to be most prominent in their
mind, such as the incompatibility of arbitration
with the honor of Austria, or the personal judg-
ments and inclinations of individual diplomats.
As to a correct estimate of how the forces would
work out, as to foresight of determining factors,
these men showed no unusual ability; in fact, the
guess of the intelligent man on the street would
have been as safe- as their judgment. They stood
on too narrow, a base; they believed that Italy
would remain, neutral, that England would not
enter the contest, and later that the United States
would never engage in hostilities. When we con-
sider the mental attitude of the controllers of
foreign affairs in all countries during this long
period of secret manipulations, we can find noth-
ing sacrosanct about the deductions and judgments

112 SECRET DIPLOMACY

of secret diplomacy; in fact, the lack of contact
with public opinion and the deeper forces of life,
is everywhere painfully apparent, A Swiss
writer has stated: "The World War is the work
of a small minority of men in power. Their
power rests on the principle of authority, and on
the erroneous supposition of wisdom and fore-
sight exceeding the average. The means of main-
taining this erroneous supposition is secret di-
plomacy, which deprives the people of all possi-
bility of insight and control in the most momen-
tous questions. The result of this system is the
ruin of Europe." It is too great a risk to take,
to leave in the hands of individual men, no mat-
ter how highly gifted personally, the control of
such forces and the playing of such chances.

In Russia, the cohduct of foreign affairs under
the Empire was in the hands of a narrow group
of men of special training and experience, but
without an element of responsibility to the public
at large, except that involved in the general re-
sults of diplomatic policy. It is a notable fact
that during the nineteenth century only six men
held the position of foreign ministers in Russia.
This is by far the longest average tenure in any
country. Sazonov, who became foreign minister
in 1911, further emphasized the esoteric charac-

THE CRISIS OF 1914 113

ter of foreign policy by definitely divorcing it
from home affairs. He did not consult with the
Council of Ministers, but only with men of his
own chosen environment, a select group of a few
collaborators. Russian foreign policy was there-
fore dontroUed by a very small clique, represent-
ing the traditions of secret diplomacy, and playing
at a game of chance, though never so shrewdly,
with the lives, fortunes and interests of vast
populations. In the Balkan states Eussian di-
plomacy had for a long time applied all its arts in
order to establish the predominance of Eussian
influence. The secret alliance between Servia and
Bulgaria was nurtured by Russia evidently with
the desire of raising a barrier to the eastward ex-
pansion of Austrian influence. In 1912, the fear
was entertained that the alliance might spend its
main efforts against Turkey instead of Austria.
At this time a loan was arranged for King Ferdi-
nand of Bulgaria, the funds for which were ad-
vanced by the Czar. The Eussian Foreign Of-
fice was fully informed concerning the Balkan al-
liance, which commenced the war in 1912 with Eus-
sian assent and encouragement. What direction
the thoughts of Russian diplomats were taking, is
apparent from a remark of Sazonov, Eussian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Servian Min-

114 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ister, on April 29, 1913, reported by the latter as
follows :

"Again Sazonov told me that we must work for the
future because we would acquire a great deal of terri-
tory from Austria. I replied that we would gladly give
Bulgaria Monastir (BitoUia) if we could acquire Bosnia
and other territory of Austria."

A Belgian diplomat, in a report written from
Berlin in 1913, says that notwithstanding the
great Russian influence in the Balkans, Russian
diplomacy had vacillated a great deal there since
the beginning of the Balkan war; he goes on to
say: "In a moment of confidence the French am-
bassador spoke particularly concerning the influ-
ence which M. Isvolsky has maintained, who has a
personal desire of revenge against Austria-Hun-
gary, and takes great pains to spoil the game
whenever there is any appearance of Austrian
success. ' ' (Baron Beyens to the Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, March 18, 1913.)

When the great crisis came on, the diplomacy
of Russia worked in close connection with the
militarists. The irreconcilable stubbornness of
Count Berchtold greatly strengthened the hands
of the militarists, both in Petersburg and Berlin,
and virtually put the decision in their hands. The
Russians did their part to bring on the war by

THE CRISIS OF 1914 115

first ordering mobilization and making that mobi-
lization general almost immediately. The facts
concerning this matter have become known. On
July 29, 1914, General Janushkevich, the Russian
Minister of War, under directions from the For-
eign Minister Sazonov, gave the German military
attache his word of honor as a soldier, to the ef-
fect that "no general mobilization had taken place,
or was desired." At the very time, he had with
him the Czar's mobilization order. During the
night of July 29th, the Czar gave directions to
suspend the execution of the order for general
mobilization. Generals Janushkevich and Sukh-
omlinoff, with the approval of M. Sazonov, made
the momentous decision to go on with the execu-
tion of the order, in disregard of the Czar's com-
mand. It is quite evident that this action made
the peaceful settlement of the crisis far more dif-
ficult, and gav& full control into the hands of the
military party in Berlin. As late as July 31, M.
Viviani told the German Ambassador at Paris
that he was in no way informed of a general mobi-
lization in Eussia. The Russian militarists had
got away.

vm

THE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR

While the war lasted, the demands of self-pro-
tection required the careful concealment of nego-
tiations and policies from enemy knowledge. But
though it is easy to understand the need of se-
crecy at such a time, yet the spirit displayed in
these negotiations had but little in common with
the ideals professed in the same breath. More-
over, there was a lack of complete sincerity among
the Allies themselves, and particularly was there a
concealment from some of them of important facts
and agreements affecting their interests. How-
ever, the most baneful effect of secret diplomacy
during the war is found in the undermining of pub-
lic confidence in a moral foundation of public ac-
tion. As Lord Loreburn says: "It was not
wholesome that while our people were stimulated
to unparalleled exertions by a parade of lofty mo-
tives there should be at the same time in existence
agreements of this kind, of which no public men-
tion could be made, and from which little has re-
sulted except the right of foreign Powers to de-
ne

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 117

mand their fulfilment on our part." That at a
time when the people in the vast armies were
actually fighting for ideals of freedom and peace,
common to humanity, the chief care of responsi-
ble statesmen should have been the division of
prospective spoils, did certainly not lay solid
foundations for peace.

Japan in her action with respect to Shantung
and in secretly making the twenty-one demands
on China, was first in the attempt to utilize the
great struggle for narrowly selfish gain, in this
case not entirely at the expense of the enemy but
of a neutral and of her allies. Nor did other gov-
ernments keep themselves free from the tempta-
tions of prospective conquest, with the risk of
making war interminable and putting the world
face to face with revolution, anarchy and famine.
As early as February, 1915, the Russian Foreign
Minister informed the French and British am-
bassadors of the territorial acquisitions which
Russia desired to make through the war, includ-
ing a great part of Turkey in Europe and in Asia.
The French and British Governments expressed
their readiness to agree, provided a number of
claims made by France and England were satis-
fied. Italy entered the war, as is well known, on
condition of her claims for territorial annexations

118 SECRET DIPLOMACY

being satisfied. She agreed to the Russian de-
mands on the same condition.

On 'March 9, 1916, the Eussian Foreign Minister
instructed the Eussian Ambassador at Paris to
the following effect: "It is above all necessary
to demand that the Polish Question should be ex-
cluded from the subjects of international negotia-
tion, and that all attempts to place Poland's fu-
ture under the guarantee and control of the
Powers should be prevented. ' ' Thus did the Eus-
sian Government attempt secretly to lock the door
against any chance of Poland regaining her lost
national rights. The entry of Eoumania in 1916
led to additional arrangements. These agree-
ments were kept strictly secret and the millions
who were laying down their lives in the war had
no conception of this intricate web of bargains.

An effort to settle at a time when the Allies
were united in their main aim in the furnace heat
of the war, questions which might divide them
when peace had come in sight, could be under-
stood; and that such agreements should be kept
secret during the war, might have been consid-
ered a necessity. However, the necessity of war
in this case was stretched to cover arrangements
which in themselves went diametrically contrary
to the publicly professed principles for which the

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 119

war was being fought, and gave rise to the just
suspicion that in several cases at least, very spe-
cific advantages had been the controlling incen-
tive for entering the war. But these agreements
have aroused the greatest resentment because they
were in several cases directed against the inter-
ests of third parties, and particularly because
when the United States was making its enormous
and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties were kept
from its knowledge. That the American Govern-
ment should not have been informed of the secret
treaties made at the instance of Japan in which
American interests were most seriously affected,
and that just after these agreements had been
concluded the statesmen who had been closely con-
nected with acceding to these arrangements on
the part of Great Britain, at the price of the
British control of the islands of the South Pa-
cific, came to the United States to stimulate the
practical devotion there to the cause of the Al-
lies, is a fact that wUl unfortunately help to give
munition to those who are unfavorable to any
real friendly understanding between the two great
English-speaking powers. The secret commer-
cial policy pursued by Great Britain during the
war is also justly subject to severe criticism as
giving food and subsistence to the growth of deep

120 SECRET DIPLOMACY

suspicion on the part of even the most faithful of
friends.

The secret treaties relating to the division of
territories in Europe did not come to the knowl-
edge of the public until 1918. At that time they
were republished by one or two British papers,
but were suppressed by the remainder. The
treaties were, however, distributed in iimumerable
copies by their own governments among the
troops of the Central Powers in order to stimu-
late them to fight in a spirit of self-defense. It
is reported from various reliable sources that the
Slovenes were the most eager to fight, of any part
of the Austrian army, after the Pact of London
had become known to them, with its various prom-
ises to Italy.

The secret assurances which had been given to
Italy in the Compact of London were probably
the cause of prolonging the war, with its enor-
ihous slaughter, for more than a year. In the
Spring of 1917, secret negotiations were pursued
between the Emperor of Austria, the President
and Premier of Prance, and the British Prime
Minister. The intermediaries in these negotia-
tions were the Bourbon Princes Sixtus and
Xavier, brothers of the Empress of Austria. The
negotiations were carried on from Switzerland

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 121

■witli a confidential envoy of the Emperor of Aus-
tria. Only the Emperor, the Empress and the
Duchess of Parma were in the secret. Count
Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of For-
eign Affairs at this time, at first knew only of the
general fact, not of the details. A note of Count
Czernin, with a secret personal note written by
the Emperor, were brought to Prince Xavier and
taken by him to Paris. The proposals in Count
Czernin 's note related to the restoration and in-
demnification of Belgium, and the German renun-
ciation of Alsace-Lorraine, which "Austria-
Hungary naturally would not oppose." Count
Czernin stated that Austria-Hungary could not
make a separate peace; that it had no idea of
crushing Servia, but needed guarantees against
such affairs as led to the murder at Sarajevo;
that Austria-Hungary had no desire of crushing
Eoumania, etc. The secret addenda made by the
Emperor, without the knowledge of Count
Czernin, stated: "We will support France and
exercise pressure on Germany with all means [in
connection with Alsace-Lorraine]. We are abso-
lutely not in Germany's hands; it was against
Germany's will that we did not break with
America."
When President Poincare received the Prince's

122 SECRET DIPLOMACY

report he stated that the secret note afforded
a basis for discussion, that he would communi-
cate the two notes, with arrangements of ab-
solute secrecy, to the Premier, and inform the
Czar by personal letter, as well as the King of
England, and Mr. Lloyd George, "who is a dis-
crete man." But the President thought that
Italy would be the stumbling block. After this
Interview the Princes proceeded to Vienna for a
personal interview with the Emperor, which took
place on the night of March 23rd. The Emperor
discussed the whole situation, saying that Servia
was naturally the friend of Austria, and that all
that Austria needed was the suppression of revo"-
lutionary propaganda there. He stated that one
of the Entente Powers was secretly conversing
with Bulgaria; Bulgaria does not know that the
secret has leaked out. "It has not much impor-
tance, because all these dreams of empire of the
East will have to end in the status quo, or very
nearly that." Count Czernin later joined ia the
conversation, which is described as "rather gla-
cial." He expressed his belief that peace must
be made at any price, and that it might be neces-
sary for Austria to secure a divorce from Ger-
many because the latter would never abandon Al-
sace-Lorraine. After a second visit, the Emperor

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 123

gave Prince Xavier an autographed letter, en-
joining absolute secrecy because "an indiscre-
tion would force him to send troops to the French
front." The autographed letter of Emperor
Charles, dated March 24th, contains the following
proposals : That he will support the just French
claims to Alsace-Lorraine by all means, using all
his personal influence with his allies ; Belgium and
Servia are to be restored to full sovereignty ; Bel-
gium is to secure indemnities for her losses; and
Servia is to have access to the Adriatic Sea. On
the basis of this letter, discussions took place
among the men concerned in France and in Eng-
land. But Italy remained the obstacle.

Another trip was taken by Prince Xavier to
Vienna, where he met the Emperor on May 8th.
The question now was, "What compensations should
Austria receive for ceding its territory to Italy
in accordance with the Pact of London? Count
Czernin joined the meeting and on the following
day prepared a memorandum, which was based
upon the principle, "Austria-Hungary can cede
no territory without compensation ; but if the ter-
ritorial question is arranged, then a separate
peace with the Entente might be concluded."
"When the matter was taken up again at Paris,
the Italian diffienlty remained. M. Eibot strongly

124 SECRET DIPLOMACY

adhered to the idea that without Italy, no result
could be had. Meanwhile, the unsuccessful Ital-
ian offensive of July, 1917, had supervened, and
the war had to go on for another sixteen months,
although the acceptance of the proposals of the
Emperor would undoubtedly have brought it to
an early end.

Count Czemia has given in his book, In the
World War, an unimpassioned and coldly-bal-
anced view of the diplomacy of the time. He does
not relate the details of the secret negotiations of
1917, but he evidently did not approve of the man-
ner in which they were carried out because their
effect was to suggest to the Entente a willingness
of Austria-Hungary to separate from her allies,
without strengthening her position in any way. In
a letter written to Count Tisza in the summer of
1917, Czernin said: "It is possible to turn and
steer the Entente course if thought feasible; but
then courage would be needed to make the turn
fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with
treachery and not carrying it out ; we should lose
all ground in Berlin and gain nothing either in
London or Paris."

The policy pursued by Japan throughout the
war made use of all the devices of secret diplo-
macy for the attainment of ends narrowly na-

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 125

tional. After having possessed herself of Tsing-
tau, with a marked cold-shouldering of her Brit-
ish allies, Japan set ahout an attempt to arrange
things in China so that no effective resistance
might be offered there to Japan's expansionist
desires. In January, 1915, the Japanese minis-
ter in an interview with the President of China,
after enjoining the strictest secrecy on the pain
of most disagreeable consequences, proposed the
famous twenty-one demands. That it should have
been attempted to dispose of matters so funda-
mentally important, involving the national rights
of a population of 350,000,000 people, through de-
mands secretly forced upon a President, at a time
when the national representative body did not
function, — that is one of the startling facts of mod-
ern history. Strange as it may seem, the Japa-
nese Foreign Office had apparently persuaded
itself that secrecy could be maintained in a mat-
ter of such transcendent importance. For when
contrary to that expectation and in accordance
with nature and with the salutary fact that, after
all, such tremendous issues can not be thus se-
cretly disposed of, the facts of the case began to
leak out, categorical denials were made by the
Japanese Foreign Office and by various embas-
sies. In this case, those who had the right to

126 SECRET DIPLOMACY

object to the disposal of important interests in
which they themselves had a share, were not mere
neutrals or outsiders but the allies of Japan, en-
gaged in a life and death struggle at the time.
As the twenty-one demands aimed at the estab-
lishment of a predominant position in China
through control of finance and armament, every
other nation there interested would have been ad-
versely affected by the proposed arrangement.
The Chinese, though isolated, would not immedi-
ately yield to the threatening attitude of their
neighbor and the negotiations were strung out
over months. Though they were assid\iously kept
secret, the nature of the transaction in general
and in detail became quite well known outside, so
that the results could not be kept hidden; yet the
whole procedure constituted an aflSrmation that it
was proper to deal with the destinies of a people
in a secret council chamber, where the demandant
backed by strong military forces, confronted the
first official of a vast, peaceful but unmilitant na-
tion, which would never in the world agree to such
procedure and the resultant undertakings. Japan
did indeed get certain concessions, but at the cost
of making her diplomacy and policy universally
suspected on account of the methods which had
been used.

SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR, 127

The policy of Japan at the time did not look
■with favor upon China associating herself with
the Allies. Demarches which were made to bring
about the entry of China into the alUanoe were
negatived by Japan. This in itself might have
been based on sound reasons, yet the real inward-
ness of this policy was revealed at the time when
the United States had broken off relations with
Germany and when the Chinese Government in
the days immediately thereafter was considering
whether to follow the example of the United
States. From a report of the Russian Ambassa-
dor at Tokio concerning an interview with the
Foreign Minister of Japan, which took place on
February 10, 1917, we learn that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs alluded to a rumor that an at-
tempt might be made to induce China to join
the Allies to the extent of breaking off relations
with Germany. The Foreign Minister said in ef-
fect: "It would be unwise and dangerous to at-
tempt to bring China to the side of the Allies
unless we can be sure that it can be carried
through. This is, however, doubtful. Yet the
Japanese Government is willing to undertake the
task of inducing China to take the step. But be-
fore making any such proposal, the Japanese Gov-
ernment desires to be informed as to the attitude

128 SECRET DIPLOMACY

of the Russian Government in the matter of Shan-
tung and the Pacific Islands. Will the Eussian
Government support Japan at the Peace Confer-
ence in these matters ? ' ' The Russian ambassador
was requested to get the opinion of his govern-
ment on this point. In other words, in return
for a commission paid largely by China herself,
the Japanese Government was ready to permit
that China should join the Allies in the Great
War. It was assumed by the Foreign Minister
that Japan's persuasion should be necessary to
induce China to take this step ; but in fact, at the
very time when this conversation between the
minister and ambassador was going on, the Cab-
inet of China was in the all-day session from
which resulted the decision to follow the United
States iu breaking off relations with Germany.
This step was taken without compulsion, urgency
or the promise of advantages, upon a careful con-
sideration of the underlying conditions and equi-
ties, without assurances of gain, merely in the ex-
pectation of fair treatment as an ally and as-
sociate..

IX

HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED

The world has not yet recovered from the sur-
prise and disillusionment which overcame it when
the secret treaties of the war became known and
when it became evident that they would be made
the basis of the Treaty of Peace. The secrecy
of the procedure of the Peace Conference — ^which
had been heralded as an assembly of the peoples
for carrying out and making permanent those
great principles for which men had grimly and
silently suffered and died and which had been
eloquently voiced by the American President —
seemed to be so complete a return to the old meth-
ods of diplomacy that from the day when the
muzzle was clamped on, public faith in the con-
ference and its results was shaken. The motives
of the men who made this decision were probably
good. It was their desire that the work should
be rapidly accomplished and should not be con-
fused by divided counsels. But again the results
of the secret method are hardly apt to increase
confidence in its usefulness as a procedure for

129

130 SECRET DIPLOMACY

dealing with the affairs of the peoples of the
world in such a manner as to place them upon a
sound and lasting foundation.

The solemn document which was prepared for
the information of the newspaper men on the de-
cision of the peace conference to enforce secrecy,
did not satisfy any one. To the public there
seemed to be no larger principle at issue than
that, on this occasion if ever, open covenants
should be openly arrived at, and it was feared
that if the peace conference did not base its action
upon an appeal to public opinion, no adequate
solution could be found at all. When the treaty
itself had been framed, it was sedulously kept se-
cret until distributed by the French paper Bon-
soir. The deliberations of the Council of Five
were secret beyond all precedents in public ac-
tion. No secretaries were admitted and no offi-
cial minutes were kept, nor were there communi-
cations to the public through the press. Doctor
Dillon's description of the Five as "a gang of
benevolent conspirators, ignoring history and ex-
pertship, shutting themselves up in a room and
talking disconnectedly," unfortunately appears
not entirely untrue ; particularly as to the ignor-
ing of history and expertship, which was quite
patent, although from the nature of things we

HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 131

cannot exactly know how disconnectedly the Five
talked.

Unfortunately, after the war the use of secret
diplomatic policy has continued without noticeable
diminution. The details of certain situations
make one feel as if we are after all only a genera-
tion removed from the eighteenth century. These
matters are so recent and still so controversial
that I do not desire to enter upon them in any
detail.

It is, however, surely to be regretted, that it
should have been found necessary to surround the
mandates with peculiar secrecy. This institution
was conceived in a desire to create a trusteeship
in behalf of the world in general and for the par-
ticular benefit of the populations comprised in the
mandates. Not only has the assignment of cer-
tain mandates given rise to great popular resist-
ance indicating that the local populations were
far from ready to trust their interests to a for-
eign mandatory, but the fact that these arrange-
ments are so carefully guarded with secrecy
comes near to destroying all hope that there is
any intention to handle them otherwise than from
the imperialist point of view and for the benefit
of the mandatory.

Among the many things that have happened

132 SECRET DIPLOMACY

since the armistice, the Franco-Hungarian in-
trigues are specially to be noted as emphasizing
the great danger of secret methods, in which a
government runs the risk of being committed by-
persons, irresponsible or not properly controlled,
into embarrassing and harmful situations. We
know of these particular facts through confiden-
tial reports discovered and published, officially
recognized by certain governments, though for-
mally denied by the Magyar Cabinet. These
papers give working details of what was already
known in general terms concerning reactionary
Hungarian intrigues in Czecho-Slovakia and Aus-
tria, including preparations for an armed upris-
ing, and other assistance to monarchists. French
interests were at the same time active in Hun-
gary. They made an agreement for a leasing of
the Hungarian state railways for fifty years. Ac-
cording to this contract, the Hungarian Govern-
ment is bound to consult the diplomatic repre-
sentative of the French Government concerning
every measure which may have a bearing on any
clause of the agreement. A political compact was
simultaneously initialed in which the French Gov-
ernment withdrew its opposition to universal mili-
tary service in Hungary, and that country was to
be assisted in boundary rectifications at the ex-

HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 133

pense of Czecho-Slovakia and Eoumania. A third
agreement provided for the sending of a Hun-
garian army against Soviet Eussia under French
command. These agreements were undoubtedly
accepted by many people as fully concluded. The
Magyar Premier in open session of the national
assembly boasted of having achieved an alliance
with France; the same • understanding was also
accepted by certain Paris newspapers. The
French Government, however, did not sanction
what secret negotiators had prepared in Hungary
and disavowed the agreements, with the exception
■of the lease of the Hungarian railways. This il-
lustrates how in times of unsettlement and sharp
national rivalry, representatives on the spot or
agents of powerful interests in close touch with
the home government may by secret means try
to bring about arrangements which the conscience
of their nation does not approve and which serve
merely to generate suspicion and distrust.

There is reason to believe that the draft of a
secret treaty between France and Yugo-Slavia
which was published in 1920 by the Idea Nasionale
was at the time actually being considered by the
two governments concerned. One of the points
of the proposed treaty was that upon the declara-
tion of war between France and any Mediterra-

134 SECRET DIPLOMACY

nean power, Yugo-Slavic troops would be massed
along the hostile boundary according to previ-
ously determined plans. In connection with this
provision the representatives of France made the
following suggestion: "In case of a conflict it
would be better that the Yugo-Slavic troops, in-
stead of massing on the hostile frontier, should
rather provoke a 'Casus Belli' on the part of the
nation at war with France. Otherwise their in-
tervention might bring on the interference of
other powers." The proposed arrangements,
even though' not adopted by the two governments,
nevertheless illustrate the methods acceptable to
secret diplomacy, but which open public opinion
would never sanction.

Whatever we may think about the exact share
of the blame for having brought on the great
catastrophe which should be attributed to secret
methods and policies, we cannot have any doubts
about their influence since the armistice. Whether
or not secret diplomacy brought on the war, it
certainly has not ended it. War still exists, not
only when actual hostilities are going on, but in
the whole temper of international affairs — con-
tinuing enmity, continuing armaments, unending
waste of human effort. Thus, for one thing, the
entire Near Eastern situation remains unsettled.

HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 135

As an expert on this troubled region has said:
"The principle of settlement as revealed by these
treaties is fundamentally wrong. The East must
be resuscitated, not exploited." But be it East
or "West, there is the same return to the old game
of balancing off gains and changing boundaries,
without consideration of the rights of the respec-
tive peoples. The costly mistakes of the Con-
gresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin are being re-
peated.

THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

OuB historical survey of diplomatic policy and
practice does not hold much assurance that the
evils of secret diplomacy have very appreciably
■waned since the eighteenth century. The cruder
methods of deception and corruption which were
at that time employed would indeed now be con-
sidered beneath the dignity of diplomats; al-
though it is unhappily true that some of the most
despicable tricks, such as stealing correspondence
and placing informers in houses to be watched,
are still practised occasionally. However, it may
be said that while in general the trade-secrets of
diplomacy have lost greatly in prestige, the spirit
of diplomatic action itself has not yet been
brought into accord with democratic ideals.

A secret service attached to the diplomatic es-
tablishment is still considered useful by some gov-
ernments. It is, however, certainly very doubt-
ful whether the results thus obtiained in the nature
of accurate information, are at all commensurate
to the expense and to the constant danger of being

136

DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 137

misinformed through secret agents who think that
they must earn their pay. My own observation
leads me to believe that people who use secret
service information are frequently confused and
worried by an abundance of unauthenticated re-
ports brought to them ; they would have been far
better off without backstairs information, relying
on the fundamental facts and on knowledge which
can be obtained only by seeking the confidence
of the men who control public action. Secret serv-
ice gossip may often give the key to the aims and
desires of an individual person, and if one is
willing to appeal to motives through corrupt and
deceitful means, the information may be actually
useful. However, he whose policy rests upon an
essential reasonableness and mutual benefit, can
afford to disregard such gossip.

We might distinguish between a secrecy which
is vicious in itself, and one that pursues beneficent
objects. The former seeks to conceal the pres-
ence of harmful motives and projects, to confuse
and mislead people to their disadvantage, and in
general, to play on weakness and ignorance. The
other keeps secret its plans and negotiations which
in themselves have honest motives, from a desire
to prevent interference with their prompt and
complete realization. Opinions as to the charac-

138 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ter of a policy may differ widely and those who
secretly advance a policy generally condemned by
many, may perhaps claim credit for honest pur-
poses. This type of secrecy is common. Unfor-
tunately, though it may advance a good object, it
incidentally has an evil influence upon public con-
fidence. It must be confessed that the distinction
here pointed out is difficult to apply in practice
in a thoroughly objective manner, because there
are probably among diplomats very few indeed
who do not persuade themselves at least that the
means applied by them are designed to achieve
useful purposes.

A good example of how stratagem may be used
for a laudable purpose is found in the action of
William J. Buchanan, American Minister to Ar-
gentina, in adjusting the Chili- Argentinian bound-
ary dispute. Buchanan, one of the most original
of American diplomats, had nothing whatever of
the suave manipulator of the old school of diplo-
macy. He was direct to the verge of bruskness,
yet his ability to go straight to the essential point,
and his mastery and bigness, made him highly
successful as a negotiator. In this particular
case, Buchanan had been designated, together with
a Chilian and an Argentinian representative, on
a commission to settle boundary questions and re-

DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 139

quested to make a preliminary report. He agreed
io act only on the following conditions : That be-
cause of the complexity and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, it would be necessary to report on
the suggested boundary by sections, that each sec-
tion should be voted upon as reported by him,
and that a majority vote on each section should
be decisive. This proposal was accepted. After
a careful investigation, Buchanan made his report,
and it was found that on each section the sug-
gested boundary was carried by two votes against
one; the American always voted in the affirma-
tive; the Chilian and Argentinian, as in the par-
ticular section the allotments seemed favorable or
unfavorable to their respective country. In ac-
cordance with the terms agreed upon, the entire
report had thus to be accepted, and all the thorny
problems of long-standing boundary controversies
were settled. Had Buchanan not used this strata-
gem it is very unlikely that the report as a whole
would have been accepted, as each of his associ-
ates would have felt that he could not vote for a
report containing arrangements for giving up spe-
cific tracts of territory which his country had
hitherto always insisted upon retaining. By this
clever arrangement Buchanan made it possible
for them to vote against such relinquishment in

140 SECRET DIPLOMACY

each case without defeating the project as a
whole ; but if he had revealed to them his plan at
the beginning, the object could not have been
achieved.

This incident illustrates that a complete solu-
tion will often be accepted as satisfactory al-
though it may contain details which, by them-
selves, would have been resisted to the last. It
may be said that the disadvantage of public dis-
cussion lies in the emphasizing of such points of
opposition, and the obscuring of the general rea-
sonableness of a solution.

Mr. Balfour in his defense of the secrecy of
diplomatic intercourse, says that the work of
diplomacy is exactly similar to the work which is
done every day between two great business firms.
He then argues that, in all such relationships, it
is unwise to air difficulties in public. Bismarck
used the more homely illustration of a horse trade,
the participants in which should not be expected
to tell each other all they know about the prospec-
tive bargain. That view is putting diplomacy on
a rather lowly footing. One might expect a
somewhat different temper among men dealing
with momentous public affairs than the bluff-and-
haggle of a petty private transaction. Yet such
tactics have actually been found useful in diplo-

DESTRUCJTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 141

macy. Mr. Balfour is on sounder ground when
he says, "In private, in conversations which need
not go beyond the walls of the room in which you
are, both parties may put their case as strongly
as they like and no soreness remains," but "di-
rectly a controversy becomes public, all that fair
give-and-take becomes difficult or impossible."
This, of course, implies a somewhat low estimate
of public intelligence and self-control, of which
more later.

The greatest vice of a secret diplomatic policy,
working in the dark and concealing international
undertakings, lies in the inevitable generating of
mutual suspicion and the total destruction of pub-
lic confidence among the different countries which
compose the family of nations. No nation is so
bad as imagination, confused and poisoned by
secrecy and by the suggestion of dire plottings,
would paint it. Agreements and understandings
which do not exist at all are imagined, the nature
of those which actually have been made is mis-
judged, and animosities are exaggerated ; thus the
public is quite naturally put in that mood of sus-
picion and excitement which renders it incapable
of judging calmly when apparently startling facts
suddenly emerge.

Secret diplomacy destroys public confidence.

142 SECRET DIPLOMACY

however, in a still more insidious manner : by the
practice of using a language of ideal aims and
humanitarian professions in order to conceal and
veil the most narrowly selfish, unjust and uncon-
scionable actions. The conventional language of
diplomacy still carries in it many of the phrasesi
and concepts instilled by the false idealism of the
eighteenth century, to which at that time diplo-
macy gave lip worship. The most disconcerting
performances of this kind are the profuse and
reiterated declarations promising the mainte-
nance of the sovereignty, independence and in-
tegrity of certain countries, when in fact the ac-
tion really taken was quite to the contrary effect.
The diplomacy of Japan has manifested pe-
culiar expertship in the use of phrases that are
associated with some wise public dispensation or
arrangement and which have a calming effect —
to cover action not remotely in fact contributing
to such beneficent providences. The sovereignty,
integrity and independence of a neighboring coun-
try are guaranteed in solemn terms at the very
moment when force, intrigue and every tricky arti-
fice are secretly employed to destroy them.
"Strong popular demand" is alleged as a reason
for harsh action abroad, in a. country where the
expressions of public opinions as well as polioy;

DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 143

itself are controlled by a narrow group, with ab-
solutist authority. There is so much talk of
"frank discussion" that every one is put on his
guard as soon as the word "frank" is uttered.

The "peace of Asia," a "Monroe Doctrine for
Asia," the "Open Door," "greatest frankness,"
"hearty cooperation with other powers," are her-
alded at times when the context of facts makes
a strange commentary. But while such a dis-
crepancy is very strident in a country where mili-
tary absolutism wields control over diplomacy,
with a grudging obeisance to representative
forms, yet other countries are by no means free
from this hypocrisy. "What blasted promise of
equity in all that succession of declarations con-
cerning Korea, China, Persia, parts of Turkey,
and Morocco. "What confusion of political ideals
in supporting Denikin, Wrangel, and Horthy as
defenders of "representative government."

When Russia and Japan, in response to Secre-
tary Knox' Manchurian proposal had made their
secret arrangements to defeat his policy. Great
Britain, though it had made many reassuring pro-
testations at Washington, nevertheless had se-
cretly acquiesced (to cite a Russian diplomatic
paper) in the "recognition of our (Russian)
sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria, Mon-

144 SECRET DIPLOMACY

golia, and Western China, with the exception of
Kashgar, as well as the undertaking not to hinder
us in the execution of our plans in these terri-
tories, and herself to pursue no aims which we
should have to regard as incompatible with our
interest." And it was also stated that Great
Britain, in return, was to receive "recognition of
her freedom of action and her privileged position
in Tibet," This was in 1912.

Thus were the solemn declarations relating to
the Open Door and the integrity of China applied
in action.

Subsequent departure from the letter and spirit
of such declarations may indeed sometimes be ex-
cused on account of changed circumstances; but
frequently it is quite apparent to those who know
what is going on, that such well-sounding declara-
tions are made for public consumption, at the
very time when the contrary action is taken se-
cretly.

This is indeed nothing less than a crime against
the public opinion and conscience of the world,
which cannot be condemned in terms too strong.
It shows a thorough contempt of the people, who
are supposed to be either of so little intelligence
or of so short a memory that such vain profes-
sions may succeed in veiling the true inwardness

DESTRUCTION OE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 14^

of political intrigue. This practice tends to en-
gender thorough confusion in the public mind as
to standards of right and justice in international
affairs ; it shakes the basis on which alone sound
international relations can grow up; as, indeed,
all social relations must rest upon confidence in
an underlying justice and equity.

Closely allied to the practice of making public
declarations in international affairs which do not
correspond with the specific action taken, is the
control of the press and the censure of news.,
This is indeed a matter which transcends the sub-
ject of diplomacy, because a system of press con-
trol and censure is often applied by other de-
partments of the government than the diplomatic
branch. As far as foreign affairs are concerned,
it is used in an effort to support foreign policy,
and it therefore shares the same defects which in-
here in the old diplomacy. Like secret diplomatic
control, it is accounted for on the assumption that
the people cannot be trusted with the entire truth,
and that carefully selected pbrtions of the truth
have to be put forth in order to make them ready
to support the policy considered necessary by the
leaders. This involves the assumption of an enor-
mous responsibility by a few leaders in determin-
ing by themselves what the public interest re-

146 SECRET DIPLOMACY

quires and instead of relying on the strength nat-
urally to be gained from a spontaneous public
opinion, to attempt to fashion that opinion for
specific purposes. Press control and censure,
with the incomplete and warped information
;which it implies, is one of the evil accompani-
ments considered necessary in the conduct of a
war, for the safety of the combatant nation. The
principle that strategic information must be kept
secret is extended, at such times, out of all rea-
son. After hostilities have actually been con-
cluded, this practice tends to subsist and to con-
tinue the evils of misinformation and confusion
in the public judgment. The manner in which
all news emanating from the Balkan and Near
Eastern countries has been censured since the
war, has made it impossible for the public of the
world to form a just conception as to what is
there going on. Control of the press and censor-
ship likewise resulted in such confusion in the
public mind concerning the problems of Russia,
that there remained no reliable basis for a policy
which would facilitate the restoration of more nor-
mal conditions there, in a sympathetic spirit with
the struggles and difSculties of the Russian peo-
ple.

On account of the natural fact that men are

DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 147

apt to be influenced in their action unconsciously
through persons with whom they have constant
associations, it is a matter of no mean impor-
tance that the armament interests should have
been so strongly represented in many capitals by
men of high professional and social standing, al-
ways on the ground, eager to advance the busi-
ness in military supplies. In many capitals, very
close relationships have grown up between the
diplomatic officers and the representatives of the
great armament firms. As a mutual apprehen-
hension of excessive preparation for war greatly
stimulates these industries, it is not surprising
that their representatives do not exert themselves
to prevent occasional war scares. In fact, highly
misleading information on war plans has often
been given out, as in the case of a representative
of the Coventry Ordnance Works, who in 1909
informed the British Government of excessive
shipbuilding by Germany. The news was later
found to be erroneous; but new orders had been
given in Great Britain, and through action and
reaction armaments were stimulated elsewhere.
The close connection of the Krupp Iron Works
with the German Government and with associa-
tions favoring aggressive foreign action is well
known.

148 SECRET DIPLOMACY

It has often happened that what represents
itself to be a national interest and enlists diplo-
matic and political support in that way, is really
only the enterprise of individuals to make profits.
The men who support it with their best energies
and talents are not villains, but tljeir method of
assuming a great national interest where only a
tradition, a prejudice or a private plan of profit
are involved, renders their doings far from bene-
ficial to the commonweal. Similarly, those who
operate on the principle that the public mind must
be nourished with certain carefully selected facts
and kept from the knowledge of others, may have
honest motives, but their ideas of public action
are obsolete or deserve to be so, as they are left
over from the absolutist regime in politics.

XI

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In considering the relation of legislative bodies,
and of the public opinion therein represented, to
the conduct of foreign affairs, it will be useful to
glance briefly at the relevant historical facts.
When the United Colonies of America formed a
separate political organization from the mother
country, the conduct of foreign affairs "was en-
trusted to a committee of Congress, a successor
to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. In
1781 a Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, with a
permanent department, was created and in 1782
the conduct of foreign affairs was regulated in
the following terms:

"All letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence,
plans of treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions,
passports, safe conducts, and other acts of Congress
relative to the department of foreign affairs, when the
substance thereof shall have been previously agreed to
in Congress, shall be reduced to form in the office of
foreign affairs, and submitted to the opinion of Con-
gress, and when passed, signed and attested, sent to the

149

150 SECRET DIPLOMACY

office of foreign affairs to be countersigned and for-
warded."

Congress therefore retained a very close control
over this matter ; a control which under the Con-
stitution passed to the Senate, though in a re-
stricted form. In no other country did a legisla-
tive committee participate in the conduct of for-
eign affairs with similar power and influence.
The policy of the arrangements under the Con-
stitution is explained by John Jay in the Feder-
alist as follows :

"It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immedi-
ate despatch are sometime requisite. There are cases
where the most useful intelligency may be obtained, if
the persons possessing it can be relieved from appre-
hensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will oper-
ate on those persons whether they are actuated by mer-
cenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are
many of both descriptions, who would rely on the se-
crecy of the President, but who would not confide in
that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popu-
lar assembly."

Jay's explanation is dominated by the conception
which the eighteenth century had of the functions
of diplomacy and the conditions of its work. The
constitutional system as conceived at that time

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 151

implied (1) Full power of negotiation in tlie
President, (2) Taking counsel with the Senate,
(3) Formal ratification of treaties by the Senate,
and publication thereof as parts of the law of the
land. The system has been highly praised by
European publicists as reconciling the mainte-
nance of confidential relations with publicity of
the results, in that treaties are given the charac-
ter of laws.

In the course of the nineteenth century there
occurred many instances resulting in a growing
practice of making special agreements by the Sec-
retary of State alone, without the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. When President Eoosevelt
in 1905 attempted to deal with the Dominican sit-
uation in this manner, the Senate objected and in-
sisted that all international agreements of any
kind must be submitted to its action. The sys-
tem of the United States, however, actually per-
mits of the current conduct of foreign affairs
without information to the people or even without
constant and complete information to the Senate
which is, moreover, usually preoccupied with mat-
ters of internal legislation.

In England, the mother of Parliaments, we
might expfect that there should have been a con-
stant effort at parliamentary control of foreign

152 SECRET DIPLOMACY

affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective
control was denied; yet on account of the spe-
cific nature of the system of Cabinet government,
such has not been the case. Under the two-party
system as it exists in England the conduct of for-
eign affairs is always in the hands of a minister
trusted and supported by the majority in the
Lower House. Even if the minority should at-
tempt to censor the conduct of foreign affairs as
being carried on apart from the knowledge and
active consent of the House, the majority whose
leaders form the Cabinet which is managing
things, will always prevent such a vote from suc-
ceeding. Only in case of a cabinet going abso-
lutely and openly counter to the policy of its own
party in Parliament could a real conflict of this
nature arise ; and such a contingency is itself im-
passible, because of the party control exercised by
the cabinet.

According to the theory of the Stuarts, the man-
agement of foreign affairs belonged entirely to
the Crown which had not at that time been put in
commission. In 1677 the House of Commons ob-
jected to granting money for alliances and for
wars, unless the matter in question had been pre-
viously communicated to it. Charles II, however,
declared the conduct of foreign affairs to be the

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 153

Crown's fundamental prerogative in which it must
remain free from direct control of Parliament.
William III was in fact to a very large extent his
own Minister for Foreign Affairs. "With the in-
troduction of responsible Government under the
Hanoverians, however, the situation changed.
The dominant party being represented by the
ministers was quite ready to submit to their
guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was
the opposition who occasionally attacked the gov-
ernment on its foreign policy, and particularly
the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords '
protest of March 26, 1734, it was urged that ' ' the
interposition of the British Parliament would be
more effectual than the occasional expedients of
fluctuating and variable negotiations." In 1740
it was moved that a select committee consisting
of peers should be appointed to inquire into the
conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was re-
jected. Another Lords' protest in the same year
opposes the argument that absolute secrecy is es-
sential because this claim is often used in bar of
all inquiries. Such secrecy is "much oftener the
refuge of guilt than the resort of innocence."

Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for cer-
tain letters of instructions, argued for the neces-
sity of giving such information to Parliament.

154. SECRET DIPLOMACY

He asked how could members of tlie House of
Comm.ons judge of the estimates to be laid before
tbem as a provision for national safety if they
did not know by what danger the nation was con-
fronted. The motion, however, Was rejected.

When Pelham was criticized in the House for
not having informed Parliament of the prelimina-
ries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he argued:
"If Parliament should encroach upon the pre-
rogative of the Crown, by assuming a right to
make peace or war, and to inquire into foreign
transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be
reduced to a dangerous predicament; for no for-
eign State will negotiate with our ministers, or
conclude any treaty with them, either political or
commercial." This is an argument often made
in the eighteenth century to show the unwisdom
of Parliamentary control. The change of min-
isters following party changes in the House, and
the fact that the Foreign Minister would not by
his own word be able to give complete assurances
to foreign governments, were considered to put
the British Government under a disadvantage in
negotiations. It was therefore considered unde-
sirable that negotiations should be submitted to
the control and sanction of Parliament. Walpole
had stated the matter in the f oljowing words :

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 155

"Therefore while our happy constitution remains en-
tire, while the Parliament meets but once a year, and
does not continue assembled above three or four months
in the twelve, it is impossible for either House of Parlia-
ment to intermeddle, much less to prescribe to the
Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without
exposing the nation to imminent danger."

Throughout the nineteenth century Parliament
interfered very little with the conduct of foreign
affairs. The minister for foreign affairs or the
premier would from time to time give information
or make a systematic discourse on foreign affairs
and it was understood that the House would be
kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies
of the Government's foreign policy. Specific
questions were asked by members but not fre-
quently. The nature of the British system would
have rendered unmeaning any struggle for control
between the House and the Cabinet.

The manner of keeping Parliament and the pub-
lic informed on foreign affairs was discussed.
The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of
laying before Parliament official information in
the Blue Books. He stated :

"I am perfectly certain there is always laid before
Parliament a very fair and complete view of the trans-
actions between this country and any other to which
those papers may relate. I know that foreign Govern-

156 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ments rather complain of our Blue Books, and to a cer-
tain extent they may curtail some of the communications
that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be
extremely sorry to see our system of publication of diplo-
matic papers in any way curtailed, or different from
■what it is; of course, there must always be care taken
not to compromise individuals for the information they
have given, but I believe it is an immense advantage to
this country that our despatches and diplomatic transac-
tions should be known, because if they have the appro-
bation of Parliament and of the country, the Government
then has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor,
and it is that which gives such strength to our policy
and to our opinions in foreign countries."

That is a very statesmanlike presentation of the
advantages of constant public knowledge of for-
eign policy in giving the government a secure base
of intelligent support.

When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large
numbers concerning the foreign policy of the gov-
ernment, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after the
concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, com-
plaint was frequently made in Parliament and in
the press to the effect that Parliament on the one
hand was not given a chance to acquire a com-
plete knowledge of foreign policy, and on the other
it was not sufficiently alert and active in using
its opportunities for control. In 1886 the follow-
ing resolution was moved:

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 167

"That in the opinion of this House it is not just or
expedient to embark in war, contract engagements in-
volving grave responsibilities for the nation, and add
territories to the Empire, without the knowledge and
consent of Parliament."

Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass.
Mr. Gladstone opposed it on the ground that the
House of Commons under existing arrangements
actually possessed all necessary power of control
and that the passage of this resolution would
mean simply that the House of Lords would share
this power with it.

In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to
public criticism of negotiations which were still
in progress between Russia and Great Britain re-
garding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the
following interesting and important statement
with respect to the relations of foreign policies
to public opinion, which in temper resembles that
of Lord Clarendon cited above:

' ' The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine
which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the
duty of an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the
conduct of the Government, if by so doing it should have
the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other
parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching
doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to.
... If we are of opinion that the course of public af-

158 SECRET DIPLOMACY

fairs is going ill, and that our Government has misman-
aged, that faults are being committed and dangers are
being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to vrhom
we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our abso-
lute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is
they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the
mischief which is going on. You have a form of Gov-
ernment which in many points is purely democratic,
and you must take it with the incidents which naturally
adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of
deliberation. The Cabinet is the people, and their de-
liberations are conducted in the open field. If they are
to be rightly informed, you must deal fully and frankly
with the subjects which form the basis of their deter-
mination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes,
but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help
it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privi-
leged communications between you and those by whose
verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argu-
ment because somebody else outside hears it and you
may be adversely affected by it. . . ."

The concealment of important obligations and
the growing secrecy of diplomatic affairs during
the first decade of the Twentieth Century brought
on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the
House of Commons. After the secret agreement
concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John
Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech
in the House of Commons in September, 1911 :

"I do not believe any representative assembly in the
history of the world has ever been called upon to dis-

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 159

cuss a matter so vital and so far-reaching as that which
the House of Commons has before it to-day to consider,
and with so absolute a lack of information. . . . The
House was summoned for this discussion to-day without
any papers whatsoever. . . . We ought at all events to
have had an account of diplomatic correspondence be-
tween the four great Powers intimately interested in
the question of Morocco, as is customary to be given to
the House of Commons on such an occasion. This would
have enabled members of the House before the debate
commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment
upon the whole matter. We have heard a good deal to-
night of the secrecy of the Foreign policy of this coun-
try. It is no use attempting to deny it. Those of us
who have been a long time in this House, and can re-
member the methods of the Foreign OfSce twenty-five
years ago, know as a matter of fact, which cannot be
successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy has
become during the last ten years progressively more
secret every year. Until this present year this has gone
on, when the intense pressure of Foreign Affairs and the
danger of war has forced the hands of the Minister to
give some time for the discussion of Foreign Office af-
fairs. For ten years the Foreign policy of this coun-
try has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of
secrecy. Some of us pointed out years ago that the se-
crecy of Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and logical
result of that new departure which was heralded about
xen years ago, and which we heard praised once more
on the floor of this House to-night. I refer to what is
known as the policy of the continuity of the Foreign
policy of this country; of the withdrawal of the For-
eign policy of this country from the sphere of party
politics."

160 SECRET DIPLOMACY

At the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill ex-
pressed himself very strongly on the subject of
withholding information from Parliament, in the
following terms:

"From generation to generation, you have allowed
treaties involving the highest international obligations
— involving questions of peace and war — to be taken
absolutely out of the hands of the House. It is no ex-
aggeration to say, so far as international policy is oon-
cerned, you have rendered the House as little effectively
powerful as any man walking over "Westminster Bridge.
Over and over again treaties involving matters of life
and death, involving questions of first-class importance,
have been ratified behind the back of Parliament. . . .
The people themselves must be allowed to know all about
this diplomacy and what it is. And there should be no
seereey in regard to high diplomatic statecraft about it.
The House of Commons is sample judge of what is dis-
creet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete ab-
surdity for others to treat us as children or for us to
allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high
international importance as those involving questions of
peace and war."

Sir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy
up to a certain point was necessary and that par-
ticularly the ratification of treaties could not be
previously discussed. He then made the very sig-
nificant remark that not until the House of Com-

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 161

mons "was really free to devote itself to discus-
sions of imperial affairs would it get control."
In other words as long as the House of Commons
remains a body occupied primarily with domestic
and local legislation it cannot spare the attention
necessary for an effective control of foreign pol-
icy.

Early in 1914, evidence was taken by a select
committee on House of Commons procedure. Mr.
Balfour during these discussions rather emphar
sized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign
affairs. He thinks that such matters should not
be aired too frequently in the House of Commons,
because indiscreet speeches, which can be per-
fectly appraised in the House, may make bad
blood when reported. Diplomatic conversations
must be kept confidential if you are to work the
European system at all. But though the House
of Commons does not and cannot know the cur-
rent details of international negotiations, it is not
uninformed. This plainly is the language of a
statesman to whom the idiosyncrasies of the Euro-
pean system are so familiar that they seem to be
the only natural state of affairs. The statement
is made from the point of view of the expert who
rather resents any sort of interference on the part
of the less well informed.

162 SECRET DIPLOMACY

In Marcli, 1918, it was moved in the House of
Commons :

"That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Com-
mittee of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, repre-
sentative of all parties and groups in the House, in order
that a regular channel of communication may be estab-
lished between the Foreign Secretary and the House of
Commons, which will afford him frequent opportunities
of giving information on questions of Foreign policy and
which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves more
fully with current international problems, will enable
this House to exercise closer supervision over the general
conduct of Foreign Affairs. ..."

Mr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on
this motion and further elaborated the ideas
which he had put forward in 1914. In a speech
delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably
the most complete and persuasive exposition of
the value of traditional methods in diplomacy:

"... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are
great instruments for preventing, as far as can be pre-
vented, and diminishing, even when you cannot prevent,
friction between States which are, or which ought to be,
friendly. How is the task of peace-maker — ^because that
is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and to the
Foreign Office, which controls diplomatists — ^to be pur-
sued if you are to shout your grievances from the house-
top whenever they occur? The only result is that you
embitter public feeling, that the differences between the

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 163

two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought
never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of
the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parlia-
ments of the two countries have their passions set on
fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended
sometimes, in international catastrophes. . . . Office of-
ficials, or officials of any Department, — to expend some
of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination,
you will really be destroying the public service. There
is nothing on which I feel more strongly than that.
They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not to
be accustomed to it. ... I do not hold the view that
antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which no
man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of
everyday life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy
is exactly the work which is done every day between two
great firms, for instance, which have business relations,
or between two great corporate entities which have in-
terests diverging or interests in common. If you are a
man of sense you do not create difficulties to begin with.
Tou try to get over all these things without the embit-
terment which advertisement always brings with it. It
is when you begin to press your case in public that an-
tagonism arises. In private — in conversation which need
not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, —
you can put your ease as strongly as you like, and the
gentleman with whom you are carrying on the discus-
sion may put his case as strongly as he likes, and if good
manners are observed and nothing but fair discussion
takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven to
ignore the strong points of his opponent's case. Di-
rectly a controversy becomes public all that fair give-
and-take becomes either difficult or impossible. . . . But
if all you mean ... is that it is wrong for the nations

164 SECRET DIPLOMACY

of the world to find themselves hampered in their mu-
tual relations by treaties of which those countries know
nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say that
there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable;
but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a
necessary evil. Please remember that two nations make
a treaty together for their mutual advantage. Both are
desirous of passing it. One nation says, 'It is against
our interest that this treaty should be made public at
present.' The other says, 'We do not like being com-
mitted to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make
public at once.' Which is going to prevail? ... It
does not rest with any single Foreign Office, British or
other. It is always an arrangement between two — pos-
sibly three or four, Foreign Offices. You cannot lay
down — and I do not thiak you would be wise to lay
down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and
for no object, could you so far concede the point as to
say that a treaty is to be made which is not to become
public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that
that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable
one. To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible
limits should, I think, be the object of every responsible
statesman who has the control of foreign affairs. Be-
yond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any
signs of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Mo-
tion before us. You should have your control over
those who manage your affairs, but it is not the kind of
control which the honorable Member wishes to set up
with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a dif-
ferent control. You must know, broadly speaking, what
the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that
is thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at
this moment by every man in this House who takes the

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 165

trouble to thiiik. The general lines on which, we are
proceeding are thoroughly known."

This argument brings out all the strong points
of the system of secret diplomacy under the ex-
isting conditions of international politics, but it
contains no hint that these conditions need im-
provement. They cannot, as a matter of fact, be
improved until some strong nations, even at the
risk of disadvantage to themselves, take the lead
in placing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis.

xn

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY

In consequence of the startling developments
in diplomacy which preceded and accompanied
the great war, the relation of democracy to diplo-
macy has been earnestly discussed of late, par-
ticularly in Great Britain.

When considering this important matter, the
distinction between the methods of diplomacy and
diplomatic policies should be borne in miad for
the sake of clearness of thought. The develop-
ment of public opinion, the disappearance of
purely dynastic aims of state action, and the con-
stantly broadening outlook of political life, have
led to the elimination of most of the cruder meth-
ods of deception and intrigue. But two questions
still remain: Should diplomatic negotiations be
carried on in the public view, that is with con-
stant and full information given to the public or
parliament, on all important details? and, Should
the diplomatic policy of a democratic government
at all times be kept fully before the representative
bodies, and the public?

166

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 167

Most discussions which favor the use of secret
diplomacy, refer to the presumed necessity of
confidential methods of negotiation. But there are
some publicists and statesmen who believe that
the policy of foreign affairs itself can best be
handled by responsible statesmen keeping their
own counsel and giving to the public only a gen-
eral adumbration of the trend of policy. These
two questions are constantly mixed up in current
discussion; and their absolute separation is in-
deed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic
policy will naturally accentuate the secrecy of
the methods employed. Abstractly considered, it
would be quite possible to have the foreign policy
of a country determined by public action, and
still to surround diplomatic negotiations with se-
crecy. But if the substance of the policy were
definitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods
wottld lose much of its effectiveness.

The use of such methods is defended from two
points of view ; from that of the trader who looks
for a better bargain through not having given
away his entire hand at the beginning ; and from
that of the builder who desires to work quietly
without interruptions from an excitable public,
who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away

168 SECRET DIPLOMACY

contrasts which publicity would tend to exag-
gerate.

There is an ex post facto publicity of diplomatic
policy. If this is afforded as soon as a new situ-
ation has arisen or a new agreement has been cre-
ated, some of the harm of secrecy is avoided. In
such a case the statesmen, cabinet, or conference,
practically give assurance that, if allowed to work
quietly on a certain problem, they will produce
a solution which will commend itself in general
to the sense of equity of the nation or nations con-
cerned ; although the sum total of the arrangement
may contain details which, considered by them-
selves, would be unacceptable and which might
have interfered with the making of an accord, if
unduly emphasized or given publicity during the
negotiations.

Mr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918,
which has already been referred to, indeed speaks
quite convincingly of the advantage of confiden-
tial relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but
he goes so far as strongly to deprecate a demand
for information on the part of Parliament. In
that he certainly shows a measure of anti-demo-
cratic bias, as when he says, "Do not suppose
that we can do the work better by having to ex-
plain it to a lot of people who are not responsible.

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 169

That is not the way to get business properly-
done." He therefore rejects the idea of a par-
liamentary committee of control ia the niatter of
foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the
existence of secret treaties is an evil, although he
thinks that it may be at certain times necessary,
because the associated treaty power may desire it.
He is mildly deprecatory, at best.

Count Czernin, speaking to the Austrian dele-
gations on June 24, 1918, concerning President
Wilson's fourteen points, stated that he has no ob-
jection to the introduction of the principle of
"open covenants," although he confesses that he
does not know by what means effective adherence
thereto can be assured. Concerning diplomatic
negotiations, which he treats simply as a matter
of business, he points out the advantages of se-
crecy from the point of view of trading. More-
over, if there were full publicity, the general pub-
lic might passionately oppose every action involv-
ing any concession as a defeat. This would not
be conducive to peaceable relations.

There are those who believe that the chief evils
of secret diplomacy would be avoided if ample
opportunity were given for discussion in repre-
sentative assemblies, if there were a parliamen-
tary committee keeping constantly in touch with

170 SECRET DIPLOMACY

the conduct of foreign relations, and if treaties
and declarations of war could not be made with-
out the consent of the national legislature. Some
advocates of democratic control go so far as to
reason that a decision to make war and thereby
to order the shedding of human blood, should not
be made without a national referendum vote.

On the other hand, those opposed to all public-
ity of diplomatic affairs argue that international
policies cannot be determined in the market place.
They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that
as democracy cannot be expected to regulate the
details of an important undertaking, it is particu-
larly unqualified to deal with international mat-
ters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are
required. Followers of this opinion believe that
the conduct of foreign affairs is best placed quite
unreservedly in the hands of responsible states-
men, who have greater information, larger experi-
ence and more self-control than the average of
humanity. They generally have in view the pres-
ervation of national interests, under conditions
of peace if possible ; they will not be inflamed by
exciting incidents, but will keep these in proper
subordination to the general plan. Such details,
if made public, would easily lead to occurrences
that would upset the results of wise planning.

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 171

As Lord Cromer has said, it is such untoward
chance incidents which cannot be controlled that
are to be feared, rather than any deliberate plot-
ting on the part of diplomats. Such responsible
statesmen always remain accountable for the gen-
eral results of their policy; they are conscious of
the importance of their trust, and therefore are
a safer repository of discretionary powers than
a general committee.

Back of these arguments, however, there
usually lies the conviction that the public is su-
perficial, easily swayed, excitable and altogether
delighting more in the hurrah of war than in the
humdrum of peace. It might be remarked that
if such had actually been the case, the most re-
cent experience of the people with war has prob-
ably given them a different idea of the attractive-
ness of that kind of excitement ; unless indeed the
mass of humanity are irremediably and forever
fools, when taken in the aggregate.

The sensational character of the daily press
must be considered in this connection. The news
value of normal, peaceable developments is very
small. It is therefore a godsend to the news-
papers when something extraordinary happens,
particularly in international affairs. For this
reason, the daily news frequently presents an un-

172 SECRET DIPLOMACY

true or warped picture of the actual situation.
Gilbert Murray asks what people are referred to
by those who demand popular control of diplo-
macy; are they the people of educational socie-
ties, or of the music halls? The public is not
homogeneous, or so organized as to give expres-
sion to convictions on current affairs which have
been maturely considered. It lacks the leisure
and training for penetrating superficialities and
going to the bottom of difficult questions. Lord
Cromer believes in general that democracies are
not peaceful, and he refers particularly to the
American democracy for proof ; Lord Lytton said,
"Governments are generally for diplomacy, the
people for war."

Men of all shades of opinion are agreed that
the people are not greatly interested in foreign
affairs, and the opponents of proposals of demo-
cratic control argue that it would be useless to
create machinery for action where there exists
no interest, nor purpose to act.

It is quite true that the public during the nine-
teenth century seemed less interested in foreign
affairs than during the eighteenth. At the ear-
lier time, diplomacy was a fascinating, personal
game, about which the wiseacres in the coffee
houses were eager to make their criticisms and

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 173

prognostications. When the middle class came
to power in the nineteenth century, it was pri-
marily interested in economic and other domes-
tic questions, and was satisfied to leave the con-
duct of foreign affairs to statesmen and diplo-
mats. The constantly growing political con-
sciousness of the public at large was concentrated
chiefly on questions of internal politics and re-
form. Foreign affairs, asi they reached the pub-
lic, were thought of still from the point of view
of the onlooker, rather than of him who actually
had to bear the brunt of the burden. Those who
had to bleed and die when hostilities had been
brought about, never had any chance, nor deter-
mination, to influence^ the course of diplomacy
leading up to wars.

"\yith such a general apathy of the public, it
was not surprising that diplomacy should cliag
to its caste privileges, should try to preserve its
discretionary powers, and should often attempt
deliberately to keep people in the dark. "In the
public interest" is the curtain beyond which no
one may peer. Even in the American Grovern-
ment, particularly during and since the war, for-
eign affairs have been handled with what would
ordinarily seem insufficient information to the
public; in. fact; with occasional putting forth of

174. SECRET DIPLOMACY

misleading and entirely partial information, or
the refusal to furnish information even "vdien re-
quested by those having official responsibilities.
This is a notable change, as up to 1914 it was
substantially true that the United States had no
diplomatic secrets.

While from the point of view of traditional
diplomacy, and of international relations as they
were up to the Great War, it seems quite natural
that democratic control should be thought by
many to be unpractical; and while indeed no
one can flatter himself that through a change of
method the conduct of international affairs could
suddenly be rendered more wise and entirely ef-
fective towards the public welfare, yet I cannot
avoid the conclusion that there is a wrong ori-
entation in the emphasis of the need of secrecy
and of the unfitness of the people to deal with
problems of foreign affairs. The belief in the
unfitness of the people in this matter appears to
be the result of a preconceived notion as to the
overpowering difficulty, complexity and almost
sanctity of foreign affairs. Modern governments
are based on the principle that all legislation
must meet the test of public criticism and rest
on public consent; certainly it cannot be argued
that matters of the incidence of taxation, the

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 175

proper organization of credit, and the determina-
tion of commercial policies, arc less complex and
intricate than are foreign affairs. It is indeed
true that it is difiicult for one nation thoroughly
to appreciate in detail the conditions of life in
another. This truth should have its greatest
value in dissuading a nation from meddling with
the internal affairs of another, even from good
motives. Those international questions which
are apt to produce war may indeed relate to in-
tricate matters^ but the essential point is always
the contention for power, influence or commercial
advantage, and it is not apparent why the public
in general should be unfit to judge as to whether
national treasure and life are eventually to be
spent in huge quantities to bring about, or to
prevent, any such shifting of power or influence.
It is, however, because the motives involved are
so largely connected with class interests, or sur-
vivals of pride of race, that those concerned in
them are eager to deny the fitness of the general
public, which if called on to decide would put into
the foreground the question, "How does the con-
trol of this or that group of capitalists in Mo-
rocco, for instance, or the greater or smaller in-
fluence of Austria or Russia in Servia, affect the
daily life and welfare of our people?" It is cer^

176 SECRET DIPLOMACY

tainly true that questions of peace and war have
never definitely been reasoned out on that basis.
There has always been the assumption that cer-
tain things were essential to national prestige
and could not be questioned; it is only when the
actually existing broader base of national political
life is organized also for active control of foreign
affairs, that these considerations will have their
full weight. Only the most exceptional states-
men could lift themselves out of the narrow
groove of tradition and precedent; and more ex-
ceptional still, in fact all but impossible, is the
capacity of one man to represent in himself in
just proportion, all the interests and feelings of
a nation.

Infallibility cannot be expected in the handling^
of foreign affairs, whether under a broad discre-
tion of statesmen or under strict democratic con-
trol. There will always be an alternative of wis-
dom and rashness, constructive planning and
headlong action, carefulness and negligence. But
past experience has certainly established beyond
peradventure of doubt that secret diplomacy is
not infallible, and particularly that diplomacy
acting under absolutist traditions, as in Germany
before the war, may make the most fatal mistakes
of judgment and of policy. Balfour said: "I

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 177

do not think the Government in June, 1914, had
the slightest idea that there was any danger
ahead." A remarkable statement, when we con-
sider the actions and reactions of secret diplo-
macy during the decade preceding the war. It
has been quite truly said that diplomacy is far
more eminent in autopsy than in diagnosis. M.
Cheradame somewhat severely observes, "The
typical diplomat lives in a world of his own. His
information is rarely obtained by direct observa-
tion of people and facts." And while ordinarily
men of exceptional talents are selected for the
difficult position of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
yet all considered, it is hard to believe that were
decisions on the essential matters of international
life made on a broader basis, and influenced more
by a direct action of public opinion, the result
would be less wise. '

Active participation of the people in the mak-
ing of momentous decisions regarding foreign af-
fairs, is denied either under the assumption that
the people might not be ready to face the fateful
test, or, by the majority, with the thought that
the people are too excitable and rash to be trusted
with such far-reaching decisions. While it is in-
deed easy to generate warlike excitement among
the masses, it must be remembered, when such a

178 SECRET DIPLOMACY

charge of rashness is made, that the people have
never been currently informed of the develop-
ment of international dangers, but usually at a
critical time shreds of information have been
flashed on them, designed or at least apt to stir
up all their atavistic love of fight and fear of at-
tack. Even thus, the greatest noise is made
usually by those who do not in the event of hos-
tilities actually have to risk their blood and bones.
It stands to reason that if honestly kept in-
formed about international relationships, the peo-
ple would be far less prone to sudden excitement.
Very few people indeed appear to doubt that had
the decision of war or no war been laid before the
peoples of Europe in 1914, with a full knowledge
of the facts, the terrible catastrophe would never
have come about. As Mr. Lowes Dickinson has
said, if the people had been allowed to share the
apprehension and precautions of the diplomats
before 1914, there would have been quite a sim-
ple and clear question before the English people,
for one. It could have decided whether it would
pursue a policy that might lead at any moment
to a general European war, or to take the alterna-
tive which Sir Edward Grey later spoke of,
namely, "to promote some arrangement, to which
Germany could be a party by which she could be

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 179

assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would
be pursued against her by France, Russia and our-
selves, jointly or separately." Without the sup-
port of the people, kept in line by fear of hidden
dangers, not even the militarists of Germany
could have forced military action.

One of the first acts of the Eussian Soviet Gov-
ernment was to announce its hostility to secret
diplomacy. "When it first published the secret
treaties and documents of the Czarist Govern-
ment, its motive was, as shown by Trotsky's dec-
laration made at the time, thoroughly to discredit
the management of affairs under the old regime.
In the same connection, it announced its own pur-
pose of conducting foreign affairs in the open.
Such seems indeed to have been its general prac-
tice with -respect to the announcement of policies,
though its agents continued to use underground
methods. One thing, however, the Soviet Gov-
ernment is evidently trying to bring about, namely,
a broad public interest in the conduct of foreign
affairs. It desires the Russian people, and more
particularly the members of the ruling Commu-
nist Party, to be currently informed about the
progress of international affairs and about ar-
rangements concluded. Observers report that at
the meeting of the provincial Soviets the first busi-

180 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ness ordinarily taken up is the reading and dis-
cussion of a report on international relations sent
by the central government. We have no means
to check up the truth of these reports; but this
effort to interest the broad mass of the popula-
tion in the outward relations of the state is cer-
tainly worth notice. The expectation is encour-
aged that the reason for acts relating to foreign
affairs will be explained, particularly when sac-
rifices are demanded.

xin

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM

Those who view the modern state as a purely-
predatory organization, — for exploitation within
and without, — ^point to the methods, practices and
results of diplomacy as one of the plainest indi-
cations of the sinister nature of the political state.
Such criticism cannot he safely brushed aside as
utterly unreasonable ; it should rather call forth a
searching inquiry as to whether, as a matter of
fact, the conduct of foreign affairs could not and
should not be brought into greater consonance
with genuinely democratic principles, and be
placed on the sound basis of well-informed pub-
lic support.

No matter what opinion one may hold with re-
spect to the necessity of secret diplomacy, it must
be recognized that this practice involves a very
narrow conception of the active scope of democ-
racy. It is in fact a historical survival from the
period of the absolutist state ; or in other words,
that aspect of the modern state which deals with

181

182 SECRET DIPLOMACY

foreign affairs has retained the character of abso-
lutism. It is a superstition, in the picturesque
sense of that word used by Lowell, when he de-
fines it as "something left standing over from
one of the world's witenagemotes to the other."
In this case, indeed the most recent witenagemote
approached the question and proposed a step in
advance towards itsi solution. But the difl&culty
still persists.

In its relations with other states, the state is
considered to be absolute, not bound by any laws,
responsible only for its own security, welfare and
progressing influence. The struggle for political
power still exists among states, in essentially the
same keenness and rigidity with which it appeared
to the eyes of Machiavelli. The importance of
world-wide human relationships, and of interna-
tional cooperation in scientific and economic life,
has indeed been brought forth and given its place
in the public mind ; but because of the manner in
which the conduct of international affairs is
actually handled, the feeling thus generated does
not have much chance to influence action at crit-
ical times, when the people are startled and ex-
cited by the sudden revelation of dangers, which
awaken in them all the bitter feelings engendered
by the past struggles of mankind.

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 183

This survival is given strength by class inter-
ests, pride of race, and. by the manipulations of
plutocratic control. Where affairs are handled
by a narrow circle of men, no matter how high-
minded and how thoroughly conscious of their
public responsibility, yet with the necessary limi-
tations of the human mind, they cannot but be
influenced at every turn by the opinions of others
with whom they are actually in contact; so that
in decisions on these momentous matters, the
thing which is concretely present is very often
an interest comparatively narrow in itself, and
related to the public welfare only by a series of
remote inferences which are accepted at their face
value. The most successful statesman of the
nineteenth century said that the whole Balkan
question was not worth the bones of one Pom-
eranian grenadier; yet his successors in power
risked the very existence of the nations of Europe
for one phase of that question.

Powerful interests will always have means, for-
mal or informal, to lay their needs and desires
before the men in power. They may indeed be
very important and may deserve special atten-
tion, but unfortunately, many cases have hap-
pened in which their point of view has been
adopted without making sure that there existed a

184 SECRET DIPLOMACY

general public interest sufficiently important to
warrant taking the risks involved.

A diplomatic caste recruited from a certain
class of society, trained in the traditions of au-
thority, in contact all the time with men of simi-
lar views and principles, cannot in the nature of
things free itself from the limitations of such
environment and such training.

From the personal point of view diplomacy has
adhered to the belief in the superior intelligence,
ability and foresight in the handling of foreign
affairs, on the part of those who by inherited tra-
ditions and special experience may be said to be-
long to a caste distinguished from the mass of
humanity. Some one has said, there is a great
danger in that there exists a caste of people who
have taken the maMng of history as their profes-
sion; who still cling to the erroneous idea that
the manipulation of large masses of people, the
redistribution of territories, and the modification
of the natural processes of grouping and settle-
ment, is history. But such people who believe
they are making history are really obstructing it.
Even so unusual a man ^s Bismarck, working
as he did on a great national problem, did not
gain lasting success in action whereby he endeav-
ored to anticipate the developments of history.

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 185

The artful contrivance and harsh, ruthless exe-
cution of many of his plans left a heritage of evil
to the world; hut the greatest evil lay in the ex-
ample given by so successful a man in making it
seem that history could actually thus be made.
The attitude which is taken in behalf of such men,
in claiming for them a completely free and full
discretion in controlling foreign affairs, recalls a
statement made by H. G. Wells concerning a Brit-
ish leader: "He believes that he belongs to a
particularly gifted and privileged class of beings
to whom the lives and affairs of conunon men are
given over — the raw material for brilliant careers.
It seems to him an act of insolence that the com-
mon man should form judgments on matters of
statecraft." The diplomats of the old school in-
deed do require the people, but only as material
with which to work out their grandiose projects.
Their view not too distantly resembles that of the
German militarists to whom ordinary humanity
existed only for one purpose, "to do their damn'd
duty."

We should naturally expect to find the great-
est secrecy and the most callous use of secretive
methods, where absolutism remains most com-
pletely established. In the last remaining abso-
lutism, that of Japan, these expectations are ful-

186 SECRET DIPLOMACY

filled, both as regards carefully-guarded secrecy
of all diplomatic action, and the habitual use of
well phrased declarations of a theoretical policy,
announced for public consumption, but bearing
only a Platonic relation to the details of actual
doings. But more liberally governed states have
not by any means all freed themselves from this
practice, even to the extent of faithfully keeping
the representative bodies, and the public, in-
formed of the true character and aims of impor-
tant national policies.

During the discussions of the last few years, a
great many remedies for this state of affairs have
been suggested. The Constitutional practice of
th.e United States has been taken as a model in
England in the suggestion that there should be a
representative committee on foreign affairs in the
House of Commons, which should keep in con-
stant touch with the diplomatic officials and su-
pervise the conduct of foreign relations; that
there should be at least two days given to the dis-
cussion of the Foreign Office Vote; that there
should be full reports made on the progress of
all important negotiations ; and that treaties and
alliances should not be concluded, nor war made,
without a previous authorization on the part of
Parliament. The last formal proposal of this

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 187

kind was the motion made in March, 1918, in the
House of Commons, the opposition to which by
Mr. Balfour has already been alluded to. That
he should object particularly to the prying into
foreign affairs on the part of persons "not re-
sponsible," and by "politicians," that the pro-
posed committee of the House of Commons should
be thus characterized, throws light on the preju-
dices involved; but it also reveals the absurdity
of the present arrangement from the point of view
of free government. In France there has existed,
since 1902, a standing committee on foreign and
colonial affairs in the Chamber of Deputies.

When he was premier, in 1920, Signer GioUiti
introduced a bill carrying the following provi-
sion: "Treaties and International understand-
ings, whatever be their subject and character, are
valid only after they have been approved by Par-
liament. The Government of the King can de-
clare war only with the approval of the two Cham-
bers." The ministry of Giolliti fell before this
sound measure could be passed.

It may be questioned whether many of the ar-
rangements suggested could be more than pallia-
tives, as long as an intelligent and constant pub-
lic interest in foreign affairs has not been aroused,
and as long as the absolutist aspect of foreign

188 SECRET DIPLOMACY

policy continues. The suggestion that war should
not be made without a previous national referen-
dum, has indeed logic on its side from the point
of view of the democratic theory of state, but it
has thus far not entered into the state of practical
consideration.

The most important remedy as yet attempted
is the provision in the Covenant of the League of
Nations, that all treaties shall be made public.
No greater encouragement, indeed, could be given
to the growth of confidence and the destruction
of baneful suspicions and fears, throughout in-
ternational life, than if it were possible to assure
the nations of the world that all engagements im-
posing international obligations of any kind what-
soever would be made known immediately upon
their conclusion. This provision of the Covenant
has already gone into force, and numerous new;
treaties have been submitted, even by govern-
ments who are not as yet members of the League.
But certain governments have delayed compliance
in cases where treaties are known to have been
made secretly. As there is no specific sanction for
this provision in the Covenant, and as actually
binding agreements can be made without taking
the form of a treaty or convention, this remedy
is not in itself powerful enough to remove the

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM ^ 189

evil. If two or three states are willing to keep
an engagement secret at the risk of later incur-
ring a certain amount of opprobrium when the
fact is discovered, there is no means as yet avail-
able for obliging them to abandon such course.
Nevertheless, this provision of the Covenant con-
stitutes a great advance in the work of placing
the public busiaess of the world on the only sound
basis, and cultivating that confidence upon which
depends the future immunity of mankind from
constant danger of suffering and destruction. It
will, however, not be a real remedy until the na-
tions agree actually to outlaw all secret agree-
ments as a conspiracy against the general wel-
fare and safety.

The other important advance made in the Cove-
nant is found in the provisions for the investi-
gation of any cause of conflict before hostilities
shall be resorted to. If after the first shock of
excitement, which accompanies the revelation of
a serious international crisis, public opinion can
be given a certain space of time to inform itself,
then it may indeed be hoped that a different tem-
per will control the giving of the fateful doom
of war. As Count Czemin has stated, on the
night of August 4, 1914, between the hours of nine
and midnight the decision as to whether England

190 SECRET DIPLOMACY

would come into the war, lay with the German
Government. A system under which such tremen-
dous issues have to be decided in such a manner,
is absurd to the verge of insanity.*

While the above arrangements, if they could be
effectively carried out, would undoubtedly serve to
moderate the evils which now result from the con-
duct of international affairs on so narrow a basis,
yet it is difficult to expect from them more than
relatively superficial results. It is only if a new
spirit can be developed among the nations, and
if the absolutist conception of the state as far as
it still remains, can be transformed into some-
thing more consonant with the complexity and
delicacy of human relationships, that we may hope
to hail the dawn of a new era. It would be as
great a transformation as that which separates
the Pagan from the Christian ideal. Mankind is
still somewhat blinded by the glitter and pa-
geantry of the absolutist state ; the pride of power
manifests itself now particularly in foreign in-
tercourse. When Portugal became a republic, it

*A German writer puts the blame for the outbreak of the
war on the telegraph. He says that if there had been no tele-
graphic communication between the capitals, the fatal crisis
would not have arisen; there would have been time for reflection
and a decision to make war would never have been taken in
blood.

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 191

desired at first to abolish the entire diplomatic
establishment, and to allow all international busi-
ness to be done by the consuls. That proposal
may have resulted from an instinctive feeling that
there was something incompatible between a
really free community, and the sense of absolute
power embodied in diplomacy.

A change can be brought about only when the
underlying unity of mankind is more intensely
felt and when the common interests in science,
commerce, industry and the universal language
of art are valued at their true importance to the
welfare of the people of all Nations. Joint effort
in the constructive work of developing resources,
particularly in the tropics, will make it possible
for vastly increased populations to live in com-
fort on their present sites, without the need of
crowding each other. A higher valuation of hu-
manity, a more just proportion in the influence
permitted different interests, a keener scrutiny
of traditions and watch-words — all this is neces-
sary. Men and women to-day feel an intense ap-
prehension, when they think of the fate of their
children in a world in which the unreasoning
prejudices and unenlightened practices that have
recently again come to the fore in international
life should prevail, leaving mankind in a dazed

192 SECRET DIPLOMACY

confusion, and pushing the people from time to
time into wholesale slaughter with ever more hor-
rible instruments of destruction. They feel also
that if secret policies, engendering fears and sus-
picion, are to continue to be the dominant factor,
then all improvement in human welfare, education
and science, will have to be in a large measure
postponed to the preparation of constantly more
formidable engines of death. One cannot but re-
member the worst imprecations of the Greek
tragic poets and philosophers, on the miserable
destiny of man. In fact, if we should have to be-
lieve that no better way could be found to man-
age the vital interests of mankind, a great nat-
ural catastrophe, which would extinguish once and
for all the miserable breed on this planet, would
almost appear in the light of a redemption.

But we cannot believe that the peoples of the
world will be so foolish as to allow themselves
to remain in this condition and not to find their
way to a reorganization of public affairs which
will make such a haphazard and perilous situation
impossible. It seems plain that the idea of the
state and of state action will have to be trans-
formed in accordance with the greater self-con-
sciousness of humanity which has developed in
the last century, or the desire to scrap the po-

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 193

litical state and to find some more adequate and
natural form of organization will rapidly gain in
strength. Meanwhile, there is a need of the
formation of a great freemasonry of all publi-
cists, political men and teachers of the people,
united in the resolve to know and make known
the essential elements in current international af-
fairs, to arouse the public to a sense of the im-
portance of these matters to their every-day life,
and to support the men more directly responsible
for the conduct of foreign policy, with an intelli-
gent, searching, reasonable and broad public
opinion.

XIV

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Up until a recent date Americans could con-
template the play of secret diplomacy in Europe
■and Asia with a feeling of entire aloofness, as
belonging to a political society which had neither
need nor inclination to utilize such methods. Our
unmenaced continental position, the natural pro-
tection and separation implied in distance and
ocean boundaries, and the conscious intention of
keeping clear of international entanglements, all
contributed to make the foreign policy of the
United States entirely public and straightforward.
The fathers of the Constitution had established
the sound principle that treaties are the law of
the land. This not only involves mature consid-
eration of a treaty before it is made, but publicity
as well. The American people have known at all
times what obligations had been incurred, and the
world had the same information. There has been
no room for guesswork and suspicion.

The instructions which were issued to John
Jay when he was sent as special envoy to Eng-

194

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 195

land in 1794 lay down the following rule of con-
duct: "It is the President's wish that the char-
acteristics of an American minister should be
marked on the one hand by a firmness against im-
proper compliances, and on the other by sincer-
ity, candor, truth and prudence, and by a horror
of finesse and chicane." These straightforward
words began a tradition which has ever since ani-
mated the American diplomatic service. When
after the Spanish war, under Secretary Hay,
American diplomacy entered more fully into
world-wide problems than in any previous era,
the expression "the new diplomacy" was cur-
rently used in a laudatory sense to designate what
Hay had implied when in a public address he had
declared the Golden Rule to be the cardinal prin-
ciple of American diplomacy — an ideal which
makes secrecy and intrigue unnecessary.

In order to give the public an opportunity of
informing itself concerning the conduct and de-
velopment of foreign affairs, the United States
Government has from an early date published an
annual collection of diplomatic correspondence.
Since 1861, this publication is known as Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States. It was formerly published within two or
three years of the year to which it related, but

196 SECRET DIPLOMACY

during the war this interval was considerably ex-
tended. The precedents and principles elabo-
rated in the diplomatic correspondence of the
United States have been collected, codified and
published in a very important and useful com-
pendium by Francis Wharton, under the title of
Digest of International Law. This work was ex-
panded, amplified and brought down to date by
Prof. John Bassett Moore, under the same title,
in 1906. It is of the highest importance, not only
as a repository of diplomatic and legal precedent,
but as a definite and public record of the position
taken by the American Government on all inter-
national questions that had arisen up to the date
of its publication. The preparation of such di-
gest on the part of other governments is highly to
be desired for the purpose of clarifying interna-
tional law and policy, and for giving them a sound
basis of reason and experience upon which the
people and governments may rely. The fact that
a precedent reported in this digest, might be cited
against the American Government as an admis-
sion, does not imply a disadvantage which would
at all offset the benefits resulting in general from
public knowledge.

With respect to the details of negotiation, there
are confidential relationships which have always

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 197

been observed by the American Government. Or-
dinary considerations of courtesy require that
those who may speak to us frankly in confidence
shall not be made to sufifer by being quoted and
thus perhaps be exposed to misunderstanding and
criticism. On our part, in preparing a sound
basis of action, favorable as well as unfavorable
matters have to be considered; yet there is ordi-
narily no need of publicly advertising the short-
comings of individuals and governments as set
forth in reports on such unfavorable matters.
Such considerate action is not based on a desire
to mislead or to take advantage, but to save un-
necessary irritation. For the purpose of permit-
ting complete freedom of discussion and of criti-
cism without the risk of giving offense, the United
States Senate, as a matter of its ordinary pro-
cedure, goes into secret session when discussiug
a treaty submitted to it. There have, however,
been several exceptions. Thus, for instance, the
debates on the Bayard-Ohamberlain Fisheries
Treaty of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties
of 1912, and on the Nicaragua Treaty of 1916,
were carried on, and concluded, in open session.
Many senators are in favor of making this the
common practice.
Before the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore,

198 SECRET DIPLOMACY

whose knowledge of the records is unequaled,
said to me, the State Department had no secrets
whatsoever, with the exception of personnel re-
ports. We, too, however, can depart from a well-
established tradition, as is shown by our diplo-
matic history during the war. I do not believe it
will ever be charged that in any matter big or
little the American Government sought narrow,
selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such motives,
there was none. There was no American policy
or enterprise that needed concealment, apart from
military policies and strategy during a war.
"When I glanced over at the end of my mission
in Peking the extra-confidential, cable correspond-
ence, I was inwardly amazed by the entire lack of
anything that really needed concealing, in that
closely guarded dossier.

Yet American diplomacy did during the war fall
somewhat under the spell of the traditional meth-
ods still in vogue in Europe. We were not a
party to any secret engagements for the division
of spoils after the war, although from the time
of the peace conference on, the influence of the
American Government was exercised mostly in se-
cret, and the agreements subsidiary to the gen-
eral settlement were secretly signed. These did
not contain any apportionment of advantage to

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 199

the United States, but on the contrary were sup-
posed to contain the nearest approach to the
equitable ideas of American policy which was, un-
der existing conditions, obtainable. But through-
out this trying period the conduct of American
diplomacy did not rest on the foundation of a con-
tinuous, frank appeal to the public opinion of our
own nation or of the world.

Even before the armistice some very important
matters were dealt with in this fashion. Though
the permanent importance of the Lansing-Ishii
note as affecting in a concrete and specific way the
definition of rights and policies in the Far East
is very doubtful, yet in its immediate effect under
all of the circumstances of the time, this was cer-
tainly a noteworthy document to issue from the
American foreign office. Yet, its conception and
execution was absolutely surrounded with secrecy
so that not even the high officials normally con-
sulted in such matters, with the exception of the
Secretary of State himself, were informed as to
what was coming. This secrecy worked entirely
in the interest of the Japanese government. By
privately giving out the agreement in Japan and
in China before the date when its publication had
been agreed upon, the Japanese government suc-
ceeded to a certain extent and for a time, in giv-

200 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ing this matter the appearance of a great Japa-
nese diplomatic victory and of a highly important
concession on the part of the United States.

It is not necessary to recall the general disil-
lusionment that came about when President Wil-
son agreed to the policy of secrecy at the peace
conference. Undoubtedly this decision was based
on the motive to secure, with a promptness re-
quired by the stress of the times, a settlement
which would in general commend itself to the sense
of justice of the world, although it might neces-
sarily contain details which, if published by them-
selyes, would cause lengthy public discussion and
delay the final solution. If such an expectation
was entertained, it was not as a matter of fact
fulfilled in the results of these secret consulta-
tions. The method adopted did not favor the
broad and permanent view, but rather the more
shortsighted bargaining in which the old diplo-
macy excels. In their solutions neither the con-
sultations of the peace conference, nor the sub-
sequent diplomatic negotiations among the Al-
lies, got beyond the old methods of bartering the
destinies of small and weak peoples, which had
been used by the Congresses of Vienna and of
Berlin with disastrous results. The various con-
ferences of 1919 to 1920 recorded a complete re-

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 201

turn to tlie system of secret diplomacy, to such
an extent that it appeared constantly as if the
plenipotentiaries feared to let their doingsi be
kno-vm. Even when there was no reason from
any point of view for concealment, information
came out in a roundabout fashion which left the
public mind confused; as for instance in the giv-
ing out of a decision regarding the fate of Con-
stantinople, and in the reports concerning the
text of President Wilson's Adriatic memorandum
which were current before its publication.

From the entanglements of this procedure
American diplomacy did not keep itself free, nor
did it, at this time, assist the world in finding a
more straightforward method more in accord with
American political experience.

The disadvantages of secret methods of trans-
acting public business have been brought home to
the American people through several incidental
matters of no small importance. It evidently was
the intention of President Wilson to reserve
American rights as to the Island of Yap which is
a vital link in the chain of cable communication
between America and the Far East, and a reser-
vation of this kind is indicated by references in
the ofificial minutes, though not by a written proto-
col. Without the knowledge of the United States,

202 SECRET DIPLOMACY

the Coimoil of the League of Nations later dis-
posed of the mandate for all of the North Pacific
Islands. As this action was secret, it could not
be known whether the American interest bearing
on Yap Island had been safeguarded or not. It
was stated as late as January 26, 1921, that the
American Government was not in possession of
the greater part of the minutes of the Peace Con-
ference. Notwithstanding the protests of the
United States, Japan based her claim to the
North Pacific Islands on the secret treaties made
during the war.

The secrecy of the peace conference, and the
revelations before and during its sessions, con-
cerning the secret treaties for the division of the
spoils, produced a great disillusionment in the
public mind. The fact that the United States
though asked to make enormous sacrifices in the
common cause had been kept in the dark concern-
ing at least some of these treaties, and particu-
larly of those which affected its own interest, did
not inspire the American public with any confi-
dence in the general conduct of affairs among the
nations.

After the adjournment of the conference the
American President and Government still contin-
ued to take a part in the various attempts to set-

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 203

tie outstanding questions, particularly with re-
spect to the Adriatic. When President Wilson
towards the end of February, 1920, addressed a
note to the allied powers concerning the Adriatic
settlement, the documents and negotiations which
had gone before were entirely unknown to the
public. On December 9, 1919, an agreement had
been signed by Great Britain, France and the
United States, Undersecretary Polk signing for
the latter. On January 9th, the British and
French premiers had agreed with the Italian
premier on a modified plan of settlement. On
February 10th, the American Secretary of State
wrote a note containing President Wilson's ob-
jections to the plan of January 9th. The allied
premiers replied to this note on February 18th.
All these agreements and this correspondence
were kept secret, nor was President Wilson's final
answer given out for some time; only more or
less accurate prognostications appeared in the
press.

The American Government at this time was at
a disadvantage in not participating in the ne-
gotiations directly; the American ambassador at
Paris was invited from time to time to hear what
the conference of premiers cared to tell him, but
the proceedings of the conference were apparently

204 SECRET DIPLOMACY

not transmitted to the American Government,
The British press at the time quite generally ex-
pressed great dissatisfaction with the methods
followed by the diplomats. The Westminster Ga-
zette wrote: "The whole of both peoples is
acutely concerned in the result. We must, there-
fore, register a protest against the manner in
which the negotiations are being conducted.
They are being carried on in secrecy, only broken
by unreliable rumors, by the three principal gov-
ernments. The peoples have a right to know
what is being done in their name, so that they
may be able to protest, if need be, against deci-
sions which may affect their future relations."
The Times protested: "We are not going to
stand by and have our friendship and relations
with America jeopardized by the proceedings of
a triumvirate sitting behind closed doors. The
American democracy, we imagine, will not be less
resolved to assert their rights and stifle this ef-
fort at secret diplomacy."

At this time Mr. Bonar Law, the government
spokesman in the House of Commons, denied ab-
solutely that a harsh and uncompromising reply
had originally been drafted to President Wilson's
despatch, and that it had subsequently been
changed through the influence of Viscount Grey

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 205

and Lord Robert Cecil. The Times characterized
this denial as "an example of verbal quibbling
which inferior intelligences mistake for diplo-
macy," and maintained that "though it may be
verbally true, it conveys and is designed to con-
vey what is untrue"; and the Daily Mail stated
that the country owed a debt of gratitude to Lord
Grey for his activities in the matter. This all
illustrates on how insecure a foundation, and with
what chances of confusion, public opinion has to
work in matters of foreign affairs where the prac-
tices of ithe old diplomacy are followed.

The American people at this time very nearly
lost patience with the entire business, and turned
away from European affairs with complete dis-
gust. This is the most outstanding effect pro-
duced by the secret diplomacy of Europe as far
as the American people are concerned. The dan-
ger now is that their feeling of disgust and con-
fusion, and their impatience with the selfish and
shortsighted manipulations of European diplo-
macy, will over-emphasize the desire of America
to live by and for herself alone. If such a mood
and temper should prevail, it would be a great
loss to America and to the world. At no time has
the world needed America more than at present,
not so much from the point of view of direct eco-

206 SECRET DIPLOMACY

nomic assistance, as on account of the fact that
American experience, principles and ideals con-
stitute at the present time the hope of the peo-
ples of the whole world; and America could, if
she desired, exercise an enormous influence in
making the popular desire for such action active,
vital and fruitful.

But even aside from the general confidence
which is felt by the peoples of Europe and Asia
in the character and ideals of the United States,
there are a great many specific contributions
which America could make to the solution of Eu-
ropean problems. No matter how much we shall
desire during the next decade to hold aloof from
Europe and to concentrate on our own affairs,
nevertheless, should European affairs go radically
wrong through a constant denial and deception of
the hopes and aspirations of the people for hon-
est and sensible solutions, America in the end will
again have to share the burden thus laid on the
shoulders of mankind.

The fundamental American principle that
treaties have the force and status of law con-
tains in itself the promise of solving some of the
worst troubles of the world, if it could be gener-
ally applied. America should continue, for her
own safety and that of the world, to use her whole

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 207

influence for making that principle a part of the
universal public law. No international engage-
ment shall be binding unless ratified by a repre-
sentative body, and published to all the nations.
Otherwise it shall be absolutely void, and shall
not give rise to any rights or obligations ; in fact,
an attempt to make an agreement contrary to
these conditions shall be considered an act hostile
to the peace of the world. That should be the
recognized law.

Nothing shows so clearly how human develop-
ment has halted at this point, as the fact that it
should still require an argument to show the ne-
cessity of publicity and lawfulness with respect
to the most essential interests of the vast popula-
tions that make up the international family.

The record and constant practice of the United
States, as well as her great actual and potential
power, fit her above aU. others to be a leader in
the establishment of this principle. The Amer-
ican nation possesses a great moral capital in the
confidence and trust that the peoples of the world
repose in it. No matter if unsympathetic chan-
ceries should plot to prevent America from mak-
ing her influence felt in the affairs of the world,
no matter how European diplomacy may occa-
sionally sneer at American idealism; the peoples

208 SECRET DIPLOMACY

themselves, great and small, including particu-
larly those areas so immensely important — ^Rus-
sia and China — would willingly look to America
for leadership and guidance, with complete trust
and confidence. When this is fully realized, we
shall also be able to judge how vitally what Amer-
ica stands for in the world will be strengthened
by a constant adherence to open and straightfor-
ward methods in international intercourse.

But America herself, it will be said, cannot fun-
damentally change the spirit that animates for-
eign policies, and bring about the universal use
of honest and open practices. We are living un-
der a system which is the result of historic forces
that have not yet fully spent themselves and
which put the potential enmity among nations in
the foreground.

I do not believe that it is necessary to shut our
eyes to reality and to seek recourse in a Utopian
policy, in order to escape the menace inherent in
current international practices. If America will
only not fall in line with the absolutist tradition
in diplomacy, but will emphasize at all times, with
all her influence, those principles of international
conduct which our natural freedom from entan-
glements has permitted us to develop as of actual
experience, America will contribute in a most po-

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 209

tent manner to the realization of that new spirit
which must surely come to deliver humanity.
That spirit is not a mere ideal, — ^it is fortunately
already present in much of international prac-
tice ; but it needs constantly to be followed up and
supported in order that it may become the custo-
mary and instinctive guide, superseding such
prejudices as are still current which favor tor-
tuous manipulation and perpetuate an uninformed
and confused state of the public mind.

In order to fulfil this promise and destiny the
United States would have to rely in the first place
on the inherent merit of her ideals and princi-
ples of action, and on the support which they will
receive from the approval of the peoples of the
world. As far as organized governments go, as
distinguished from the people, some will be more
inclined than others to cooperate with the United
States in a reform of international practice.
There is no question but that the great majority
of governments will thus cooperate, though some
of the m'ost important may for a time be left on
the other side.

With those peoples and governments who are
in language, political traditions and general im-
pulses most closely related to, us, there should
grow up a particularly strong feeling of confi-

210 SECRET DIPLOMACY

denee making all our intercourse absolutely open.
There certainly need not be any secrets between
the United States and the great commonwealths
of Canada and Australia. Our interests, our con-
dition, our institutions, all make for the closest
understanding. Through them there may be also
realized that harmony which ought by every nor-
mal reason to exist between the United States and
the English people, and which is disturbed only
from time to time when the policy of the British
government is determined more from the point
of view of the supposed needs of the British Em-
pire in India, than of that of the true tradition
of the English-speaking world. I do not think of
treaties or of alliances, but of something much
stronger — an intimate understanding among peo-
ples, based on mutual trust and confidence, and
the consciousness of a common destiny, common
purposes, and a common belief in the things which
alone will prevent civilization from extinguishing
itself in senseless hatreds.

CONCLUSION

In modern diplomacy there still persists the
image of the chess players intent on their compli-
cated game, planning each move with long fore-
sight of all the combinations that could possibly
be organized by the opponent. In the popular
image, too, the great diplomat is conceived as
spinning a complicated web of actions and rela-
tionships in which every detail is subordinate and
subservient to a general dominant purpose. Then
comes the international publicist and with inge-
nuity still more refined than that of the imagined
diplomat, he reasons out the innermost ambitions
that dominate and inspire the makers of foreign
affairs. So it has remained possible for the most
extravagant imaginary constructions to be put
forth in volumes of sober aspect, which purport
to give the key to diplomacy or to expose the per-
nicious ambitions of this or that foreign office.
It has become a game in which nothing is impos-
sible to the constructive imagination.

To any one familiar with the usual methods of
foreign offices and of diplomatic representatives,

211

212 SECRET DIPLOMACY

the idea that foreign affairs are really handled in
this maimer, like mental legerdemain, becomes
quite grotesque. Complicated manipulations with
respect to movements far in the future, looking
to still more distant results, — that kind of diplo-
matic planning exists more in the imagination
than in the actual conduct of foreign affairs. In
the majority of cases foreign offices meet each
situation as it arises, relying indeed on prece-
dents and having certain underlying aims and
purposes, but giving most attention to the facts
immediately present and often satisfied with any-
thing that will ease a troublesome or embarrassing
situation. Foreign offices indeed differ greatly in
the definiteness and constancy of their objectives
and the completeness with which they subordi-
nate details to central aims, 'phe Russian for-
eign office always had the reputation of great con-
tinuity of policy; it gave the central place to
fundamental objectives to which problems that
arose from day to day could be referred; and thus
it solved them with a cumulative effect upon the
advancement of its political aims.

Prom the point of view of the older traditions
of diplomacy, there would be a decided advantage
in definiteness of plan and in the harmonious sub-
ordination of all details to the main idea. How-

CONCLUSION 213

ever, the advantage of this method is frequently-
defeated through the narrowness of the objects
aimed at, when diplomatic policy is conceived in
this manner. Immediate purposes may indeed be
achieved more readily, but the permanent results
will usually be barren or lead ultimately to con-
flicts of forces. In such a system there is too
much abstraction from the multiform forces of
actual life; and while those who pursue it may
flatter themselves that they are making history,
they are not often building in accordance with
natural and historic forces.

The concept of diplomacy which has been criti-
cized in these pages does not exclude the possibil-
ity of immediate brilliant success; but its inef-
fectiveness appears when we view it over longer
periods of history. It is built on too narrow a
foundation. We have seen that even with the
greatest statesmen, any plan of action conceived
in this manner has such positive limitations that
the very success in executing such policies through
a shrewd play of diplomatic forces, conjures up
new dangers, and difficulties. The wisdom of no
man nor small self-contained group of men is at
present sufficient to measure the needs of society
and to transform its impulses into effective ac-
tion. A broader basis for policy is needed. But

214f SECRET DIPLOMACY

the greatest weakness of the old method lies in
the fact that jnst at the very times when men
are most in need of confidence and of a spirit of
reason and sane judgment, this mode of action
leaves the public mind in confusion, excitement
and the darkest fears.

If democracy means anything, its significance
for the welfare of humanity must lie in the value
of allowing constantly more and more minds to
participate in the great things of the world. Not
only would such participation seem to be a nat-
ural right of the human mind but also the things
most worth while can be achieved only when the
ablest and best can freely lend their efforts. To
all this a narrow system of secret management by
a limited hierarchy is hostile. The old diplo-
macy rests entirely on skepticism as to the wis-
dom and self-control of the people. The people
are merely material for statesmanship. This
conception is blind to the fact that everything that
is great in modern life has arisen through the
freedom with which talent may manifest itself
wherever found and that in all pursuits of hu-
manity that are worth while, innumerable minds
cooperate, in a degree as warranted by their ca-
pacity to bring about sound action and improve-
ment. The older diplomacy assumed that the peo-

CONCLUSION 215

pie furnished only passive material for states-
manship to work upon, and it saw in the public
only potentialities for vague and general influ-
ences which statesmanship in turn was to mold
and utilize. The greatest distance it went, was
to admit that national policy must rest on popu-
lar instinct ; a principle which is quite compatible
with the practice of secret diplomacy. When we
come to talk of political instincts, however, we
are dealing with one of the vaguest and most in-
definite concepts known to thought. These in-
stincts may be interpreted and given active ex-
pression as it suits any diplomatic policy. Un-
fortunately the "instincts" most to the fore are
not usually helpful to calm and sound action. In
international affairs, an instinctive dislike or
hatred of anything different has again and again
been made the basis of aggressive action, stirring
up otherwise peaceful populations to warlike and
murderous intent. Great national policies may
often truly be said to rest on instinct in the sense
that undivided popular support is given to a pol-
icy from a variety of motives which are not clearly
reasoned out but which all express themselves in
an overpowering impulse which may be called in-
stinctive. Thus the Monroe policy in which the
most fundamental motive is the desire for peace

216 SECRET DIPLOMACY

and for the safety of the continental position of
the American nation, may be said to rest on the
instinct of self-preservation.

But it is qnite plain that unless what is here
called instinct can be transformed into an intelli-
gent, wise and discriminating public opinion, such
instinct is but a shifting sand, affording material
which may be molded into any desired form by an
ambitious policy working through suggestion and
propaganda. Instinct can be transformed into a
true public policy only through publicity and
through the training of large groups of men to
see things with true eyes and to judge with rea-
son and wisdom. Here is the crux of the mat-
ter. Secret diplomacy treats all except the inner
official ring as outsiders and "persons without re-
sponsibility." Among these outsiders there may
be numerous persons actually better qualified than
the officials themselves, through experience and
thought, to judge of international affairs. No
one can here assume infallibility. Safe counsel
can come only if the entire intelligence and moral
sentiment of a nation can find expression and if
its fittest individuals can concentrate their atten-
tion upon every great problem as it arises. A
sound, just, wise public policy without publicity
cannot be imagined. To consider publicity an

CONCLUSION 217

evil^ to consider it as impeding the proper flow
of international influences and obstructing the
solution of international difficulties, appears as an
unbelievable perversion when we consider the true
implications of such a thought.

It is therefore inestimably important that the
facts of international life, the materials out of
which policies are formed, should be known freely
and fully to the public of every nation. The
manipulation of international communications for
political purposes is the most sinister and dan-
gerous part of the system with which secret di-
plomacy is entwined. According to this theory
it is not only not good for the people to know
everything but they must also be made to know
things about the truth of which we need not bother
our heads but which will stimulate the passions
and arouse the instincts our policy desires to
work upon. Thus the void left by secrecy, by a
concealment of the true nature and character of in-
ternationally important matters, is frequently sup-
plied by an intelligence service carrying distorted
and colored versions of facts; all this confuses
and discourages the public mind to such an extent
that it becomes unable to sever fact frc/m fiction
and to form a consistent and firm judgment.

The abolition of secret diplomacy is not a mat-

218 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ter of agreeing to have no more secrets. It is a
matter of arousing among the public so powerful
a determination to know, so strong a sentiment of
the value of truth, such a penetrating spirit of
inquiry, that the secrets will fade away as they
always do when the importance of a situation is
really understood by a large number of people.

Meanwhile it need not appear futile to work for
the positive elimination of secrecy. No one can
doubt that the provision of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, which requires that all treaties
shall be made public, is salutary and that its en-
forcement would greatly increase public confi-
dence. But it is necessary to go beyond this and
to outlaw any agreement which is kept secret, by
making it the public law of the world that no
rights or obligations can be founded on such at-
tempts against the peace and common welfare of
the nations.

The personal relationships of diplomacy also
require attention. The spirit of the Diplomatic
Service should be transformed in accordance with
the modern organization of society. The most es-
sential weakness of caste diplomacy lies in the
fact that it does not provide means for a sufl5-
cient contact among the peoples of the world.
Contact is maintained only within a narrow class.

CONCLUSION 219

The diplomatic fraternity lives in its own realm
of precedences, rivalries and traditions. To con-
fine the intercourse and interchange of influences
so narrowly, is a great weakness of our present
political system.

The diplomatic office should be conceived as
having the function to represent not only the spe-
cial national interest of the respective country,
but also, on an equal plane, its participation in
all the activities and interests which are common
to the nations of the world. The legations and
embassies should be provided with a personnel
of attaches not only for political and military af-
fairs, but for commerce, education, science and
social legislation. All these matters are already
dealt with to some extent by common action among
the nations. ■ The sending of ministers as dele-
gates to international technical conferences has
often been criticized as importing into such con-
ferences the narrow, separatist point of view of
diplomatic politics. It should be exactly the
other way; participation in such conferences
ought to impart to diplomats a broad spirit of co-
operation instead of a desire to maintain intact
a theoretical isolation. That is the essence of the
matter. As long as it is supposed that by jeal-
ously scrutinizing every international relation-

220 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ship from the point of view of abstract political
independence, and assuming that it is best to
make the very least possible contribution of en-
ergy and cooperation, the national interest can be
most promoted; so long will diplomatic action con-
tinue on a strained basis, always being painfully
conscious of the potential enmity among nations.
But when it is realized that in nearly every case
the national interest, or the interest of the people
of the nation which ought to be synonymous there-
with, is best advanced by whole-souled eooperar
tion in constructive work in commerce, industry,
science and the arts, then the political factor of
diplomatic rivalry will assume more just propor-
tions as compared with the other interests of hu-
manity.

This borders upon a very broad subject dealing
rather with general international policy than with
the specific problems we were considering; and
yet we ought to be aware of this background.
We need not give up our conviction that the au-
tonomy of the national state must be preserved
and that each political society shall dispose of its
own affairs within its borders as its wisdom and
judgment may dictate, free from intervention
from without. But complete freedom of local
self-determination can rest only upon a universal

CONCLUSION 221

recognition of that right in all others, in a spirit
of confidence and security engendered by the ab-
sence of intrigue and secret ambitions. In a still
greater measure does the happiness of the na-
tional state depend on free and full cooperation
with all others in all pursuits, activities and in-
terests conamon to humanity and in making the
earth a place for dignified and happy human life.
Unless diplomacy looks forward to this and helps
to bring it about, it will remain ensnared in the
old practices which ever lead only to barren re-
sults.

Lincoln's simple faith in the people has not yet
been adequately applied in international affairs.
International action has shown the impersonal
character of calculated manipulations coldly dis-
posing of the rights and lives of millions with
cruel callousness. The last great war has made
us consider the relation of war sacrifices to the
daily welfare of the people. A great deal of the
prevailing unrest in the world is undoubtedly due
to a lack of confidence that great affairs are being
handled with wisdom and with regard to the true,
lasting welfare of the people themselves. It is
difficult to reduce to personal terms relations so
abstract and general as those obtaining in inter-
national affairs. We think of the armies in ser-

222 SECRET DIPLOMACY

ried ranks and are impressed with the impact of
their force and the great feats it may accomplish.
But we are too apt to forget the individual des-
tiny carried in every breast, the human feeling in
every heart, among all the millions that make up
this engine of power and destruction. Human
welfare rather than human power has not yet
been made the constant and overshadowing aim
of diplomacy. That will be done only when the
people themselves demand that international af-
fairs shall be dealt with in a different spirit and
with other methods. Then we shall have policies
that can be avowed and understood by the people
who bear the burden and who pay the bill.

The questions which we have been considering
are not distinct and isolated but are bound up
with all that goes toward a more adequate organ-
ization of modern society. Even in the indus-
tries, men are no longer satisfied with a narrowly
centralized control. They call for information
and accountability, they claim a share in man-
agement, at least of an advisory or consultative
nature. All who contribute in bearing the risks
of industry demand to be kept informed of the
policies and actions of the management. In ever
extending circles men share in the responsibility
for action taken in their name. It is a truism

CONCLUSION 223

that risk is diminished and tends to disappear as
it is distributed over greater and greater num-
bers. Under our present political system na-
tions are carrying a tremendous risk in intemar
tional affairs — they are risking their wealth, the
lives of their citizens, their own very existence.
The responsibility for bearing these risks and
for arranging the conditions of safety is now too
narrowly centralized. It is an elementary de-
mand of safety that it should be more widely dis-
tributed, that a larger number of competent and
representative minds should take part in carrying
this burden. And they should at all points be
supported by a well-informed public opinion
throughout the nation.

But there is a condition that lies still deeper.
The popular psychology cultivated under the nar-
row aims of nationalism has exhausted itself in
international matters in dislike and hatred of
everything alien and of all that lies beyond the
national pale. Such a state of mind is ever ready
to act the bull to any red rag of newspaper sensa-
tionalism. So, the inside managers of diplomatic
affairs may still say with some justification,
"Open discussion would too much excite the pub-
lic mind." This fundamental condition cannot
be suddenly purged of all its potency for evil.

224 SECRET DIPLOMACY

Only by gradual degrees may an attitude be
brought about within the national communities
which will be more just to the outside world and
to everything that is strange and unaccustomed.
What the great imaginative writers of the first
half of the nineteenth century accomplished in
breaking down social prejudices and abuses will
have to be done for humanity by a new host of
inspired molders of human sentiment. We may
not get rid of artificial hostilities now still nur-
tured by nationalism, until ideals of international
goodwill and fellowship have been expressed in
the form of human experience and portrayed as
part of the struggles and triumphs of the indi-
vidual human soul. Patient, sound, upbuilding
influences shall have to work powerfully on the
masses of men, and on their leaders, before we
may finally overcome the evils that express them-
selves in practices inherent in a system such as
that we call "secret diplomacy," before the world
may be made an abode o^ mutual confidence and
helpfulness instead of a house of imprisoimaent,
suspicion and terror.

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225

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Young, George. Diplomacy, Old and New. 1921.
Zublinden, S. The World War. Chapter IV. Zurich, 1917.

INDEX

Absolutism, survival of, 181 S.,

208
Absolutist politics, 148
Absolutist tradition in diplo-
macy, 208
Adams, John Quincy, 24'
Adriatic memorandum, 201, 203
Aehrenthal, 106
Afghanistan, 157
Afghan war, 69
Agadir, 81

Algeciras, Act of, 80
American government, 16, 18,

119, 173, 194 flF., 196
American idealism, 207
Alexander I, 46
Alliances, 70, 73
Alsace-Lorraine, 64, 121, 123
Anglo-French Entente, 79, 89,

93
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73, 74
Antwerp, 91

Apathy of the public, 172, 173
Appearances, 32
Archives, 51

Armament interests, 147
Asquith, Herbert H., 85, 87, 88
Australia, 210
Austria-Hungary, 48, 49, 61, 62,

65, 70, 104, 105, 107, 109,

110, 120, 121, 123, 124, 132

Balfour, Arthur J., 140, 141,
161,162. 168, 176, 187

Balkans, 97, 104, 113, 146

Barnardiston, Colonel, 91

Bavaria, 61

Beaconsfield, Lord, 67, 68, 69

Belgian General Staff, 91

Belgian neutrality, 62, 91

Benedetti, 53, 62

Berchtold, Count, 104, 105, 106,
114

Beresford, Lord, 87

Bethmann-HoUweg, 104, 106,

107
Beyens, Baron, 114
Bismarck, 5, 11, 31, 49, 51, 53,

61, 63, 64, 70, 140, 184
Bjorkoe meeting, 1905, 76
Blue Books, 156
Borgo, Pozzo di, 46
Bosnia, 114
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 65,

105
Bribery, 41, 42, 48
Bright, John, 55, 67, 157
British diplomacy, 20
Buchanan, William J., 138
Buelow, Prince, 76
Bulgaria, 122
Byles, Sir W., 88

Cabinet, 158

Cabinet and Parliament, 56

Calli&res, practice of diplomacy,
27, 29, 32

Canada, 210

Canning, Stratford, 54, 57

Caste, diplomatic, 184

Castlereagh, 47

Catherine, Empress, 36, 42, 43,
44

Cavour, 60

Cecil, Lord Hugh, 86

Censure of news, 145

Central Powers, 120

Charles, Emperor of Austria,
121, 123

Charles IT, 152

Cheradame, M., 177

Chili-Argentinian boundary dis-
pute, 138

China, 117, 126, 127, 143, 199,
208

China, breaking off relations
with Germany, 127, 128

Chinese people, 20

227

228

INDEX

Chinese public opinion, 21

Chino-Japanese war, 72

Christian ideal, 190

Clarendon, Earl of, 55, 57, 155,
157

Comite du Maroc, 80

Common interests, 14, 219

Communist Party and interna-
tional affairs, 179

"Compensations," 65, 98, 123

Conference diplomacy, 15, 219

Conferences, international tech-
nical, 219

Congress, 150

Constantinople, 54, 201

Continental system, 84

Council of Five, 130

Counter-Insurance Treaty, 70

Crimean war, 54, 55, 56, 59

Cromer, Lord, 101, 171, 172

Cromwell, 34

Crown, prerogative of the, 153,
154

Cyprus protectorate, 67

Czecho-Slovakia, 132

Czernin, Count, 106, 121, 123,
124, 169, 189

Daily Mail, London, 205

De Bass, 34

De Tocqueville, 170

De Torcy, 31, 41

Deceit, 28, 29, 39

Deception, 136

Declarations, general, 142, 144,

186
Delcassfi, M., 78
Dementi, 66, 125
Democracy, 10, 158, 159, 170,

172, 214, 221
Denmark, 37
Derby, Lord, 69
D'Estournelles de Constant,

Baron, 82
Dickinson, G. Lowes, 178
Digest of International Law,

196
Dillon, Dr. B. J., 130
Dillon, John, 81, 82, 158
Diplomaxiy, personal, 23, 52, 65,

184

Diplomacy of authority, 64
Diplomacy resembling war, 49
Diplomatic fraternity, 219
Diplomatic literature, 51
Diplomatic Service, spirit of

the, 218
Disillusionment, 200, 202
Disraeli, 50, 67, 68, 69
d'Orsat, Cardinal, 30, 33
■Double-dealing, 73
Drake, 33
Du Luc, Count, 31
Dual Alliance, 71

"Empire," 68
Ems dispatch, 63
English-speaking powers, 119,

204, 210
Experts, 8, 111

Falsiloquy, 26

Far Eastern situation, 72, 199,

201
Federalist, 150
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 113
Feria, Duke of, 33
Fez, 80

Forgach, Count, 105
France, 48, 60, 61, 62, 70, 76,

78, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 97,

117, 132, 133
Francis Joseph, Emperor, 105,

107
Franco-Hungarian intrigues,

132
Franco-Prussian war, 64
Franco-Russian Alliance, 97
Franco-Russian military con-
vention of August, 1912, 93
"Frankness," 32, 40, 64, 143
Frederick II, 38, 39, 42, 103
French Parliament, 82
"Friends of liberty," 38
Foreign Office Vote, 186
Foreign Relations of the United

States, 195
Fox, Charles James, 43

German diplomacy, 103
German-Russian agreement, 76,
77

INDEX

22d

Germany, 62, 64, 70, 71, 78, 81,

89, 95, 102, 103, 106, 176
Giolliti, Signer, 187
Gladstone, 67

Golden Rule, 47, 195
Gossip, 137

Granville, Lord, 55, 66, 157
Great Britain, 48, 65, 67, 72,
84, 88, 97, 117, 119, 143, 210
Great War, 6, 99, 112, 174, 178
Greindl, Baron, 94
Grey, Sir Edward, 80, 88, 89,

90, 96, 97, 100, 160, 178
GrpsB, M., 38

Grotius, 11, 14, 15, 24, 26
Guillaume, Baron, 94

Haldane, Viscount, 88, 100

Harris, Sir James, 29, 38, 40,
42

Harvey, T. Edmund, 97

Hayashi, Count, 73

Holy Alliance, 46

Honor, 110

House of Lords and foreign af-
fairs, 66, 153

Hughes, Secretary, 16

Human equation, 9

Human welfare, 222

Humanitarian professions, 142

Hungarian railways, 133

Ideals professed, 117, 142, 186
India, 20, 210
India, frontier of, 69
Indifference, public, 172, 173
Infallibility does not exist, 176
Instincts, 215
Isvolsky, 75, 93, 114
Italy, 117, 124
Ito, Marquis, 73

Japan, 19, 72, 73, 117, 119, 124,

126, 127, 142, 143, 199, 202
Japan, absolutism, 185
Janushkevich, General, 115
Jay, John, 150, 194, 195
Jowett, F. W., 85
Jungbluth, General, 91

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir C, 87

Enoz, Secretary, 19, 143

Korea, 143

Krupp Iron Works, 147

Labouchere, 50, 51, 55
Lalaing, Count de, 94
Lamsdorff, Count, 76, T;7
Lansdowne, Lord, 73, 79, 96
Lansing-Ishii notes, 199
Law, Bonar, 204
League of Nations, 7, 188, 218
Leutrum, Countess, 105
Liberal theory of state, 3
Lincoln, 221
Lloyd-George, 122
London, Pact of, 120, 123
Loreburn, Lord, 95, 96, 98, 116
Lords, House of, 66, 153
Louis XI, 28
Louis XV, 52
Lowell, J. R., 182
Lytton, Lord, 172

Macartney, Sir George, 37
Machiavelli, 11, 14, 24, 28, 40,

182
MacNeill, Swift, 160
Malmesbury, Lord, 29, 33, 40
Manchuria, 143
Manchurian railway neutralizar

tion, 19
Mandates, 131
Manipulations, 212, 221
Mankind, underlying unity of,

191
Manteuffel, 50
Marcy, Secretary, 50
Marlborough, Duke of, 41
"Material for statesmanship,"

215
Matin, 82

Mazarin, Cardinal, 33
Mediterranean situation, 87, 88
Mehge de la Touche, 33
Memoirs, Eighteenth Century,

25
Methods of diplomacy and of

private business, 4, 140, 163,

169
Mettemich, 35, 46, 47

230

INDEX

Militarists, German, 105, 185
Militarists, Russian, 105, 115
Military assistance, 85, 90, 92,

93
Minority interests, 183
Monarcliist diplomacy, 23
Monroe Doctrine, 18, 215
Moore, John Bassett, 196, 197
Morny, Due de, 53
Morocco, 60, 71, 78, 79, 82, 89,

101, 143
Murray, Gilbert, 172

Napoleon I, 35, 46, 48
Napoleon III, 5, 52, 53, 56, 60,

62, 63
Naval assistance, 87, 90, 92, 93
Nationalism, 11
Near East, 134
Necessity of war, 118
Newspapers, 171, 223
Nicholas 11, 56
Nicholas III, 75, 77, 115
North Pacific islands, 19, 128,

202
Notes, exchange of, November,

1912, 92

Objectives, constancy of, 212
Open covenants, 130
Open Door, 18, 144

Pact of London, 120, 123

Palmerston, 31, 54, 56, 59, 68

Panin, 37, 42, 43

Parliament and foreign aflfairs,
149 ff.

Parliament and secret diplo-
macy, 82, 85, 94, 95, 98, 149 flf.

Peace Conference of Paris, 129,
130

"Peace of Asia," 143

Pelham, 154

"People who are not responsi-
ble," 168, 216

Pester Lloyd, 110

Plnckney, 44

Plutocratic control, 183

Poincarfi, President, 93, 121

Poland, 47, 118

Policy, diplomatic, 48, 58, 166

Polish Question, 118
Politics, essence of, 13, 39
Polk, Undersecretary, 203
Port Arthur, surrender, 72
Portugal, 15, 190
Potemkiu, Prince, 41, 43
Press, control of, 145, 171
PressensS, Francis de, 80
Prestige, 176

Preventive war, 13, 64, 106, 108
Private business and diplomatic

affairs, 4, 140, 163, 169
Propaganda, 216
Prussia, 49, 53, 61, 62
Public opinion, crime against,

144
Public opinion and diplomacy,

58, 102, 112, 144, 166 ff.
Publicity, 216, 217

Rashness, alleged, of the people,
177

"Raw material for brilliant ca-
reers," 185

Realpolitik, 103

Reichstag, 102

Representative government, 58

Rjbot, Alexander, 123

Roosevelt, President, 151

Rosebery, Lord, 66

Rosebery, Lord, on Anglo- Jap-
anese treaty, 74

Rosebery, Lord, on Entente, 84

Rosen, Baron, 74

Roumania, 118

Russell, Lord John, 52, 57

Russia, 7, 37, 55, 65, 67, 70,
75, 78, 97, 104, 105, 108, 109,
114, 143, 146, 208, 212

Russian diplomatic policy, 112

Russian local agents, 54

Russo-French Alliance, 70

Russo-Turkish war, 65

Salisbury, Marquis of, 66, 157
San Domingo, 151
San Stefano, treaty of, 65
Sandwich, Earl of, 37
Savoy and Nice, 60
Sazonov, 112, 115, 133

INDEX

231

SchleBwig-Holsteiii, 61
Schuvalof agreement, 156
Secret diplomacy, abolition of,

127, 218
"Secret diplomacy" used in a

special sense, 52, 57
Secret procedure, Paris Confer-
ence, 7
Secret service, 22, 28, 41, 50,

136, 137
Secret treaties, 48, 61, 65, 67,

71, 76, 78, 79, 113, 116 ff.,

119, 134, 164
Senate and foreign affairs, 151,

197
Servian question, 104, 108, 113
Shantung, 117, 125, 128
Sixtus, Prince, of Bourbon, 120
South. Pacific Islands, 119
Soviet Russia, 133, 179
Speech of August 3, 1914, 89,

96
Spheres of Influence, 79
St. Petersburg, 40, 52, 73
Standing Committee of Foreign

Affairs, proposed, 162, 164,

186
Standing committee on foreign

and colonial affairs in France,

187
Stanhope, Lord, 31
Stratagem, 138
Stratford de Redcliffe, 54, 55,

57
Survival, 13
Suspicion, 6, 17, 54, 72, 100,

126, 136, 141
Sweden, 37

Talleyrand, 44, 46
Temps, 82
Tibet, 144

Times, London, 204, 205
Traitg de diplomatie. Garden,
48

Treaties, publication of all,

188, 205, 206
Treaty of Versailles, 129
Triple Alliance, 70
Trotsky, 179
Truthfulness of diplomacy, 12,

30
Tschirsky, Von, 77, 106, 107
Turkey, 38, 67
Turkish Empire, 60
Twenty -one demands, 117, 125
Two-party system, 152

United Colonies of America,

149
United States, 119, 151, 174,

186, 194 ff., 201, 209

Vattel, 26

Vienna, Congress of, 45

Viviani, M., 115

Walpole, Sir Robert, 154
Walpole, Horace, 45
War, declaration of, 186, 187
Washington, Conference of,

1921, 16
Wells, H. G., 185
Westminster Gazette, 204
Whist, 50
William I, 63
William II, 75, 76, 78
William III of England, 153
Willy-Nicky correspondence, 75
Wilson, President, 21, 129, 169,

200, 201, 203, 204
Wotton, Sir Henry, 28
Wyndham, i53

Xavler, Prince of Bourbon, 120,
123

Yap, 201, 202
Yerburgh, Mr., 85
Yugo-Slavia and France, 133